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ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND SEVERITY 
OF PENALTIES Hi CRIPCH^IAL STATUTES 



By 



Trueman R. Tremfole, Jr. 



A DISSERTATION PRESEt-JTED TO THE GRADUATE 
COUNCIL OF THE Ul^IIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL 
FULFIKU4ENT OF THE REQUIP^E-ENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPIiY 



UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA 
1972 



ACKNa'fLEDGEMENTS 

Initially, I want to express ray appreciation to Dr. Marvin E. 
Shaw, chairman of my dissertation ccninittee . Dr. Shaw has help- 
fully guided me at each phase of this project and, moreover, 
throughout the last three years of ray graduate education. I also 
want to thank Dr. Guillermo F. Mascaro for his interest in this 
research; the insights that he provided me are reflected in this 
paper. In addition, I am grateful for the help that Dr. C. Micliael 
Levy, Dr. Richard K. McGee, and Dr. Eliner W. Bock gave me as ccm- 
raittee numbers. Finally, I want to acknowledge four students at the 
University of Florida — David English, Mjarguerite Gamble, Pete 
Laskey, and Peggy Wagner — for their assistance iri developing the 
content analysis system and in the classification of the statutes. 



IX 



TZffiLE OF CONTENTS 

Page 

Aa<Na'ILEDGEr.'ENTS ix 

LIST OF TABLES V 

ABSTE^ACT vi 

CHAPTER 

I nTTRODUCTICN 1 

Heider's Theory X 

Perception of Causality 2 

Attribution of Responsibility 3 

Research Related to Heider's Theory 5 

Research Techniques '.-... g 

Research on AR 7 

Causal structure 7 

Other structural vciriables . 9 

Characteristics of the actor 12 

Characteristics of the attributor 13 

SunriHry 15 

Assignment of Sanction . ig 

Heider's Theory and the Criminal Law 19 

Conditions for Criminal Liability 20 

Assignrrent of Punishrr^nt 23 

Conclusions 25 

Research Problem and Hypotheses 25 

Research Problem 25 

Hypotheses 32 

Surrmary 37 

II METHOD 38 

Sairple of Statutes 33 

Statutes Selected . 38 

Preparation of Statutes for Content Analysis . 39 

Codiag the penalties 40 

Omitted material 44 

Footnoted definitions 44 



ill 



METHOD (Continued) p ^ 

Content Analysis ■ . 45 

Content Analysis System 45 

Identifying the units of analysis ..... 45 

Categories of analysis 45 

Criteria for classification 48 

Judges 50 

Procedures 51 

Severity Measurements 53 

III RESULTS 59 

Inter judge Reliability . 59 

Testing the Hypotheses 65 

Hypothesis One 65 

Hypothesis Two 67 

Florida statutes 67 

Homicide statutes 76 

W DISCUSSION 80 

Heider's Theory and Related Research ...... 80 

Causal Structure and Penalty Severity .... 80 

OutcoTie Seriousness 88 

Criminal Law 92 

Conclusions 95 

APPENDIX A STATUTES SELECTED FOR COITTENT ANZ\LYSIS AND 

ALTERATIONS OF THEIR TEXTS 99 

APPIM)IX B SYSTEM OF CONTEtTT ANALYZING CRIMINAL LM'JS 

FOR THE ATTPJBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY ... 189 

APPENDIX C ETSTRUCTIONS USED IN SELECTnxIG CRITERIA 
l-ORDS AND PHRASES FOR COI^IENT ANALYSIS 

SYSTEM 214 

APPENDIX D MATERIALS USED TO TEST THE SECOND HYPOTHESIS 

BY THE FLORIDA STATUTES 215 

REFERENCES 227 

BIOGRZ^PHICAL SKETCH - 232 



IV 



LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE - • • ■ Page 

1 Interjudge Reliability for All Statutes 
as Measured by Percentage of Tvvo-Person 

Agreements and Pi_ . 60 

2 Interjudge Reliability (Percentage of 
Two-Person Agreements) for Statutes Analyzed 

at Beginning, Middle, and End of Content Analysis . . .62 

3 Intrajudge Paliability ......... 54 

4 Percentages of Statutes Representing the 

Levels of Causality ' . ....'. ... . 66 

5 Mean Seriousness Ratings of Outcones ' 
Described in the Florida Statutes Used to 

Test the Second Hypothesis 69 

6 Summary of Analysis of Variance for 

Penalties Prescribed in the Florida Statutes . . . . 71 

7 Mean Penalty as a Function of Level of ■ 

Causality and Degree of Outcome Seriousness ..... 73 

8 Mean Outccxne-Seriousness Rating as a. 

Function of Level of Causality .......,' 75 

9 Severity of Penalties Prescribed in the 
Hanicide Statutes Representing the. . , :_ r 

Levels of Causality 77 



Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the 
Graduate Council of the University of Florida in Partial 
Fulfillment of the Requireirents for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 



ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY AND SEVERITY 
OF PENALTIES IN CRIMINAL STATUTES 

By 

Trueman R. Tremble, Jr. 

August, 1972 

Chairman: Marvin E, Shaw 
Major Department: Psychology 

According to Heider's theory of the attribution of responsibility, 
the amount of responsibility attributed to an actor for an event is de- 
pendent upon the extent to which personal factors, as opposed to environ- 
mental factors, are perceived to have caused tiie event. To study this 
theory, a content analysis of criminal laws was undertaken to determine 
first, the extent to which the different levels of causality (ccmnission, 
foreseeability, intentionality, and justification) described the condi- 
tions under which a person may be held liable for criminal conduct and, 
second, the severity of the penalties prescribed in than. 

Three judges categorized each of 272 Florida statutes and 187 non- 
Florida hcmicide statutes at one of the four levels of causality on the 
basis of the definition of the punishable conduct presented in the statute. 
The severity of the penalties prescribed in a sarrple of the statutes was 



VI 



also measured. As a control measure, 31 university students rated 

the seriousness of the outccmes described in 90 of the Florida statutes. 

Supporting the first hypothesis, the distribution of the statutes 
across the levels of causality differed such that the levels of fore- 
seeability and intentionality most frequently described the conditions 
for criminal liability. Corparing the penalties prescribed in statutes 
classified at the four levels, the penalties increased in severity from 
the level of foreseeability to the level of intentionality and then de- 
creased at the level of justification; these findings supported the 
second hypothesis. As would be expected, other incidental results in- 
dicated that more severe penalties tended to be prescribed for more 
serious outcomes. 

Since criminal liability typically appeared to be contingent upon 
a contribution of personal factors greater than the mere caimission of 
the criuiinal conduct and since the severity of the penalties tended to 
vary with the degree of personal causation, the results were interpreted 
as supporting and increasing the generalizability of Heider's theory. 
Together with the results of past research on this theory, the results 
of this study also tentatively suggested that the principle of retribu- 
tion is reflected in the conditions for criminal liability and in the 
severity of penalties as set forth in criminal sta-tutes. 



vxi 



ampTER 1 



INTRODUCTION 



Heider's (1958) t±ieory of the attribution of responsibility 
(AR) has provided a framewDrk for recent research on AR by indi- ■ 
viduals. Legal discussions of criminal liability and psychologi- 
cal research raise the possibility that the causal structures out- 
lined by Heider's theory are represented in the criminal law and, 
in turn, are related to the severity of the penalties prescribed 
by the law. Given this possibility, the purpose of the present 
study was to test predictions based upon Heider's theory by a con- 
tent analysis of criminal statutes. 

Heider's Theory 
In discussing the conditions under v^ich an individual attrib- 
utes responsibility to an actor for the outccmes of his actions, 
Heider enphasized the phencanenology of the attributing individual 
and, more specifically, the attributor's perceptions of the causal 
relationship between the actor and his action outcor^s. As a gen- 
eral thesis, Heider proposed that the amount of responsibility at- 
tributed to an actor for an event increases with tlie extent to 
which personal factors a""e perceived to have caused the event. 



Perception of Causality 

According to Heider, when an individual observes a relation- 
stiip between an actor and an action outcome, he perceptually dif- 
ferentiates between the extent to vdxLch personal factors and en- 
vironmental factors contributed to the outccane. Personal factors 
include the. perceived £ibility, expended effort, and especially 
the intentions of the actor. Environmental factors consist of 
those situational characteristics, such as social norms and task 
requirements, which would influence anyone acting in the situa- 
tion. Depending upon the perceived influence of personal and 
environmental factors, the individual forms different impres- 
sions about the causal relationship between the actor and the 
action outcome. 

Heider delineated two types of causal inrpressions . The first, 
referred to as personal causality, describes those situations in 
which the actor is perceived to have intentionally produced eai out- 
cone. According to Ifei.der, intentionality phencmenologically sig- 
nifies that the actor directed his abilities and efforts in order 
to achieve the particular outcome. Consequently, causality for 
tiie outcone is attributed to the person (i.e., the actor) when he 
is perceived to have intentionally produced it. The second form 
of causal inpression, referred to as inpersonal causality, de- 
scribes those situations in wliich the actor is perceived to have 
unintentionally produced an outcome. Under these circumstances, 
environrrental factors, such as luck, are perceived to have deter- 



mined vdiich outcome woiold be produced, and causality is attributed 
to the environment rather than to the person. 

Attribution of Responsibility 

The perceived causal relationship is a principal determinant 
of AR in Heider's formulation. According to his general proposal, 
the amount of responsibility attributed for an action outcare varies 
with the extent to which personal factors, as opposed to environ- 
mental factors, are perceived to have caused the outcome. Thj.s pro- 
posal reflects Heider's notion that causation for personally caused 
events is attributed to the person rather than to the environment. 
That is, in tlie attributor's phenonenology , personally caused events 
are more ijitimately linked to the acting person. Judgments of re- 
sponsibility, thus, depend on the extent to v^aich the actor is per- 
ceived to have been actively and intiicately involved in causing the 
event. 

In elaborating upon this proposal, Heider identified five sets 
of conditions, or levels of causality, under vrfiich responsii>ility 
iray be attributed. As originally presented, the levels represent 
stages of cognitive developioit such that across the successive 
levels, tlie attributor draws finer distinctions between tlie causal 
influence of personal and environmental factors. At each successive 
level, the attributor also requires a greater causal contribution 
of f^rsonal factors before attributing responsibility. An alter- 
native conception of the levels, which is more compatible with the 



present research, is that the levels simply describe different 
\vays of perceiving the causal relationship between an actor and 
his action outcofies either by different individuals in the sane 
sitiaation or by the sariie individual across situations. 

In the order of increasing cognitive sophistication, the 
first of Heider ' s levels may be referred to as the level of as- 
sociation . At this level, the actor is held responsible for out- 
corres associated with him in any way. At the level of caimission, 
tlie second level, responsibility is attributed to the actor for 
outcomes that he actually produced, regardless of the foresee- 
c±)ility of the outcanes. At the next level, the level of fore- 
seeability , responsibility is attributed to the actor for out- 
comes that he might have foreseen that his actions would produce 
even though he did not necessarily intend to produce them. Im- 
personal causality characterizes the causal structures underly- 
ing the first tliree levels . At the f ourtli level , the level of_ 
intentionality , responsibility is attributed for intentionally 
produced outcorres. Personal causality, therefore, underlies AR 
at the fourth level. At the level of justification , the fifth 
level, less responsibility is attributed for intentionally pro- 
duced outcorres if the actor is perceived to have been influenced 
by environmental factors that would cause most individuals to feel 
and act as he did. Although personal causality characterizes AR 
at the fifth J.evel, the attributor takes into account the source 
of the actor's intentions and attributes less responsibility if 



t±ie actor is perceived to have been rnotivated by environmental 
factors . 

Heider proposed that 7VR increases with the relative extent 
to ■which personal factors are perceived to have caused the event. 
Inspecting the extent to vAiich personal factors characterize the 
causal structures of the five levels, personal factors are in- 
creasingly required for AR from the level of association to the 
level of intentional ity; at the level of justification, there is 
a relative decrease in the perceived influence of personal factors 
vdien the actor is perceived to liave been motivated by environrren- 
tal factors. Congruent with this characterization is an hypothe- 
sis which was first elaborated and tested by Shaw and Sulzer (1964) 
and v^hich was a basis of the present study. According to this hy- 
pothesis, if a ccarparison is rrade among the amounts of responsi- 
bility attributed by adults for events representing each level, 
AR increases from the level of association to the level of inten- 
tionality and then decreases at the level of justification. 

Research Related to Heider 's Theory 
A niJinber of studies have sterm'ed from Heider 's theoiry. The 
results of tliis research liave generally supported Heider 's thesis 
that AR varies with the perceived causal influence of personal fac- 
tors. In addition to causal structure, other structural character- 
istics of the event, characteristics of the actor, and character- 
istics of tlie attributor have also been shoT,\zn to influence AR. This 



research lias also dQinnstrated t±at the sanctioning process is re- 
lated to AR. 

Research Techniques 

In the first eirpirical test of Heider's theory, Shaw and SiiLzer 
(1964) sought to compare AR for events representing Heider's levels 
of causality. To do so, they wrote short stories for each level that 
linked a fictitious person to an action outcome by the causal struc- 
ture of the level. Stories at the level of foreseeability, for ex- 
anple, portrayed a person v^io produced an outcoire under conditions 
such that he might have foreseen that his actions would produce it. 
Individuals read the stories and judged vdiether and to \\hat extent 
the person described was responsible for the outcone. In addition 
to causal structure, the influence of other variables on AR can be 
studied by this technique. Outcone quality, for exanple, can be 
studied by nnnipulating the favorability of the outcorres described 
in the stories. Most of the studies directly related to Heider's 
theory have used Slnaw and SixLzer's technique (Briscoe, 1970; Cuthbert, 
1966; Day, 1969; Garcia-Esteve & Shaw, 1968; Kronstadt, 1965, 1967; 
I'fcan, 1958; Mussenden, 1971; Schneider & Shaw, 1970; Shaw, 1967, 
1968; Shav7, Briscoe, & Garcia-Esteve, 1967; Shaw & Reitan, 1969; ■; 
Shaw & Schneider, 1969a, 1969b; Sulzer, 1964; Sulzer & Burglass, : - 
1968). -_ - -.- . - . :- 

In a number of studies , AR or a phencmenon similar to it has ■ 
been investigated without systerratically varying the levels of cau-: 



sality. The techniques used in this research were, neveirtlrieless , 
similar to Shaw and Sulzer's technique in that stimulus materials 
describing events were presented to individuals vjho then judged 
the responsibility of characters involved in the events. The stim- 
ulus materials used have included the following: written scripts 
or narratives (Gilmore, 1966; Gordon & Jacobs, 1969; Lackey, 1968; 
Landy & Aronson, 1969; Shaver, 1970a, 1970b; Shaw, J., & Skolnick, 
1971; Shaw, Floyd, & Gwin, 1971; Tesser, Gatewood, & Driver, 1968), 
tape recordings (Walster, 1966, 1967), pictures describing social 
interactions (Forbes & Mitchell, 1971; Wright, 1961), and films of 
silhouetted characters (Wright, 1967) . Unless otherwise itentioned, 
the research reviewed in this paper was conducted by means of either 
Shaw and Sulzer's technique or one of the other techniques related 
to it. 

Research on AR 

Causal structure . — One hypothesis tested by Shaw and Siilzer 
(1964) was that corrparing the amounts of responsibility attributed 
by adults for events representing Heider's levels, AR increases 
from the level of association to the level of intentionality and 
then decreases at the level of justification. To test this hy- 
pothesis, university students rated stories like those described 
earlier. Half of the stories at each level linked the fictitious 
person to positive outcoires, and the other half described negative 
outcomes. The results of the study generally supported the hy- 



pothesis. Using t±ie same technique, the relationship between AR 
and causal structure has been subsequently investigated across 
outcomes varying in quality and intensity (e.g., Shaw & Reitan, 
1969; Sulzer, 1964); acts of canmission and omission (Briscoe, 
1970); and such si±iject variables as cultural background (e.g., 
Garcia-Esteve & Shaw, 1968). Although these studies have demon- 
strated that variables other than causal structure influence AR, 
they have also fairly consistently supported the hypothesized re- 
lationship between AR and causal structure. 

Tremble and Shaw (1972) tested this hypothesis in a field set- 
ting and by a different research strategy. Based on their responses 
to opinion statements, university students and members of the sxar- 
rounding ccrrmunity were grouped at the levels of causality which rep- 
resented their perceptions of a U. S. Army lieutenant's involveiiBnt 
in killing civilians during the Viet Nam conflict (popularly known 
as the "^ly Lai Incident") . A coiparison was then irade among the 
amounts of responsibility attributed to the lieutenant by individuals 
grouped at the levels of ccrardssion, foreseeability, intentionality, 
and justification. In support of Heider's theoiry, AR tended to in- 
crease from the amoxmt attributed by individuals who perceived the 
event as represented by the level of ccmmission to the amount attrib- 
uted by individuals perceiving the event at the level of intentional- 
ity, and relatively less responsibility was attributed by individuals 
whose perceptions represented the level of justification. 



Taken together, these studies provide considerable support 
for the hypothesis that AR increases from the level of associa- 
tion to the level of intentionality and then decreases at the 
level of justification. It appears, therefore, that the perceived 
causal structure of an event as defined by Heider's levels is a 
c3etenninant of the ainount of AR. In supporting this hypothesis, 
support is also garnered for Heider's general thesis that AR varies 
with the perceived causal influence of personal factors. 

Other structural variables . — In addition to causal structure, 
other variables characterizing the structure of the event appear 
to influence AR, These variables include outccsne quality, outcome 
intensity, and the nature of the action. 

Outcorre quality refers to vdiether the outccnie is positive (fa- 
vorable) or negative (unfavorable) . In a number of studies, Shaw 
and Sulzer's technique has been used to compare the airoijnts of re- 
sponsibility attributed for positive and negative outccrres (Day, 
1969; Garcia-Esteve & Shaw, 1968; Kronstadt, 1965, 1967; Mban, 1968; 
Mussenden, 1971; Shaw, 1968; Shaw, Briscoe, & Garcia-Esteve, 1967; 
Shaw & Reitan, 1969; Shaw & Schneider, 1969b; Shaw & Sulzer, 1964; 
Sulzer, 1964) . A relatively consistent finding of these studies 
has been that more responsibility is attributed for negative than 
pDsitive outcomes. In addition, outcome quality has been fotoid to 
interact with causal structure. Although the data are not conplete- 
ly consistent with respect to the nature of this interaction, it 
appears that more responsibility is attributed for negative out- 



10 



cowBS especially at tJie levels of foreseeability, intentionality, 
and justification. 

When causal structure has not been systematically varied, how- 
ever, mi^ed findings have been obtained for the relationship between 
outcane quality and AR. Wright (1961) did not report significant 
differences between the amounts of responsibility attributed for 
positive and negative outcores. In contrast, coiparatively greater 
AR scores for negative outcomes have been reported in two other 
studies (Shaw, Floyd, & Gwin, 1971; Wright, 1967) . 

A second outcore variable that influences AR is the degree of 
favorability of the outcarre, conmonly referred to as outcai:^ inten- 
sity. In research conducted by Shaw and Sulzer's technique (Briscoe, 
1970; Cuthbert, 1966; Day, 1969; Garcia-Esteve & Shaw, 1968; Kronstadt, 
1965, 1967; l-toan, 1968; Shaw, 1968; Shaw, Briscoe, & Garcia-Esteve, 
1967; Shaw & Reitan, 1969; Shaw & Schneider, 1969b; Sulzer, 1964), 
it has typically been reported that more responsibility is attrib- 
uted for high intensity than for low intensity outcoiTes but that 
the extent of this relationship depends upon the causal structure 
of the event. Like outcone quality, intensity appears to hiave its 
greatest effects at the levels of foreseeability and justification. 

VJhen causal structure has not been systematically varied, no 
consistent relationship has been found between AR and outcome in- 
tensity. Walster (1966), for example, investigated the amount of 
responsibility attributed for accidental outcort^s and found a pos- 
itive relationship between AR and the severity of the outcome. In 



11 



six studies sterrming from Walster's research, two reported either 
an inverse relationship between AR and outcome severity or the di- 
rection of this relationship to be dependent upon the quality of 
the outcome (Shaw, J., & Skolnick, 1971; Walster, 1967); nonsig- 
nificant relationships were obtained in the remaining four studies 
(Shaver, 1970a, 1970b; Walster, 1967). 

A third structural variable that appears to influence AR is 
the nature of the act. For the levels of f oreseeability , inten- 
tionality, and justification, Briscoe (1970) ccnpared the amount 
of responsibility attributed for outcomes produced by acts of ccm- 
raission with the amount attributed for outcomes produced by acts 
of omission. As predicted, more responsibility was attributed 
v^en the outcome was produced by an act of cormission. 

In surrmary, AR appears to be influenced by outcome quality, 
outccme intensity, and the nature of the act especially vdien caus- 
al structure is systematically varied. It has typically been 
found that outcoit^ quality and intensity have their greatest ef- 
fects for events representing the levels of foreseeability and 
justification. The influence of outccaiB variables, there fore, is 
somewhat 'dependent on tlie causal structure of the event. As 
Sulzer (1964) noted, the causal influence of personal factors 
is somewhat ambiguous at the levels of foreseeability and jus- 
tification; variations in outcome quality and intensity perhaps 
'alter the perceived influence of personal factors at these levels 
more than at the otiier levels . When the effects of outcome var- 



12 



iables have been investigated without systematically varying the 
levels of causality, inconsistent results have been obtained. 
This inconsistency perhaps reflects the interaction between outccme 
variables and causal structure. In the studies on accidental out- 
comes, for exanple, the inconsistent results nay be partly explained 
by the finding that the effects of outcome intensity are not as 
great at the level of ccxnmission as they are at sowe of the other 
levels . 

Characteristics of the actor . — In addition to the structural 
variables, the actor's characteristics appear to affect the amount 
of responsibility attributed to him. Wright (1961) reported that 
subjects were more willing to attribute responsibility and attrib- 
uted more responsibility to authority figures than to peers. Sim- 
ilarly, Shaw and Sulzer (1964) found a tendency for children to 
attribute more responsibility to adults than to children. Using 
a sanple of black respondents, Forbes and Mitchell (1971) studied 
the amount of blame assigned to a stimulus person who was portrayed 
as frustrating another person; they foiand that more blaire was as- 
signed when a white person was portrayed as frustrating a black 
person than when a black person was portrayed as frustrating a 
\^iite person. The results of the three studies just presented 
perhaps reflect processes similar to those demonstrated by Lackey 
(1968) and Shaver (1970a) . Investigating the effects cf inter- 
personal similarity on AR, these researchers found that an attrib- 
utor assigned less responsibility to an actor vdien he assumed that 



13 



the actor was similar to himself than vAien he assxjmed that the 
actor was dissimilar. 

Other characteristics of the actor have been found to influ- - 
ence the amount of AR. Gilmore (1966) demonstrated that inental - ■ 
health workers were iriore willing to attribute responsibility and ■ 
attributed inore responsibility to a mentally healthy person than 
to a nientally ill person. Both VJright (1967) and Shaw, Floyd, 
and Gwin (1971) investigated the perceived source of the actor's 
motivation and found that more responsibility was attributed to - 
an inteinally rnotivated actor than to an externally motivated 
actor. Gordon and Jacobs (1969) , however, reported that the - - 
socio-economic status of an accused person did not appreciably - - ■ 
affect the proportion of individuals judging him guilty of 
burglary. 

Characteristics of the attributor . — ^A.s Heider's theory is 
concerned with the phenomenology of the individual, a number of 
studies have investigated the effects of characteristics of the . 
attributor on AR. Among the subject variables investigated have ■ 
been age, etlmicity, variables related to intellectual performance, 
and personality characteristics. 

One purpose of Shaw and Sulzer's (1964) study was to ccrtpare 
the amounts of responsibility attributed by second-grade children 
with the amounts attributed by college students for events repre- 
senting Heider ' s levels . Ihey found that children emitted a rel- 
atively less differentiated pattern of AR. That is, carrpared to '■ 



14 



adults, childi^n tended to attribute more responsibility at the 
levels of association and cortmission and to attribute less re- 
sponsibility at the levels of f oreseeability , intentionality, and 
justification. In subsequent studies (Garcia-Esteve & Shaw, 1968; 
Kronstadt, 1967; Moan, 1968; Shaw, Briscoe, & Garcia-Esteve, 1967; 
Shaw & Schneider, 1969b) , the relationship between age and AR has 
been investigated nore extensively. Kronstadt (1967), for exarrple, 
grouped subjects at several age levels and found that the typical 
adult pattern — increasing AR from the level of association to the 
level of intentionality with relatively less responsii)ility attril)- 
uted at the level of justification — tended to emerge by ages 10-12. 
These findings support Heider's representation of the levels of 
causality as stages of developmental sophistication. 

In addition to age, the effects of the cultural background 
of the attributor have been examined (Garcia-Esteve & Shaw, 1968; 
Shaw, 1968; Shaw, Briscoe, & Garcia-Esteve, 1967; Shaw & Schneider, 
1969b) . To surmiarize the findings of this research, ethnic back- 
ground has been found to influence AR; however, ethnic differences 
have been found to be most prominent in younger subjects. Shaw 
and Schneider (1969b) , for exairple, demonstrated that 7-8 year old 
black children attributed more responsibility than conparably aged 
v\Siite children, that the pattern of AR for 9-10 year old black 
children was less differentiated than that for white children, but 
that the AR scores for older black and white children (11-12 and 
17-19 years) did not significantly differ. 



15 



AltJiough intelligence is apparently related to cognitive de- 
velopment and sophistication, Shaw and Schneider (1969a) failed 
to find a systematic relationship between intelligence and AR, 
Kronstadt (1967) , however, reported that the development of the 
typical adult pattern of AR was sortewhat retarded in children with 
primary learning disabilities. 

Finally, several personality characteristics have been shown 
to affect AR. Cuthbert (1966) found that highly authoritarian 
individuals attributed more responsibility than low authoritarians 
for events representing the levels of foreseeability and justifica- 
tion. Similarly, Sulzer and Burglass (1968) demonstrated that em- 
pathetic ability and punitiveness influenced the amount of respon- 
sibility attributed at the levels of foreseeability and justifica- 
tion. Wright (1967) reported that intolerance of ambiguity accen- 
tuated the extent to which more responsibility was attributed for 
negative than positive events. Self -acceptance and rigidity of 
self-concept have also been found to affect AR (Wright, 1961) . Non- 
significant effects, however, have been obtained for perceived locus 
of control (Lackey, 1968), social desirability (Mussenden, 1971), 
and for record of criminality (Moan, 1968; Mussenden, 1971). 

Sunmary . — A number of variables appear to influence AR. The 
causal structure of the event as defined by Heider's levels of cau- 
sality has been repeatedly shown to be an inportant determinant. 
These findings support Heider's proposal that AR varies with the 
extent to which personal factors are perceived to have caused the 



16 



event. Interacting with causal structure, outcotie quality and in- 
tensity influence AR so that nore responsibility is attributed for 
negative than positive outcomes and for high intensity thaji low in- 
tensity outcomes. Finally, characteristics of the actor, such as 
his perceived similarity, and of the attributor, such as cultural 
background, are related to AR. 

Assignment of Sanction 

When a person is judged responsible for an action outccxna, he 
is believed to be accountable for his behavior, and this judgment 
presumably makes him susceptible to sanctioning. Sulzer (1964) 
and Shaw and Reitan (1969) have rraintained that a distinction should 
be nade between the AR for an event and the actucd assignment of 
sanction (AS) for it. According to this position, AR and AS are 
interrelated phencmena in that AR provides a frame\vork for AS; 
however, factors in addition to AR determine the sanction that is 
actually assigned. The research evidence tends to support this 
position; however, the nature of the differences between AR and AS 
does not appear to preclude the use of AS as an indicator of AR. 

Like AR, the relationships between AS and such variables as 
the type of the act (Briscoe, 1970); cultural background and age 
(Schneider & Shaw, 1970; Shaw, 1967); intelligence (Shaw & Schneider, 
1969a) ; record of criminality (Mussenden, 1971) ; personality char- 
acteristics (Cuthbert, 1966; Mussenden, 1971); and attraction to 
the accused (Landy & Aronson, 1969) have been explored. Due to 



17 



the amount of research available, however, AR and AS can be best cam- 
pared with respect to the effects of causal structure, outccare quality, 
and outcome intensity. 

Using Shaw and Sulzer's technique, Sulzer (1964) first investi- 
gated the effects of causal structure on AS. Sulzer and subsequent 
researchers (Briscoe, 1970; Cuthbert, 1966; Mussenden, 1971; Schneider & 
Shaw, 1970; Shaw, 1967; Shaw & Reitan, 1969; Itanble & Shaw, 1972) have 
found tlTat AS generally follows the pattern obtained for AJ^ — I^ tends 
to increase from the level of association to the level of intentional- 
ity and then decrease at the level of justification, Outccme quality 
(Mussenden, 1971; Schneider & Shaw, 1970; Shaw, 1967; Shaw & Reitan, 
1969; Sulzer, 1964) and outcome intensity (Briscoe, 1970; Cuthbert, 
1966; Schneider & Shaw, 1970; Shaw, 1967; Shaw & Reitan, 1969; Sulzer, 
1964) also appear to affect AR and AS in the same direction. Like AR, 
greater sanction is assigned for negative than positive outcomes and 
for high intensity than low intensity outccmes; hovvever, these outccsne 
characteristics interact with causal structure so that outcome quality 
and intensity most greatly affect AS at the levels of foreseeability, 
intentionality, and justification. 

Although causal structure, outcome quality, and outcome in- 
tensity influence AR and AS in the same direction, these variables 
appear tx) affect AR and AS to different degrees. First, AR and 
AS follov; the same pattern across Heider's levels; however, the 
amount of responsibility attributed for an outcome has generally 
been found to be greater than, or at least as great as, the amount 



18 



of sanction assigiised for it. In directly carrparing the amounts of 
AR and AS, both Si^v and Reitan (1969) and Briscoe (1970) foiond AR - 
to be greater than &S. Similarly, Sulzer (1964) reported that the 
proportion of individuals willing to attribute responsibility for " - 
an event was usually greater than the proportion willing to assign 
a sanction for it. Cuthbert (1966) found that causal structure ac- 
counted for a greafer proportion of the variance in AR scores than 
in AS scores. 'These, findings indicate that causal structijre more . . .; 
strongly influences the amount of AR than the amount of AS, 

Outcome varisMes, on the other hand, appear to affect AS rrore . 
than AR. Sulzer (1964) , Cuthbert (1966) , and Briscoe (1970) found 
tliat variations in outcore intensity produced greater variations in 
AS than in AR. Shsw and Reitan (1969) also concluded that AS is 
relatively more determined by outcome intensity. In addition to out- 
care intensity, Sulzer reported that outcone quality appeared to in- 
fluence AS iDore thsm. AR. 

These findings support the position advanced by Sulzer (1964) .- : 
and Shaw and Reitaii (1969) . Since causal structure and the outcome 
variables affect 2® and AS to different degrees, AR and AS do appear 
to be different pheicirena. Ihey are, nevertheless, interrelated 
phenomena. Ihat is, since AR is generally greater than, or at least 
as great as , AS , AjR appears to provide a f rarrework for AS by setting 
an upper limit on the amt:)unt of AS. After this framework has been 
established, other variables, such as outcoire intensity, appear to 
determine the arcomit of sanction finally assigned. . . 



19 



Although causal structure and the outcoine variables differ- 
entially influence AR and AS, the nature of these differences does 
not seem to preclude the use of AS as an indicator of AR. Of par- 
ticular signif iciance , AR and AS tend to follow a similar pattern 
acixiss Heider's levels of causality. It seems possible, tlierefore, 
to use a measure of AS as an indicator of AR in order to study pre- 
dictions related to Heider's theory in settings vdiere a direct mea- 
sure of AR cannot be obtained. 

Heider's Iheor^^ and the Criminal Law 
V'flTenever a person is judged guilty of a crime, a form of re- 
sponsibility is being attributed to him. The criminal law, thus, 
is one area of everyday experience in v±iich AR is a frequently oc- 
curring process. Inspection of legal theory and of more descriptive 
accounts of the conditions for criminal liability reveals consider- 
able overlap betaveen Heider's levels of causality and the conditions 
under which a person may incur criminal liability. In addition, 
psychological research guided by both Heider's theory and the crim- 
inal law has obtained evidence suggesting that variables caiprising 
Heider's levels are similarly related to both the severity of the 
punishments assigned by individuals and the severity of the penalties 
prescribed in criminal statutes. These correspondences between 
Heider's tlieory and individual processes, on the one hand, and Heider's 
theory and the criminal law, on the other hand, raise the possibility 
of st'jdying of Heider's theory in the context of the criminal law. 



20 



Conditions for Criminal Liability 

Under what conditions nay a person be judged guilty of a crime, 
that is, held criminally liable? In delineating principles of the 
criminal law, Hall (1960) outlined the ideal conditions for criminal 
liability. As an initial limiting condition. Hall maintained that 
the ordinarily reasonable adixLt should be held liable only for con- 
duct which has been established by the law as criminal and punish- 
able. Only certain types of activities, however, should be defined 
as criminal. Specifically, liability should be incurred for conduct 
that created or caused effects v^ich are considered to be socially 
harmful. If a person has corrmitted socially harmful conduct, his 
liability should be further contingent upon the mental state or mens 
rea that accompanied his conduct. According to Hall, the person 
should have at least been avare of the effects of his conduct. If 
the person had been a^mxe of the harm produced by his actions, he 
may be held liable either if he intentionally produced the harm or 
if he chose to act and, thereby, heedlessly and recklessly produced 
it. Hall contended that the mens r-ea requirement just outlined is 
the crowning principle of the crinunal law. It assures that a person 
is held responsible for socially harmful conduct which is truly his 
own conduct. As a system of subjective morality underlies the law, 
the mens rea requirement also guarantees ttiat the person who is crim- 
inally liable is also morally responsible. 

While Hall outlined the ideal conditions, discussions of the 
elenents or components of crimes (Corpus Juris Secundum , 1961; Florida 



21 



Jurisprudence , 1956; Perkins, 1969) provide nore descriptive ac- 
counts of the conditions under which a person nay be held liable. - 
Traditionally, a crime has two corponents: objective behaviors - '- 
and the mental state (the mens rea) acccxrpanying the behavior."'- -' 
For a person to be held liable for a certain crime, it must be 
demonstrable that he emitted the behaviors delineated by the law 
and, additionally, that his conduct followed fron the rcois rea -■' 
also specified by the law. As rroitioned earlier, Hall maintaiiied -■ - 
that a person should be held criminally liable only if he had been 
aware of tlie effects of Ms conduct. Discussions of the defini- .' 
tions of crimes , hov^ver , reveal that there Is considerable var- - 
iation in the iroital states specified for different crirres and 
that these mental states do not necessarily conform to Hall's spec- 
ifications . It seems possible to distribute the mens rea coipo- " 
nents of most crimes along a continuum ranging frcm, at one end, 
a premeditated intent to produce tlie particular harm to, at the 
other end, criminal negligence due to a failure to be aware of 
the contingencies of vM.ch one should, have been aware . Crines - -■ 
known as the strict liability crimes, however, do not appear to 
belong to this continuiin. Strict liability crimes are defined 
without reference to the mental state of the perpetrator so that ■' ' 
the coimdssion of the specified conduct is the major ODndition 
for criminal liability. -' :■..-;. 

The law also takes into account justifying and excusing con- 
ditions. Based upon Perkins' (1969) analysis ,. three types of- ' 



22 



justifications and excuses can be identified: (1) characteristics 
of the person which are considered to reduce his capacity to enter- 
tain the requisite mens rea (e.g., insanity, involuntary intoxi- 
cation, immaturity) , (2) modifying circumstances that also reduce 
the capacity to entertain the requisite mens rea (e.g. , ignorance 
of fact, necessity) , and (3) circumstances Wnich place social values 
in conpetition (e.g., public authority, prevention of criine) . While 
Hall (1960) as v;ell as Perkins underscored the effects of justifi- 
cations and excuses on the mens rea requir orient. Packer (1968) an- 
phasized that the recognition of such extenuating conditions also 
serves to protect the individual's freedom and autonor^. As indi- 
catai by Perkins, extenuating conditions can either totally excul- 
pate a person or reduce his guilt to sane lesser degree. 

Based upon this presentation, there appears to be considerable 
similarity betv.^een the conditions for crimixial liability and the 
conditions for AR as outlined by Heider's levels of causality. 
Ihe commission of the conduct for v/hich responsibility is attrib- 
uted is an inportant condition in both the law and Heider's theory. 
Except for the strict liability offenses v^ch appear to be repre- 
sented by' Heider's level of commission, criminal liability is also 
contingent on the mens rea associated with the commission of the 
conduct. Tlie mens rea elements of crimes appear to vary fron neg- 
ligence to preri-editated intentionality, and the causal structures 
represented in Heider's levels of foreseeability and intentionality 
lie within this range. Altliough the legal concept of justification 






23 



is broader than Heider ' s concept and includes tlie personal char- 
acteristics of the actor, justifying conditions reduce responsi- 
bility in both the criminal law and Heider 's theory. 

Assignment of Punishinent 

Guided by both Heider 's theory and the criminal law, Friedrich 
(1965) investigated the punishments assigned by individuals and 
in criminal laws for harmfiiL acts produced under varying condi- 
tions. According to Friedrich, Heider believed that an individual 
judges another person's culpability by referring his observations 
of the person's behavior to a set of assiitiptions , beliefs, and ex- 
pectations concerning the conditions of responsibility. ' Speculat- 
ing that the theory and practice of the criminal law reflect the 
ordinary person's fraiiewDrk for judging culpability, Friedrich ex- 
amined lav; texts and cases in order to identify variables that 
influence such judgments. 

Based upon this examination, Friedrich predicted that the 
following four variables influence the amount of punishment as- 
signed for hannful acts: (1) the severity of the harm, (2) the 
actor's foreloiowlesdge of the hannful consequences produced by the 
act, (3) past provocation to the actor, and (4) present threat to 
the actor. Several degrees were distinguished for each of these 
\7ariables. The three degrees of foreknowledge, for exanple, v^ere 
the impossibility of knowing of the harmful consequences, scfiie 
knowledge of tlie harmful conseqaences , and clear knowledge of the 



24 



iTarmful consequences. For each possible ccanbinatdon of the four 
variables, a story was written about a hypothetical actor v*io 
harmed another person. Individuals read each story and rated the 
amount of punishment that the actor should receive. In addition, 
fcvTO law professors jointly identified the penalty that the New 
York Penal Code would prescribe for the actor. 

For the ratings iiade by individioals, Friedrich found that 
progressively niore punishment was assigned as the severity of the 
harm and as the actor ' s foreknowledge of the harm increased . Less 
punishinent \^ra.s assigned when the actor had been provoked or was 
currently being threatened by the person he harmed. The severity 
of the penalties prescribed in the penal code tended to increase 
or decrease in the same manner as did the ratings rrade by individuals 
with, the major exception being that the criminal code prescribed 
a nore severe penalty, rather than a less severe penalty, for pro- 
voked acts. 

From variables extracted fron the criminal law, Friedrich ap- 
pears to have generated Heider's levels of ccnmission, foreseeabil- 
ity, justification, and possibly intentional ity. In doing so, 
Friedrich 's research further demonstrates the conceptual similarity 
between the criminal law and Heider's theoiry of AR. Friedrich 's 
findings rejgarding the severity of punishments aire perhaps of even 
greater significance. The results generally suggest that the pen- 
alties prescribed in a criminal code are sensitive to the causal 
v-ariables ccmprising Heider's levels of causality; more specifically. 



25 



they suggest that both the punislTnients assigned by individijals 
and the penalties prescribed in the law are similarly related to 
these variables. 

Conclusions 

In conclusion, there appears to be considerable siiTiilarity 
between the conditions for criminal liability and the conditions 
for AR as outlined by Heider's levels of causality. This simi- 
larity raises the possibility of interpreting the conditions for 
criminal liability in terms of Heider's levels of causality. Using 
fictitious events, Friedrich found that tl:ie severity of the pen- 
alties prescribed in criminal lav/s and the severity of the punish- 
ments assigned by individuals tended to be similarly related to 
variables conprising the levels of causality. This finding sug- 
gests that the penalties prescribed in laws could be used to study 
the punishments assigned for events representing the levels of 
causality. 

Research Problem and Hypotheses 
The discussions of criiunal liability and Friedrich 's research 
suggest that Heider's theory is reflected in tine conditions for 
criminal liability and in the penalties prescribed for crirres. The 
purpose of the present research, thus, was to study Heider's theory 
in the context of the cr:ininal law. To do so, criminal statutes 
were content analyzed to determine the levels of causality at vdiich 
persons nay be held responsible and punish^able for criminal conduct. 



26 



The content analysis then afforded the opportunity to test tivo 
predictions derived from Heider's theory and related research. 

Research Problem. 

One function of criminal statutes is to define and describe 
the socially harmful conduct that is punishable by the law. In 
order for a person to be held liable for a crime defined by a 
statute, it must be derronstrable that his behavior conformed to 
tlie definition of the criire (Corpus Juris Secundum , 1961) ; thus, 
statutory' definitions of crimes appear to outline the conditions 
under which a person iray be judged responsible and punishable. 
Heider's levels of causality rnay also be considered to describe 
different sets of conditions under which responsibility is attrib- 
uted. By doing so, Heider's theory vas studied in the context of 
the criminal law. Statutes v^iich defined crimes and prescribed 
penalties v,ere first classifiexJ into categories representing 
Heider's levels. In this rrenner, the levels of causality ^N^ch 
described the statutory conditions for criminal liability were 
ascertained. Having content analyzed the statutes, it was then 
possible to examine botli the differential representation of the 
levels and the severity of the penalties prescribed in statutes 
classified at the different levels. 

lb execute this study, criminal laws had to be divided into 
units that could be placed into categories representing Heider's 
levels and that simultaneously preserved an identifiable connec- 



27 



tion between the criininal conduct described in the law and the 
penalty prescribed for it. Accordingly, the unit of content 
analysis chosen for this study was the socially harmful conduct 
punished by a certain penalty . The unit of analysis can be out- 
lined more coirpletely in terms of the content of criminal laws. 
Each unit of analysis consisted of conduct. Inspection of 
criminal statutes revealed that different types of conduct rray 
be punished by the Scame penalty. Preneditated murder, for ex- 
ample, and murder in the commission of a felony may be punished 
by the penalty of death. It was possible, therefore, for a sin- 
gle unit of cinalysis to describe several different forms of con- 
duct. The conduct prohibited by tlie law was also considered to 
be socially harmful. LUce Heider's theory, the criminal law 
theoretically distinguishes between conduct and its effects, with 
the socially liarroful effects providing the reason for prohibiting 
the conduct (Hall, 1960). An examination of criminal statutes, 
hoviever, revealed that the harmful effects of crimes are not 
necessarily explicitly sta.ted in the laws themselves. In ana- 
lyzing a given unit, therefore, it was often necessary to infer 
tlie harmful effects of tlie conduct described in it. Each unit 
of analysi.s also contained a penalty. This component points out 
one additional char'acteristic of criminal statutes. Rather than 
defining crin:es, some laws describe conduct that vvould ordinarily 
be punishable; however, the conduct is described in terms of con- 
ditions which exculpate the perpetrator. These laws, nevertheless, 



28 



were appropriate for t±ie present research since they outline condi- 
tions under vdiich non-criminal responsibility is attributed. These 
laws also dictate a legally significant disposition vfcLch represents 
the least severe "punishment", no punishment. By including such 
laws, the penalties ranged from complete exculpation to the death 
sentence. In sunmary, the unit of analysis consisted of the various 
forms of conduct and their harmful effects which were punishable by 
a penalty ranging from exculpation to the death sentence. For con- 
venience this unit was referred to as the "statute". It should be 
noted that the boundaries of the statute used as the unit of analy- 
sis did not necessarily conform to the boundaries of a law found in 
a crimiiial code. 

In this study, statutes were to be classified into categories 
representing Heider's levels of causality. In doing so, it seemed 
reasonable to use four of Heider's levels — ccmnission, , foreseeabil- 
ity, intentionality, and justification. In past research on Heider's 
theory, the level of association has typically been described by 



I 



events vd-iich tlie actor did not commit and with which he was quite i 

reiTotely associated (e.g. , by group membership) . In the criminal I 

law (Hall, 1950; Perkins, 1969) on the other hand, a person must 

generally commit a crirre in order to incur liability for it. The 

1 

level of association, therefore, did not appear to be applicable 
to the criminal law. 

As originally defined, Heider's levels represent the conditions ; 

under which responsibility is attributed for action outccnes. Vlhlle \ 






29 



legal tlTeory also distinguishes between conduct and the effects of 
the conduct, laws often describe conduct without explicitly differ- 
entiating beb^een conduct and its effects. The levels of canmis- 
sion, foreseeability, intentionality, and justification, therefore, 
TAere redefined so that as content analysis categories, they could 
accoiroodate conduct as well as conduct and its effects. In doing 
so, the definitions of the levels were broadened so that the causal 
conditions described by Heider's levels characterized the conduct 
classified at tlie redefined levels; however, the causal conditions 
did not necessarily refer to the particular consequences of the con- 
duct as they do in Heider's formulation. TlTe distinguishing causal 
condition at Heider's level of intentionality, for example, is in- 
tentionality, and criminal conduct described in terniis of intention- 
ality was classifiable at the redefined level of intentionality even 
if the intention did not directly refer to the particular outconies 
produced by the conduct. All four levels Vvere redefined in tlais 
iTBnner. 

In the present study, thus, the level of cornmission vjas defined 
as follows : Responsibility is attributed at the level of commissioh 
if the law describes conduct tlmt is perfonned by a person . The law 
does not describe conduct performed under the conditions of foresee- 
ability, intentionality , or justification . At Heider's level of 
conmission, the causal condition for AR is the ccaimissicn of the 
outcome. This condition was reflected in the redefined level in 
that all statutes classifiable at this level merely described con- 



30 



duct without reference to characteristics signifying the conditions 
of foreseeability, intentionality , or justification. 

At Heider's level of foreseeability, responsibility is attrib- 
uted for outccnies that might have been foreseen by the actor. The 
level of foreseeability was redefined around the concepts of fore- 
seeability and kna,vledge , and all statutes classifiable at tlie re- 
defined level described conduct associated with foreseeable outccmes 
or knowledge of factors partly defining the crime. The level of 
foreseeability vras redefined in the following inanner: Responsibility 
is attributed at the level of foreseeability if the law describes 
conduct that is performed by a person who either (1) could have 
foreseen or did foresee the social harm produced by his conduct or 
(2) could have kno\-m or did know factors that partly define his 
conduct . The law does not describe the conduct as being performed 
under the conditions of intentional ity or justification . 

At Heider's level of intentionality, the distinguishirig condi- 
tion for AR is the actor's intention to cause the outccfnes of his 
actions. According to the redefined level of inte-ntionality, all 
statutes classifiable at this level described conduct manifesting 
intentionality; however, the intention ODuld refer to the harm pro- 
duced by tile conduct, a similar harm, or seme other harm explicitly 
stated by the law. The level of intentionality was redefined in 
the following manner : Responsibility is attributed at the level 
of intentionality if the law describes conduct that is performed 
by a person who either (1) intended to produce the specific social 






31 



harm of his conduct, (2) intended to produce a social harm smilar 
to the one that te produced , or (3_)_ performed the conduct along 
with an intent to acconplish soiie other harm that is explicitly 
stated by the law . The law does not describe the conduct as being 
performed under the conditions of the level of justification . 

At fielder's level of justification, a lesser airount of respon- 
sibility is attributed for intentional outcomes produced under jus- 
tifying conditions. While environmental factors are the only justi- 
fying conditions in Heider's formulation, the following factors 
served as justifying conditions in the redefined level of justifica- 
tion: (1) environmental circumstances that would affect other in- 
dividuals so that they too Vvould be more likely to perform the con- 
duct and (2) personal characteristics which would reduce the person's 
capacity to formulate and/or control the intentions of an ordinarily 
reasonable person. Personal factors were considered to be justify- 
ing factors for twD reasons. First, in Heider's naive analysis of 
action, personal characteristics as well as environmental factors 
can limit personal causality. Second, as GUmore (1966) suggested 
with respect to mental illness, the actor's personal characteristics 
can create an ambiguous situation such that he may be perceived as 
eitlier less resistant to environmental inducements to manifest his 
intentions or less capable of intentional conduct. 

The redefined level of justification differed fron; Heider's 
definition in another respect. Heider discussed the mitigating in- 
fluence of justifying factors on the AR for intentional outcomes. 



32 



Acx^ording to t±ie redefined level, responsibility vss attributed at ■ 
the level of justification for any conduct as long as justifying 
factors vrere given consideration. This modification is ccupatible 
with Heider's formulation in that if a person can identify and ta]<e 
into account the influence of justifying factors on intentional 
outcomes, he is likely to be capable of doing so for unintentional 
outcomes as v,ell. Evidence reported by Friedrich (1965) and Kronstadt 
(1965) supports this contention. 

In the present study, the level of justification, thus, was 
defined as follows : Responsibility is attributed at the level of 
justification if the law describes conduct that is performed by a 
person under any of the conditions of caTmission , f oreseeability , 
or intentionality , as descrUoed earlier . The law additionally de- 
scribes the perfomance of the conduct in terms of factors , like 
the follov7ing ones , that vx^uld attenuate the an-punt of responsibility 
attributed to tlie person : (1) the person performing the conduct is 
influenced by circumstances that vpuld affect other ordinarily rea- 
sonable persons so that tliey too vr>uld be rrore likely to perform 
the conduct , or (2) the person is descrj±ed as iTaving personal char- 
acteristics that \vould reduce Ms capacity to formulate and/or con- 
trol the intentions of an ordinarily reasonable person. 

Hypothese s 

The content analysis afforded tlie opportunity to test two hy- 
potheses based upon Heider's theory and related research. Before 



33 



elaborating upon the hypotheses, an assuiiption that underlies 
them should be made explicit. 

Heider's theory delineates phencmenological factors that in- 
fluence the individual as he attributes responsibility; consequent- 
ly, his theory predicts judgments of responsibility by individuals. 
Rather than directly representing the judgments of individuals, 
criminal statutes represent legislative or group decisions about, 
first, the conditions under v\diich defendants should be judged guilty 
and, second, tlie punishments for defendants Vvho have been judged 
gioilty. Even though Heider's theory is not directly predictive of 
group decisions, predictions about statutes can be advanced frcm 
Heider's theory and related research if it is assurred that the 
decisions ennbodied in statutes reflect the perceptions and judg- 
ments of individual legislators. Itore specifically, in defining 
crires, legislators have been influenced by their individual per- 
ceptions of responsibility so that the statutory definitions of 
crimes reflect the conditions under which they as individuals would 
attribute responsibility. In addition, the penalty prescribed in 
a statute reflects the punishment that individual legislators would 
be willing to assign for behaviors performed under the conditions 
defined in the statute. 

The results of a recent role-playing study (Shaw & 'Eranble, 
1971) provide indirect support for this assunption. As fart of the 
background information read by each member of the four-person groups, 
the foramn of three factory workers was accused of an act that ad- 



34 



versely affected the three workers. For different groups, the 
conditions under vdiich the foraiian had reportedly produced this 
negative outcome v;ere structured to represent a control condi- 
tion, the level of commission, the level of foreseeability, or 
the level of intentionality. During the role-playing phase \diich 
follCT-ved, the forerrHn atteirpted to reach a decision with the three 
vrarkers about a cliange in their work procedures. It v^as found 
that decision-iraking time and decision quality varied as a func- 
tion of the personal causality of the forerran. These findings 
suggest that tlie causal structure of an event can affect group 
processes and, indirectly, that this variable could be reflected 
in decisions about crinnnal liability. 

Given these assumptions, the first hypothesis was has&l upon 
Heider's proposal tliat AR varies with the extent to which personal 
factors, as opposed to environinental factors, are perceived to have 
caused the event. This proposal, Wnich has been supported by past 
research, seemed to iirply that if legislators' decisions about the 
conditions for criminal liability do reflect their individual per- 
ceptions of responsibility, they would be likely to structure 
these conditions so that criminal liability requires a relatively 
greater contribution of personal factors. That' is, the levels of 
causality are differentially represented in the criTtdnal statutes, 
and those levels which are relatively more characterized by per- 
sonal causality are the inore frequently represented levels. This 
expectation, it should be noted, is also conpatible with Hall's 



35 



(1960) contention that a system of subjective morality underlies 
tlie criminal lav;. Since the relative contribution of personal 
factors varies across Heider's levels, this expectation was tested 
by coTparing the number of statutes classified at the different 
levels. The first hypothesis, therefore, was that there is a 
difference in the number of statutes representing the levels of 
commission , foreseeability , intentionality , and justification . 

Based upon Heider's theory, it was speculated that like the 
relative contribution of personal factors, the number of statutes 
classified at each level increases from the level of ccnrnission 
to the level of intentionality and then decreases at the level of 
justification. A directional hypothesis, however, did not seem 
warranted. Legal discussions (Hall, 1960), for example, imply 
that the level of foreseeability suffices for criirinal liability. 
In addition, Sulzer (1964) reported that there was basically no 
difference between the proportion of individuals vto were willing 
to attribute scsrie degree of responsibility for events representing 
the level of foreseeability and the proportion willing to attribute 
responsibility for events at the level of intentionality. Legis- 
lators, therefore, iray be just as willing to attribute responsi- 
bility at the level of foreseeability as at the level of intention- 
ality so that the relative number of statutes at the levels of fore- 
seeability and intentionality was somewhat unpredictable. 

It should also be mentioned that a comparatively snaller number 
of statutes v;as expected at the level of justification and that this 



36 



smaller nmriber was partly artif actual. Although the law takes into 
account justifying factors, an inspection of criuiinal codes revealed 
that such factors are not explicitly enunciated for each offense; 
furthermore, it has been maintained (Hall, 1960) that unless such 
considerations influence judgments of guilt, justifying factors are 
more appropriately considered in administering punishments. 

Past research has demonstrated that like AR, the amount of 
sanction assigned by individuals increases with the relative ex- 
tent to which personal factors are perceived to have caused the 
event. It seemed likely that if the penalty prescribed for a crime 
reflects the punishment that individual legislators are willing to 
assign, the amount of punishment prescribed for a crime wDuld de- 
pend upon the extent to which personal factors contributed to the 
socially harmful conduct. This expectation is supported by Friedrich's 
(1965) finding that the severity of statutory penalties and the j 

amount of sanction assigned by individuals tended to be similarly \ 

related to variables conprising Heider's levels. The second hy- I 

[ 
pothesis of this study, therefore, was that comparing the severity [ 

of the penalties prescribed in the statutes classified at the ji 

levels of causality , the severity increases from the level of 

comnaission to the level of intentionality and then decreases at 

the level of justification . 

The assunption underlying this study is that Heider's theory 

is reflected in the criminal law. Legal writings and Friedrich's 

(1965) research appear to support the validity of the assurrption. 






37 

As the review of the research revealed, most of the support for 

Heider's theory has been obtained in the laboratory setting and 
by Shaw and Sulzer's (1964) teclTnique iii particular. Confirma- 
tion of predictions from Heider's theory through a content analy- 
sis of criminal statutes, thus, wDuld make two additional contri- 
butions. First, it wDuld provide direct support for the assump- 
tion that Heider's theory is reflected in the criminal law. Second, 
it vrould tend to extend the generalizability of the theory both 
to the criminal law and across research techniques. 

Surrmary 

The purpose of this research ^-^as to study Heider's -theory of 
AR through a content analysis of criminal statutes. The follow- 
ing twD hypotheses, based upon Heider's theoiry and related re- 
search, v.'ere then tested: 

(1) There is a difference in the number of statutes repre- 
senting the levels of commission, foreseeability, intentionality, 
and justification. 

(2) Caiparing the severity of penalties prescribed in statutes 
classified at the levels of causality, the severity increases from 
the level of comnission to the level of intentionality and then 
decreases at the level of justification. 



CHAPTER II 



iVETHOD 



Sanple of Statutes 
Statutes Selected 

TwD sannples of laws v^re selected for this study: (1) criminal 
laws of tlie State of Florida and (2) homicide laws of states other 
than Florida. The sample of Florida laws was drawn from Florida 
Statutes Annotated (Title 44, Sections 779.01-377.14) which con- 
tained the laws of tlie State of Florida updated for tlie year 1971- 
1972. An examination of this volume revealed that it contained ap- 
proxinmtely 525 criminal laws prescribing at least one penalty and 
tlTat the laws ^^ere arranged into 52 cliapters according to similar 
types of offenses. In order to obtain a representative sample, 
the laws were chosen by randcmly selecting 24 of the chapters of 
lav/s and, additionally, the chapter of hcxnicide laws. By this 
procedure, approximately 249 laws prescribing at least one penalty 
v.ere selected, more than 45% of all such laws. 

A representative sanple of non-Florida hanicide laws was ob- 
tained by randomly selecting 25 states of the United States. The 
states selected were as follows: Alaska, Delaxvore, liawaii, Indiana, 
lovia, Louisiana, tiaine, I^feryland, Minnesota, Ilississippi , Nebraska, 
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahcna, Oregon, ]Rhode Island, South 



38 



39 



Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wiscon- 
sin, and VJyoining. 

Eash state's hanicide laws were taken from a pi±ilication sim- 
ilar to Florida Statutes Annotated . Whenever possible , the hcxni- 
cide laws were identified by chapter titles. Accordingly, v»hen 
the laws of a state were arranged into chapters, those laws within 
a chapter entitled "homicide" (or having a similar title such as 
"murder" or "manslaughter") were selected as the laws for the state. 
\1ben the laws of a state were not arranged into chapters, the laws 
of the state were searched until there was located a series of laws 
that defined and penalized crines of hcmicide, defined as the kill- 
ing of one human being by another (Perkins, 1969) . These laws were 
then used as the sairple for the state . Regardless of vAiich of the 

tro procedures had been used to identify them, all of the hcmicide i 

I 
laws originally selected were content analyzed except for those i 

i 

mentioned later. Tlie honncide laws selected and references to 
publications from which they were taken are listed in Appendix A. 

Preparation of Statutes for Content Analysis 

A booklet of typewritten laws was compiled for each chapter of 
Florida lav/s and for each state's homicide laws. Each booklet of 
Florida laws was labeled with the title of the chapter of laws 
placed in it; likewise, each booklet of hcmicide laws was entitled 
by the name of the state whose laws had been placed in it. Each 
of the 50 booklets presented verbatim and in the order of their 



-'.•^•■»-*U>" J*-. 



40 



original appearance all of the laws contained in their respective 
chapters with three exceptions. First, the penalties prescribed 
in the laws were replaced by codes. Second, several types of 
laws or parts of them were omitted. Third, references to foot- 
notes were added to certain laws. These alterations are dis- 
cussed in the next three sections. 

Coding the penalties . — Wost of the laws selected for this 
study prescribed at least one penalty. To reduce the influence -^. 
of the penalty's size on the content analysis and to facilitate 
the recognition that a penalty had been prescribed, the te:<ts of 
the laws v;ere altered so as to substitute codes for the penalties 
prescribed in them. In all cases, tlie code consisted of the word 
Penalty , the number of the law (or seK::tion number) in which the 
penalty appeared, a hyphen, and a number representing the sequen- 
tial position of the penalty in the law. For exanple, if two 
penalties appeared in a law numbered 806.01, the text of tlie law 
vxjuld have been altered so that the following two coded penalties 
would have been substituted, respectively, for the two penalties 
originally appearing in the law: Penalty 806.01-1 and Penalty 
806.01-2 ." 

The alterations required for this substitution depended upon 
the text of the particular law. In general, however, a law was 
altered by deleting the wDrds \diich set forth the penalty and by 
substituting the appropriate coded penalty for the deleted material. 
Since there is scma variation in the manner in v\hich penalties are 



'•C— --" - .I^^-s 



41 



prescribed in laws, the nature of the alterations may be described 

more clearly in terms of this variation. 

Many laws set forth a specific set of punishing consequences 

as tlie penalty for the crime. In the following law, for example, 

publicly using indecent language is punisliable by imprisonment not 

exceeding 30 days or by a fine not exceeding $25: 

Any person vho shall publicly use or utter any 
indecent or obscene language shall be punished by 
irrprisoniTient not exceeding thirty days, or by fine 
not exceeding tvs5nty-five dollars ( Florida Statutes 
Annotated , Title 44, Section 847.05), 

The text of a law that prescribed a penalty in this nanner was al- 
tered by deleting the specified penalty and by substituting for 
it vrords or a phrase wiiich indicated that tlie crime was punishable 
by the coded penalty. Thus, the above law was altered as follows: 
"Any person who shall publicly use or utter any indecent or ob- 
scene language shall be pimished by Penalty 847.05-1 . " 

A second way of prescribing penalties is by declaring a crime 
to be a misdemeanor or felony (or seme other grade of offense) . 
^-flien such a declaration is made without further specifying a penalty, 
reference is being wade to penalties that generally apply to mis- 
demeanors or felonies vihose penalties are otherwise unspecified. 
Disposing of railroad switch keys, for exanple, is defined as a mis- 
derrEanor in the following statute: 

It is unlawfxil for any person to make, buy, 
sell or give away any duplicate key to any lock 
belonging to or in use by any railroad coripany in 
this state on its switches or switch tracks, except 
on the written order of the officer of said rail- 



ijl a ~ - mi r- .rmyr-*'*^ "sw^— 



42 



road conpany whose duty it is to distribute and 
issue switch lock keys to the ertployees of such 
railroad ccsnrpany. 

Any person violating the provisions of this 
section sliall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor 
( Florida Statutes Annotated , Title 44 , Section 
860.10). 

The text of a law prescribing a penalty in this fasMon was al- 
tered by deleting references to the grade of the crime and by sub- 
stituting for then vrords or a phrase \^aich indicated that the ' 
crime was punishable by the coded penalty. Thus, the last sentence 
of the law just presented was altered to read as follows: "Any 
person violating the provisions of this section shall be punished 
by Penalty 860.10-1 . " 

In scrae laws, conduct that ordinarily constitutes a crime is 
defined as "justified" or "excused"; legally justified and excused 
conduct is subject to acquittal or exoneration. In this study, this 
type of conduct was considered to be punishable by a penalty of 
years of imprisonment. To incorporate a coded penalty into this 
type of law, a phrase or sentence was added to the text of the law 
which indicated that the conduct VTas punishable by the coded penal- 
ty. Before attaching the coded penalties, explicit references to 
exoneration or acquittal were deleted. The text of the following 
homicide law, for exanple, was altered by adding (no previous de- 
letions were made) the phrase placed within paren-theses : 

Homicide is excusable (and punishable by Pen- 
alty 9.48.150-1) vjtien corrmitted by accident or 
misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful ireans, ' 
with ordinary caution and without any unlawful 



43 



intent ( Revised Code of Washington , Title 9 , 
Section 9.48.150) . 

Generally, one coded penalty was substituted for each penalty 
appearing in the types of laws just described. In several instances, 
however, it was found that separate laws described either different 
crimes or different forms of the same crime and tliat each of these 
was punisliable by a penalty set forth in only one of the laws. In 
these instances, a coded penalty was incorporated into, each law 
that described a different form of the crime. In doing so, refer- 
ences to the penalty were deleted fran the text of a law, and a 
phrase or sentence was added which indicated that the crirre was 
punishable by the coded penalty. While this practice was applied 
to the laws prolribiiting several types of offenses, it was perhaps 
most frequently applied to the iranslaughter laws. For several 
states, one law presents a generic definition of manslaughter and 
prescribes a penalty for it. Following this law, each of several 
laws separately describes a different form of the crirrs of nan- 
slaughter, and each form is punishable by the penalty set forth 
in the first law (for an example, see Florida Statutes Annotated , 
Title 44, _ sections 782.07-782.15). For these laws, a coded penalty 
was incorporated into each lav; describing a separate form of man- 
slaughter, and references to manslaughter were deleted from each 
law except for those laws that provided generic definitions of it. 

Since the unit of content analysis, or the "statute", con- 
sisted of the conduct punishable by a single penalty, each coded 



44 



penalty demarcated a separate statute. The number of statutes, 
therefore, was determined by the number of coded penalties. Fol- 
lowing the procedures just outlined, the sairple for the study con- 
sisted of 272 Florida statutes and 187 homicide statutes. 

Qnitted material . — In general, the chapters of laws were un- 
altered except for coding the penalties. Since they would have 
■unnecessarily corplicated the content analysis, several laws and 
separate paragraphs of laws were excluded from the booklets; these 
laws contained infonration that would not have contributed to the 
content analysis. Rules of evidence and procedural matters (such 
as the disposition of confiscated gambling equipment) are examples 
of such inforriHtion. Laws that had been repealed were. also ex- 
cluded. Hie updating manuals acconpanying the published laws were 
used to determine whether a law was currently effective. Laws 
prohibiting crimes other than homicide are scraetiraes embedded in 
a chapter of homicide laws. Exairples of such criaies are performing 
abortions, aiding suicides, and assault with intent to murder. The 
laws proscribing crimes other than homicide were excluded frcm the 
booklets of non-Florida homicide statutes. 

Footnoted definitions .— Finally, one type of law was altered, 
because it did not provide enough information to be ireaningfully 
classified. This type of law defines a crime by presenting its 
common-law label, and classification of the statute required know- 
ledge of the crime's common-law definition. References to foot- 
notes were added to those laws which appeared to define crimes in 



45 



this manner. Placed at the end of each booklet affected, the 
footnotes furnished definitions of the corresponding crimes. 
As it turned out, definitions were added for the following crimes 
only: murder, iranslaughter , voluntary manslaughter, and involun- 
tary manslaughter. The definitions for these crimes were taken 
from a law dictionary ( Black ' s Law Dictionary , 1968) . 

;!^pendix A presents the chapters of laws selected for this 
study and references to the publications from wliich they were taken. 
For each law placed in a booklet, any textual alteration is noted. 
Ihis appendix also lists the material that was excluded frcm the 
booklets. In addition, the footnotes added to certain homicide 
laws are presented. 

Content Analysis 
Content Analysi s System 

The content analysis system vss comprised of a body of inter- 
related definitions, rules, instractions , and examples which were 
designed to guide the judges in identifying and classifying the 
statutes. Presented verbatim in Appendix B, the content analysis 
system is generally outlined in this section. 

Identifying the units of analysis . — Conceptually, the unit 
of analysis, or tlie statute, consisted of the various forms of 
socially harmful conduct punishable by a single penalty, lb iden- 
tify a statute, a judge was first instructed by the content anal- 
ysis system to locate a coded penalty. For the coded penalty. 



46 



the judge was then to identify the statutory material describing 
the punishable conduct \*ere conduct was defined as sirtply the 
actions or failures to act punishable by the penalty. 

After having generally delimited a statute, the judge was 
instructed to examine two characteristics of the conduct irore 
thoroughly. First, he was to determine whe'ther different "forms 
of conduct" were punishable by the penalty. According to the 
definitions provided, there were different forms of punishable 
conduct if several sets of actions (or failures to act) which 
appeared different from each other were susceptible to the pen- 
alty. Second, the judge was to ascertain the social harm pro- - 
duced by the conduct. To do so, he was instructed to infer or 
identify the harmful effects v^iich he believed that any form of 
the conduct \^ould produce. Except for the stipulation that it 
refer to tlie effects produced by any form of conduct, social 
^^J^ ^^as undefined. The analysis of a statute into the forms of 
conduct and the social harm was incorporated into the content 
analysis system because of the conplexity of the statutory mate- 
rial and as a means of increasing the likelihood that different 
judges would attend to the saire material in classifying the 
statute . ' ' ' 

Categories of analysis . —After the conduct comprising the 
statute had been identified, it was classified into a single 
category representing the level of commission, foreseeability, 
intentionality, or justification. In the content analysis sys- 






47 



tern, these levels were defined as follows: (1) Level of Corrmis- 
sion : Responsibility is attributed at the level of conmission 
if the law describes conduct that is perforrred by a person. The 
law does not describe conduct performed under the conditions of 
foreseeability, intentional ity, or justification. (2) Level of 
Foreseeability : Responsibility is attributed at the level of 
foreseeability if the law describes conduct that is performed 
by a person vAio either (a) could have foreseen or did foresee 
the social harm produced by his conduct or (b) could liave known 
or did know factors that partly define his conduct. The law does 
not describe the conduct as being performed under the conditions 
of intentionality or justification. (3) Level of Intentional ity ; 
Responsibility is attributed at the level of intentionality if 
the law describes conduct that is performed by a person who either 

(a) intended to produce the specific Inarm of his conduct, or 

(b) intended to produce a social harm similar to the one that he 
produced, or (c) performed the conduct along with an intent to 
acccarplish sane other harm that is explicitly stated by the law. 
The law does not describe the conduct as being performed under 
the conditions of justification. (4) Level of Justification : 
Responsibility is attributed at the level of justification if the 
law describes conduct that is performed by a person under any of 
the conditions of conmission, foreseeability, or intentionality, 
as described earlier. The law additionally describes the per- 
formance of the conduct in terms of factors, like the following 



48 



ones, that would attenuate the airount of responsibility attrib- 
uted to the person: (a) the person performing the conduct is 
influenced by circumstances that v;Duld affect other ordinarily 
reasonable persons so that they too would be more likely to per- 
form the conduct, or (b) the person is described as having per- 
sonal characteristics that would reduce his capacity to formu- 
late and/or control the intentions of an ordinarily reasonable 
person. 

Criteria for classification . — A judge classified a statute 
at one of tlie four levels by considering the descriptions of the 
forms of conduct in the statute to outline the information that 
the law takes into account in attributing responsibility for the 
conduct. If only one form of conduct was described in the statute, 
the statute was classified at the level at which the law appeared 
to be attributing responsibility for the form of conduct. If more 
than one form of conduct was described in a statute, a judge was 
to consider each form of conduct and the level at which the law 
appeared to be attributing responsibility for it. Such a statute 
was then classified at the level at which across tlie various 
forms of 'conduct, responsibility was most "characteristically, 
commonly, frequently, or predcrainantly" attributed in the statute; 
if the law appeared to attribute responsibility at several levels 
equally often, the statute was classified at the least sophisti- 
cated of these levels (in Heider's theory) . 



49 



Along with the definitions of the levels, a judge was ia- 
structed to use tavo criteria in classifying a statute. The first 
criterion involved certain words and phrases v^iich iTad been listed 
to represent the levels of foreseeability, intentionality, and 
justification. i\ccording to the first criterion, if the conduct 
in a statute was described by a word or phrase (or a similar one) 
listed for one of these levels and if the word or plurase conveyed 
the nieaning of its level, the statute was to be classifed at the 
level represented by the word or phrase. 

To obtain the vrords and phrases for the three levels, an 
original list was drawn from two sources. Part of the. list con- 
sisted of vxjrds which had been used to define crirres in a text- 
book on the criminal law (Perkins, 1969) and vrfiich appeared to 
signify characteristics of Heider's levels. The rsraining vrords 
were extracted from approximately 100 criminal laws. Most of 
these laws, according to Perkins (1969), defined either strict 
liability crirres or crimes with mens rea conponents varying frciti 
negligence to intentionality . The original list was reduced to 
54 sets of words and plirases by grouping together synonymous 
words. For each set of wDrds, a legal definition was developed. . 
The definitions were primarily based upon definitions found in 
a law dictionary ( Black ' s Law Dictionary , 1968) ; secondary sources 
for the definitions were Florida Words and Phrases (1955) , a text- 
book on the criminal law (Perkins, 1969) , and an ordinairy dic- 
tionary (Webster's Dictionary, 1960). The 54 sets of WDrds, their 



_~-4>i<-t^-4>cii »i^ , t^tr-i^iK 



50 



definitions, and, whenever possible, an exainple of their use in 
a law were then read by the researcher and two University of 
Florida students familiar with Heider's theory. These individ- 
uals independently classified each set at the level which they 
believed the set to signify (Appendix C presents the instructions 
used in classifying the words) . Each of the 39 sets of words 
vdiich had been identically classified by the three individuals 
was then listed in the content analysis system to represent the 
agreed-upon level. 

If the conduct in a statute was not described by a word or 
phrase listed for a level of causality, the judge was to classify 
the statute at the level of commission unless the second criterion 
was satisfied. According to the second criterion, a judge was to 
classify such a statute at the level of foreseeability, intention- 
ality, or justification only if he believed, first, that th^e con- 
duct wDuld ordinarily be performed under the conditions defining 
one of these levels and, second, that other persons reading the 
statute vciuld agree with him. 

Judges 

To partly fulfill course requirements, three upper -level un- 
dergraduates at the University of Florida classified the statutes 
at the levels of causality. Before doing so, the judges studied 
Heider's theory and classified stories at the levels that they 
had been \^/ritten to represent in previous research. To becoire 



51 



accustoned tx) reading laws, the judges then read a series of crim- 
inal laws that had not been selected for the content analysis. After 
this background training, the judges individually studied the content 
analysis system. As the final training exercise, the three judges 
and the researcher together discussed the system and applied it to 
several statutes that were also not part of the sample. 

Procedure 

The judges independently classified the statutes in their order 
of appearance in the 50 booklets. Except for a law dictionary ( Black ' s 
Law Dictionary , 1968) and an ordinary dictionary, the statutes were 
classified on the basis of the information provided in the booklets. 
Hie judges recorded the level at which they classified the statutes 
on separate scoring sheets. These sheets also provided space for 
the following identifying information: the judge's name, the book- 
let title, and the coded penalty derrarcating the statute. After hav- 
ing recorded this information, tlie judges perfonred an additional 
task. For each statute, they wrote brief descriptions of the crime 
punishable by the coded penalty. As discussed later, these descrip- 
tions were used to obtain ratings of the seriousness of the crimes. 

Except for three sets of booklets, the 50 booklets of statutes 
were classified in a different and randomly assigned order by each 
judge. The first five booklets (the Florida statutes in Chapters 
805, 846, and 783 and the hcsnicide statutes of Oliio and Alaska), 
the middle four booklets (the Florida statutes in Chapters 838 and 
865 and the hcmicide statutes of Oklahoma and Minnesota) , and the 



.■ ■^».-=^i^ -i'a ii «» iin,i*<(;,;anr^a^i*-asi-«wE««^'*.te^.v* — - V nT -iii r ji ran i -***-■••. M—^>tu:so«>n*9»e:*>«U<^H 



52 



last six booklets (the Floric3a statutes in Chapters 851, 800, 805, 
aiid 812 and the hcmicide statutes of Washington and Indiana) were 
the same for each judge. These booklets were selected so that each 
set contained a total of 40 statutes and so that approximately half 
of the statutes were Florida statutes and the other half were homi- 
cide statutes. By this arrangement, estimates of inter judge relia- 
bility were obtained for statutes classified at tlie beginning, mid- 
dle, and end of thie content analysis. After having classified all 
50 booklets, each judge reclassified the first five chapters; using 
the reclassified statutes, estimates of intra judge reliability were 
obtained . 

The content analysis required a period of approxinstely seven 
weeks. It seemed likely that during th-is period, the judges would 

adopt somevAiat idiosyncratic uses of the content analysis system 

i 

and that tliese differences would result in low reliability esti- 
irates. Two measures V'^ere taken to offset this likelihood. The 
judges were first encouraged to use their copies of the content 
analysis system as they classified the statutes. The second pro- 
cedure, which was similar to one used by Harvey and his associates 
(Harvey, White, Pratlier, Alter, & Hoffmeister, 1966) to cope with 
this problem, involved two group meetings held during the seven 
v;eeks. At these meetings, the judges independently coded several 
statutes which afterv.'ard were not classified as part of the sam- 
ple. The judges then discussed the reasons for their decisions. 
This second procedure was designed to point out and clarify 



53 



different interpretations and uses of the content analysis sys- 
tem. - ; . 

Severity Measurements 
To test the second hypothesis, it was necessary to measure 
and compare the severity of the penalties prescribed in statutes 
classified at tiie four levels of causality. As suggested by past 
research (e.g., Shaw & Reitan, 1969), an adequate test of the 
second hypothesis also required control of outcome intensity. lb 
do so, the second hypothesis was tested in two different ways. 
First, the penalties prescribexi in a cross section of Florida 
statutes were conpared, and outcome intensity was controlled by 
rreans of ratings of the seriousness of the outccjres described in 
the statutes. Second, the penalties prescribed in the homicide 
statutes were ccxipared. In this second approach, outcaie serious- 
ness was controlled by selection since all of the honicide stat- 
utes pertained to the saine type of outcome — the death of another 
human being. 

To test the second hypothesis by the Florida statutes, 30 
statutes representing each of the levels of ccranission, foresee- 
ability, and intentional ity were selected. Each of the 90 Florida 
statutes was selected according to three criteria. First, the 
statute had been classified at the appropriate level by at least 
two judges. Second, the statute specified a maximum period of 
confinement in a penal institution that could serve as the penalty 



54 



and that was scalable in years. According to this second criterion, 
statutes tliat prescribed the death sentence, life inprisonment, or 
a iTDnetary fine were not selected. Third, the criminal conduct de- 
fined by the statute was amenable to description for the serious- 
ness ratings discussed later. 

lb obtain statutes meeting these criteria, a random selection 
procedure was initially used. For the level of ccOTnission, 30 stat- 
utes were randomly selected from the 38 Florida statutes that met 
the first two criteria. For each of the levels of foreseeability 
and intentionality , 30 statutes were randomly selected frcm all 
Florida statutes that had been classified at that level by at least 
tvx3 judges. 

After having randomly selected 90 statutes, each statute ^-ras 
examined. If the statute ii:Bt the penalty criterion (this applied 
to tlie statutes representing the levels of foreseeability and in- 
tentionality) and if tlie statute appeared to be arrenable to descrip- 
tion, it was used to represent the level that it had been chosen 
to represent. Of the 90 statutes, 81 met these criteria. Six 
statutes, tliree representing each of the levels of foreseeability 
and intentionality, did not neet the penalty criterion. Three 
statutes, one at the level of carmission and tsro at the level of 
foreseeability, did not appear amenable to description for the 
seriousness ratings. Each of these nine statutes was replaced 
by a statute satisfying the selection criteria. To do so, the 
statutes classified at a given level by two or more judges were 



55 



listed in their sequential order of appearance in Florida's criminal 
code. Each replaceinent statute consisted of the first statute that 
succeeded the rejected statute and that rret the selection criteria. 
Of the 90 sta-tutes, therefore, 81 were selected by the randan proce- 
dure; the rerraining 9 were selected in a more arbitrary fashion. 

In order to control outcome intensity. Treasures of the serious- 
ness of the outcoires were obtained. lb do so, a short description 
was written for each of the 90 Florida statutes. The description 
presented the objective outcome or result of the conduct described 
in the statute. One statute selected for this analysis, for example, 
was as follows: 

^\hoever shall unnecessarily kill another, 
either v,4iile resisting an attempt by such other 
person to commit any felony, or to do any other 
unla\srful act, or after such attempt shall have 
failed, shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter 
( Florida Statutes Annotated , Title 44 , Section 
782,11). 

This statute describes conduct that leads to the outccrre of hani- 
cide, and the description for this statute was as follows: "A per- 
son is killed." In the following statute, the outcome is not as 
readily separable fran the conduct as it is in the last exarrple: 

Whoever trades, traffics for or buys, ex- 
cept from the producer or his authorized agent, 
any cotton or leaf tobacco, unless the saite be 
baled or boxed in the usual manner, or unless 
upon some exhibition of evidence in writing that 
tlie producer has parted with his interest therein, 
shall be punished by inprisonment not exceediiig 
six months, or by fine not exceeding one thousand 






56 



dollars ( Florida Statutes Annotated , Title 44 , 
Section 865.08) . 

For this type of statute, an outconie, such as the loss of tobacco 
due to theft, was not inferred; rather, the outcorrB was described 
in terms of the objective product of the conduct. Thus, the out- 
come in the last statute was described as follows: "Cotton or 
leaf tobacco is bought without having evidence that the producer 
has p^lrted with his interest in it." In writing the descriptions, 
an attempt was made to exclude references to causal structure. 

Since the outcomes of several statutes were the saire, 87 dif- 
ferent outcomes were prepared. These outcomes were assembled into 
a questionnaire in a random order. The questionnaire was intro- 
duced by written instructions directing the subject to rate each 
outcome for "how serious you believe it to be." Thie subjects in- 
dicated wiiere they vould place the outcomes on a 7-point scale 
ranging from to 6. The end and middle points of the scale were 
verbally defined, respectively, as "ix>t at all serious", "moderately 
serious", and "extremely serious". The subjects indicated their 
responses by \\riting tlie chosen numbers in blank spaces printed 
next to the outcon^s. The descriptions of the outcoir^s and the 
instructions for tlie seriousness ratings are presented in /Appendix D. 

The outcomes were rated by 13 rrale and 18 ferrale students at 
tlie University of Florida who voluntarily participated in order to 
fulfill requirements for a course in introductory psychology. Each 
subject responded to the questionnaire during one of three group 



♦HT--_i^=-e_y-.iil-.^|* 



' 



57 



sessions attended by 9 to 12 individuals, lb administer the ques- 
tionnaire, the researcher read the instructions out loud while the 
members of a group read them silently. In doing so, it was empha- 
sized that the subject was to rate each outcome as it was described 
and in terms of his own opinions about its seriousness. Each sub- 
ject then rated the outcomes at his own pace. Approximately 20 
minutes were required to rate all 87 outcomes. After each subject 
in a group had finished, the purpose of this project was explained. 
Using the Florida statutes and the seriousness ratings to con- 
trol outcone intensity in the manner described later, a comparison 
was made among penalties prescribed at the levels of cormission, 
foreseeability, and intentionality . The level of justification 
v;as not included because of the small number of Florida statutes 
classified at this level. In testing the second hypothesis by the 
homicide statutes, however, the level of justification was included. 
In these tests, coirparisons were made among the penalties pre- 
scribed in the homicide statutes classified at the levels of fore- 
seeability, intentionality, and justification by at least two 
judges; the level of commission was excluded due to the small nura- ' 
ber of homicide statutes representing this level. Ideally, the 
second hypothesis would liave been tested by analyses that included 



, all four levels; however, the levels included in the two separate 
approaches used in this study did overlap and together 3mbraced 
all four levels. 



58 



In testing the second hypothesis, the dependent variable was 
the sevc; ;-.y of the penalty. Each of the 90 Florida statutes pre- 
scribed a naximum penalty scalable in years; therefore, in the 
tests involving the Florida statutes, the dependent variable was 
measured by the iraxiraum number of years of confinement which could 
be iirposed as the penalty. When a penalty consisted of a nsxirrtum 
nuirber of days of confinement (e.g. , 20 days in jail) , it was con- 
verted to years by dividing the iraxiimim number of days by 365 days. 
Likewise, penalties set forth in months were divided by 12. In 
testing the second hypothesis by the honicide statutes, penalty 
severity was indexed by the most severe penalty prescribed in a 
statute. These penalties varied among exoneration, a -specifiable 
number of years imprisonirent , life inprisonment, and the death 
sentence. Ihe hcmicide penalties were considered to represent 
an ordinal scale of severity that increased in the order just 
presented . 



CHAPl^R III 

RESULTS 
■The first hypotliesis was tested by examining the frequencies 
with v.'hich tJrie foior levels of causality were represented in the 
sta.tutes. As iiTplied earlier, iyfo separate designs were used iji 
testing the second hypothesis. First, tlie penalties prescribed in 
the Florida statutes v/ere tested in a 3 (level of causality) X 3 
(outcome seriousness) conpletely randomized factorial analysis of 
variance design. Second, the penalties set forth in the homicide 
statiites V7ere coiipared in a nonparaiietric one-way analysis of 
■'/ariance design. Before reporting the results of these analyses, 
ttie inter judge reliability of the classificati-on system is presented. 

Inter judge Reliability 
Using all statutes, t^io measures of inter judge reliability 
^vere calculated.. The first \ms the percentage of statutes vfaLch 
each pair of judges had classified identiccilly. The second mea- 
sure v^.s the gi coefficient (Scott, 1955) which coinrected the 
percentage of inter judge agreertent for the number of categories 
in the classification system and the frequency with v^dch each vra.s 
\ised. ;in Table 1, these measures are presented for the Florida 
statutes, the hcxnicide statutes, and all statutes combined.. 



59 



■ 7 b y ^i afi— a nm r wrgan i ^i i j m i^ >■ *j ■ gafTJMsaga ip ■ ■ ii ' i t ■ ■ w n^aBsa^iMip^— tw in ■» c ci ri — i 



60 



TABLE 1 



Inter judge Reliability for All Statutes 
as Measured by Percentage of 
TwD-Person Agreements and Pi 



Statutes 


Pair of Judges 


AB AC BC 


Per- 
cent 


Pi 


Per- 
cent 


Pi 


Per- 
cent 


Pi 


Florida 
(n=272) 


61 


.39 


68 


-48 


72 


.56 


Horde ide 
(n=187) 


82 


.71 


89 


.83 


81 


.69 


Total 
(n=459) 


69 


.53 


77 


.54 


75 


.61 



'•«ii^u<>a<ea»^va.iit.-S*«^'* i - gLj- ia >f_^^l^. ■ 



61 



For all 459 statutes, the median percentage of inter judge 
agreement was 76%, and the rt^dian pi coefficient was .61. Ihese 
indices suggest that, for the total set of statutes , an acceptable 
level of inter judge reliability had been achieved. Analyzing the 
Florida and homicide statutes separately, the honiicide statutes 
were classified scsnewhat more consistently than the Florida 
statutes. Ihe median percentage of inter judge agreement, for 
exanple, was 82% for the homicide statutes and 68% for the Florida 
statutes. A relatively greater reliability for the homicide 
statutes was also found in the percentages of S'tatutes classified 
identically by three, twD, and no judges. For the Florida 
statutes, these percentages v;ere 52%, 43%, and 5%, respectively; 
the caiparable percentages were 75%, 23%, and .5% for the hcmicide 
statutes . 

The first, middle, and last 40 statutes were the same for 
each judge, and after having classified all statutes once, the 
judges reclassified the first 40 statutes. For each of these four 
sets of statutes, inter judge reliability was estimated by the 
percentage of statutes that each pair of judges had classified 
identically. In Table 2, these percentages are presented 
separately for the Florida, homicide, and all statutes within each 

For the first, middle and last sets of statutes, the degree of 
interjudge reliability appears to have been canparable to that 






62 



TABLE 2 



Interjudge Reliability (Percentage of Two-Person Agreements) 
For Statutes Analyzed at Beginning, Mddle, and 
End of Content Analysis 



Statutes 


Pair of Judges 


Set 


Type 


AB 


AC 


BC 


First 40 


Florida 


52 


76 


76 


HoTiicide 


79 


89 


84 


Total 


65 


82 


80 


Middle 
40 


Florida 


70 


85 


70 


Hcmicide 


90 


95 


85 


Total 


80 


90 


78 


last 40 


Florida 


75 


90 


70 


Honicide 


80 


100 


80 


Total 


78 


95 


75 


Receded 
First 40 


Florida 


19 


67 


33 


Homicide 


74 


95 


74 


Total 


45 


80 


52 



In the first set of Statutes, there were 21 Florida and 19 
hoTucide statutes. In the other two sets, there were 20 statutes 
of each type. 



63 



obtained for all 459 statutes. For example, the rredian percentage 
of interjudge agreement for all statutes within a single set was 
79.8% as ccmpared for 75% for all statutes in the study. Within 
each of these sets, tlie hcmicide statutes were also classified more 
consistently than the Florida statutes. Of even greater irrportance, 
interjudge reliability appears to have remained relatively stable 
ac2xiss tlie three sets of statutes. 

For the second classification of the first 40 statutes, 
however, a lesser degree of interjudge reliability was obtained, 
especially for pairs of judges involving judge B and for the 
Florida statutes. A scxnev^iat decreased reliability was .also found 
in the estirtates of intra judge reliability (see Table 3) v^^ch" 
was measured by the percentage of statutes that had been identically 
categorized in the two classifications of the first 40 statutes. 
Corpared to the measures of reliability conputed from the reclassi- 
fication of the first 40 statutes, all other reliability estimates- 
appear to be appreciably higher, which suggests that the stability 
of the measures involving the reclassified statutes is questionable. 
The reduced consistency found in the reclassified statutes 
could indicate either that the first 40 statutes were relatively- 
more difficult to classify (as suggested by one of the judges) 
or that the jiodges v;ere less accurate in the reclassification due 
to a desire to ccsTplete a relatively tedious task. 






64 



TABLE 3 



Intrajudge Reliability 



Statutes 


Judge 


A 


B 


C 


Florida 
(n=21) 


67 


33 


62 


Homicide 
(1^19) 


95 


89 


100 


Ibtal 
(n=40) 


80 


60 


80 



Note. --Table erttries represent the percentages of statutes which 
a judge classified identically iji the two classifications of the 
first 40 statutes. 






65 



Testing the Hypotheses 
Hypothesis One 

The first hypothesis vas that there is a difference in the 
frequencies with which the levels of causality are represented in 
the statutes. A statute was considered to represent the level 
at vMch at least b,'XD judges had classified it. By this criterion, 
only 14 statutes (or 3%) were not classified. Tte percentages of 
statutes representing the four levels are presented in Table 4. 

As they pertained to a variety of criminal offenses, the 
Florida statutes provided the principal test of the first hypothesis. 
As Table 4 reveals, the levels of cormission and justification 
were represented in relatively small proportions of the Florida 
statutes, and the levels of foreseeability and intentionality were 
represented in larger and approximately equal proportions. 
According to the chi - square test for ncminal categories (Siegel, 
1956) , the distribution of the statutes across the four levels 
significantly differed frcm tlie expected distribution (X = 
124.06, df = 3, p < .001) ; likewise, the distribution of the 
statutes classified at only the levels of ccranission, foreseea- 
bility, and intentionality significantly differed from expectation 
(X = 34.55, df = 2, p < .001) . These findings supported the 
first hypothesis. 

Like the Florida statutes, most of the tomicide statutes 
were classified at the levels of foreseeability and intentionality 



66 



TABLE 4 



Percentages of Statutes Representing 
the Levels of Causality 



TVpe 

of 

Statute 


Level of Causality 


Canmission 


Foreseeabil- 
ity 


Intention- 
al ity 


Justifica- 
■ tion 


Florirla 


15 


40 


39 


1 


Homicide 


.5 


44 


36 


19 



Ifote. — There was no interjudge agreanent for 13 (or 5%) Florida 
statutes and for one (or .5%) homicide statute. 



-*»^ ■•Tlr-Sir.-^-:-«fT^X-=-4 --i" 



"■ -: ^;;^V 'ir.Vta *r-: -. ;|.»Vi r- 



67 



(see Table 4) . Since only one homicide statute represented the level 
of ccmmission, this level was excluded frcm tests involving the 
hcmicide statutes. According to the chi - square test, the distribu- 
tion of the homicide statutes classified at the remaining three levels 
significantly differed from the expected one (x2 = 17.85, df = 2, 
£ <.001); ]xMever, the distribution of the statutes classified at 
the levels of foreseeability and intentionality only was nonsignifi- 
cant (x2 = 1.51, df = 1, p < .30) . These findings both supported the 
first hypothesis and were congruent with those for the Florida statutes. 

Hypothesis Two 

Florida statutes . — The second hypothesis was that the penalties 
increase in severity from the level of coirmission to the level of 
intentionality and then decrease at the level of justification. As 
discussed earlier, 90 Florida statutes had been selected to test 
this hypothesis at the levels of coimission, foreseeability, and 
intentionality. To evaluate tlie penalties statistically, an 
analysis of oovariance design had originally been planned. In this 
manner, the median outcane-seriousness ratings could have been 
used to statistically control outcome intensity. The analysis of 
oovariance, however, assumes homogeneity of the within-grcijp 
regression coefficients (Kirk, 1968) , The regression coefficients 
for the levels of commission, foreseeability, and intentionality 
were 1.08, 1.57, and 5.15, respectively. Testing their homogeneity 
by the procedixce outlined by Kirk (1968) , the coefficients differed 
significantly (F = 5.47; df = 2, 84; £ <.G1). As the coefficients 



— «ff -r— <uv>lr>->* 



68 



were not hoirogeneous , the outcome of an analysis of covariance coiold 
not have been meaningfully interpreted. 

To test the second hypothesis by the Florida statutes, a ccmpletely 
randanized 3x3 factorial analysis of variance design, therefore, 
was used. Across the three levels of causality, three blocks of 
statutes were formed according to the iredian seriousness ratings of 
the outcones described in -them. To form the blocks, the ranges of 
the outcome ratings for each level of causality were first 
inspected (see J\ppendix D) . The outccare ratings ranged from .04 
to 5.00 for the statutes representing the level of canmission, 
frcm .02 to 5.90 for the statutes at the level of forseeability, and 
from 2.50 to 5.90 for the statutes at the level of intentionality. 
The differences in the seriousness ratings at the three levels, 
^•^lich is discussed more thoroughly later, indicated that if all 
statutes had been used, blocks of statutes with homogeneous out- 
cone ratings oould not have been completely crossed with the levels 
of causality. It was decided, therefore, to use those statutes 
for which outcome ratings fell within the range oomnnon to all three 
levels — 2.5 to 5.0. The outcorre^ ratings of 17 statutes at the level 
of commission, 16 statutes at the level of foreseeability, and 28 
statutes at the level of intentionality were located within this 
range. These 61 statutes v/ere then divided into three blocks of 
statates with nonoverlapping outcome ratings. The 20 statutes with 
outcome ratings of 2.5 through 3.1 were grouped into one block, 
the "low" seriousness group. The 21 statutes with outcome 



69 



TABLE 5 



jyiean Seriousness Ratings of Outoon^s Described 
in i±ie Florida Statutes Used 
to Test the Second Hypothesis 



Level 
of 
Causality 


Degree of Seriousness 


LC3W 


Moder- 
ate 


High 


TTotal 


Cbirmission 


2.85 
(8) 


3.42 
(5) 


4.35 
(4) 


3.37 
SD=.66 


Poresee- 
ability 


2.77 
(6) 


3.43 
(3) 


4.34 
(7) 


3.58 
S]>=.78 


Intention- 
ality 


2.83 
(6) 


3.58 
(13) 


4.33 
(9) 


3.66 
SD=.62 



Note. — Table entries represent irean seriousness ratings. The 
figures in parentheses represent the number of statutes grouped in 
the particular cell. 



70 



ratings of 3.2 tiirough 3.8 formed the "moderate" group. The "high" 

seriousness group was coirposed of statutes with outcome ratings of 

3.9 through 5.00. Table 5 presents the mean seriousness ratings 

for the nine causal ity-outoone combinations. As revealed in this 

table, the outcome ratings for the 61 statutes were relatively 

homogeneous across the levels of causality, and a conpletely 

randomized analysis of variance confirmed that the seriousness 

ratings at the three levels did not significantly differ (F = .95; 

MS = .476; df = 2, 58; p > .05) . 
—error — — 

In testing for differences in the penalties, the least-squares 
solution for a oonpletely randomized 3x3 factorial analysis of 
variance was used. The least -squares solution is described and 
recoirmended by Kirk (1968) for situations in wiiich cell sample 
sizes are unequal for reasons related to the independent variable. 
The values of the penalties entered into this analysis and all 
corparisons stemming fron it were transforrred by the reciprocal 
transfonration (transformed penalty = 1/penalty + 1) ; the trans- 
formation was necessitated by the lack of homogeneity of variance 
in the raw penalties representing the different causality-outcone comr- 
binations. In this analysis (Table 6) , significant effects were 
cbtained for causal structure and for outcome seriousness; however, 
the causality-outccme interaction was nonsignificant. 

Table 7 presents the mean penalties, based on untransfonred data, 
for the nine causality-outcome combinations. Comparing the transformed 



71 



TABI^ 6 



Summary of Analysis of Variance for Penalties 
Prescribed in the Florida Statutes 



Source - 


ss 


df 


- xMS 


- F "■ 


Causal 










structure 










(C) 


.9101 


2 


.4551 


6.56** 


Outcome 










Seriousness 










(0) 


.5380 


2 


.2690 


3.88** 


C X 


.1092 


4 


.0273 


.39 


Within 










:ell 


3.6087 


52 


.0694 . 





** p < .01. 
* p < .05 



72 



penalties at each pair of levels of causality by Dunn's multiple 
conparison procedure (Kirk, 1968) , significantly rrore severe penal- 
ties were prescribed at the level of intentionality than at either 
the level of foreseeability (d = .2577; MS . . = .0694; C = 3; 

df = 52; p < .01) or the level of coinmission (d = .2527; i^4S . , . = 

— within 

.0694; C = 3; df = 52; p < .01); however, the penalties prescribed at 
the levels of comiission and foreseeability did not differ signifi- 
cantly (d = .2267; -MS^ithin " '^^^^'' £ = 3; df = 52; £ > .05) . These 
findings partly supported the second hypothesis in that greater 
penalties were prescribed at the level of intentionality than at the 
r^Tiaining two levels; however, the nonsignificant difference between 
the levels of ccxmdssion and foreseeability was nonsupportive. 

Scheff^'s method (Kirk, 1968) was used to test for differences in 
the severity of the transformed penalties as a function of outcome 
seriousness (see Table 7 for untransformed X's) . According to these 
analyses, significantly less severe penalties were prescribed for low 
serious outccrnes than for either moderately serious outcor^s (F = 
7.71; df = 2,52; p <.05) or highly serious outccsres (F = 10.03; df = 
2,52; p <.05) . The penalties prescribed for moderately serious and 
highly serious outcomes did not significantly differ (F = .1739; df = 
2, 52; p >.05), hcwever- These findings are congruent with the past 
research demonstrating a relationship between outcone intensity and 
the amount of AS. 

Two incidental findings are noteworthy. First, for all 90 Florida 
statutes originally selected to test the second hypothesis, the 



73 



TABLE 7 



Msan Penalty as a Function of Level of Causality 
and Degree of Outoorne Seriousness 



Level of 
Causality 


Source 


Degree of Outcone Seriousness 


Low 


I^-bder- 
ate 


High 


Ibtal 


Corrmis- 
sion 


X 
SD 


.70 
.88 


6.17 
7.87 


2,81 
2.21 


2.80 

5.02 


Foresee- 
ability 


X 
SD 


.65 
.62 


.47 
.37 


3.29 

4.25 


1.77 
3.14 


Inten- 
tional ity 


T 

SD 


2.10 
2.07 


4.75 
2.88 


9.58 
7.82 


5.74 
5.69 


Total 


X 
SD 


1.10 
1.47 


4.48 
4.79 


6.02 
6.73 


3.83 
5.25 



Note. — Table entries were formed from raw penalties while the 
statistical tests were performed on transformed penalties . 



74 



vintransforrned penalties and the corxe spending outcc?me-seriousness 

ratings were positively and significantly correlated (r = .53; 

"xy 
t= 5,85, df== 88, p< .001, one-tailed). Similarly, positive and 

significant correlations were obtained within each level of 
causality. The correlation coefficients between penalty and out- 
come seriousness were .31 (t = 1.73, df = 28, p <.05) within the 
level of commission; .50 (t == 3.03, df = 28, p <.005) within the 
level of foreseeability; and .64 (t = 4.40, df = 28, p <.001) 
within the level of intentionality. Inspecting the latter three 
correlation coefficients, the strength of the relationship between 
outccsne seriousness and penalty size appears to liave increased frx3n:i 
the level of conmission to the level of intentionality; hov,ever, 
iising Fisher's r to z_ transformation (Hays, 1963) , none of the- 
differences between the within-group correlation coefficients were 
significant at the .05 level. The positive correlation between 
outcome seriousness and penalty severity was ccmpatible v/ith the 
previously reported differences in penalty size as a function of 

outcome seriousness. .. . 

The second finding also pertains to the seriousness ratings 
of the outcomes described in the 90 Florida statutes. According to 
a corrpletely randomized analysis of variance, the serious ratings 
at the three levels of causality (see Table 8) differed significantly 

(F = 7.59; MS = 1.62; df = 2, 87; p <.01) . Tested by Scheffe's 

error 
method, the outcomes at the level of intentionality were signifi- 
cantly more serious than the outcomes at either the level of 



75 



TABLE 8 



_^fean Outcome-Seriousness Patings as 
a Function of Level of Causality 



Source 



X 

SD 



Level of Causality 



C5Dimiis- 
sion 



2.60 
1.04 



Foresee- 
ability 



2.90 

1.62 



Inten- 
tionality 



3,80 
.69 



76 



cxOTnission (F= 13.33; df = 2, 87; p < .01) or the level of foresee- 
ability (F = 7.50; df - 2, 87; p < .05); however, the differences 
between the outcane-seriousness ratings at the levels of carmrLssion 
and foreseeability v;ere nonsignificant (F = ,83; df = 2, 87; p > .05) 

Homicide statutes . The second hypothesis was also tested by 
ineans of the homicide statutes representing the levels of foresee- 
ability, intentionality, and justification. Of the 187 homicide 
statutes, one was excluded from the analyses reported here because 
it had not been classified at any level by two or irore judges; one 
because it was the only statute classified at the level of 
coinruission; and one because it did not specify a readily determin- 
able penalty. For the remaining 184 statutes, the n^xiinum penalty 
prescribed was used as the dependent variable. 

Table 9 presents the percentage of statutes which represented 
each of the three levels and which prescribed a penalty of a certain 
degree of severity. For the purpose of tabular presentation, the 
penalties have been grouped according to intervals of years. For 
exanple, all statutes prescribing a penalty of any maximum number 
of years of confinement ranging fron 1 year in length through 10 
years in length have been grouped at the interval of 1-10 years. 

Ccmparing all 184 statutes by the Kruskal-Wallis one-way 
analysis of variance by ranks (Siegel, 1956) , there was a significant 
difference in the penalties prescribed at the three levels (H = 
113.96, df = 2, p < .001) . Using the I'lann-Whitney U test (Siegel, 



77 



TAHLE 9 



Severity of Penalties Prescribed in the Homicide 

Statutes Representing the Levels 

of Causality 



Level 
of 
Causality 


Penalty 


i^ 


1-10 


11-20 


21-30 


31-40 


99 


Life 


Death 


Foresee- 
ability 
(n = 81) 





54 


31 


4 








5 


6 


Inten- 
tional ity 
(n = 67) 








7 


7 


1 


1 


40 


42 


Justifi- 
cation 
(n = 36) 

— ^ 


69 


14 


11 


3 








3 






Note. — Table entries represent the percentage of statutes which 
represented a level of causality which prescribed one of the follow- 
ing as the maxiinum penalty: (a) a period of iirprisonment (in years) 
within one of the intervals listed, (b) life irtprisonment, or (c) 
the death sentence. 



78 



1956) , tiie penalties at the level of intentionality (lAd = life 
irrprisonment) were significantly more severe (Z = 8.82, U = 
453.5, p < .0001; Z = 8.29, U = 39.5, p < .0001; respectively) 
than the penalties at either the level of foreseeability (Md = 
10 years) or the level of justification (Md = years or exonera- 
tion) . The penalties prescribed at the level of foreseeability 
v.ere also significantly more severe than the penalties prescribed 
at the level of justification (Z = 5.91, U = 480, p < .0001) . 
Since the severity of the honicide penalties increased from the level 
of foreseeability to the level of intentionality and then decreased 
at the level of justification, these findings supported the second 
hypothesis . 

To provide more stringent tests, a second set of tests was 
calculated using statutes that prescrU^ed maximum penalties within 
a more restricted range . The hcmicide statutes used in these 
analyses specified maximum penalties that ranged from 1 to 40 years 
of confinement. Since only 10 statutes at the level of justification 
prescribed such penalties, each level was represented by 10 statutes. 
Tlie level of justification was represented by the 10 statutes just 
mentioned. Each of the levels of foreseeability and intentionality 
was represented by 10 statutes randomly selected from the statutes 
(n = 72 and 11, respectively) which had been classified at that 
level and which met the penalty criterion. 

Conparing all 30 penalties by the Kruskal-Wallis test, a 
significant difference was found in the severity of the penalties 



79 



prescribed at the three levels (H = 14.79, df = 2, p < .001) . The 
penalties prescribed at the level of intentionality (Md =24.8 
years) were significantly greater (U = 4, n-,1 = n22 = 10, p < .002); 
U = 10, nj_ = n2 = 10, p= .002; respectively) than the penalties 
prescribed at either the level of foreseeability (Md = 10 years) 
or the level of jiostification (Md = 12,5 years); however, the 
penalties at the latter two levels did not significantly differ 
(U = 39.5, n -j^ = n^ = 10, p > .10) . As the p^enalties prescrited at 
aie level of intentionality were more severe than the penalties 
prescribed at the renHining two levels, these findings also supported 
the second hypothesis. 



CHAPTER IV ■ ■ ' 

DISCUSSION 
Criminal st3.tutes were content analyzed in order to test hypoth- 
eses about the representation of Heider's levels of causality and 
about the severity of the penalties prescribed in them. In general, 
the results supported the hypotheses and, therefore, the theory and 
past research upon which they were based. Together with the results 
of past research on Heider's theory, the results of this study also 
seem to have ijiplications about the principle underlyijig the attri- 
bution of responsibility (criminal liability) and the prescription 
of penalties in criiriinal statutes. 

Heider ' s Theory and Related Research 
Causal Structure and Penalty Severity 

The first hypothesis was that the levels of canmission, foresee- 
ability, intentionality, and justification are unevenly represented 
in criminal statutes. The distribution of the levels in both the 
Florida and homicide statutes supported this hypothesis. In both 
sets, the levels of commission and justification were represented 
in relatively small proportions of the statutes, and each of the 
levels of foreseeability and intentionality were represented in 
approximately 40% of the statutes. As noted earlier, the small pro- 



80 



• P-f^.,---*-.,— IM.' 



81 



portion at the level of justification was scjnewhat artif actual due 
to the arrangement of the statutes. The results for the remaining 
three levels suggest that in criminal statutes, responsibility is 
seldomly attributed for the mere ccmmission of criminal acts and that 
responsibility is most frequently attributed under conditions repre- 
sented by either the level of foreseeability or the level of inten- 
tionality. 

Although a directional hypothesis was not advanced, it was 
speculated that like the perceived causal influence of personal 
factors, the representations of the levels would increase frcm the 
level of commission to the level of intentionality. Since the levels 
of foreseeability and intentionality were equally represented in both 
sets of statutes, this speculation was not confirrred. The failure 
to confirm it might be regarded as evidence against either Heider's 
theory or the validity of the content analysis. The equal representa- 
tions of the tv70 levels, however, more likely stemrred frcm the rela- 
tive scopes of the levels and/or the nature of the judgments guided 
by them. 

One factor that is likely to have contributed to the equal repre- 
sentations of the two levels is their relative scopes. In Heider's 
tlieory and the present research, the level of foreseeability is de- 
fined in terms of the knowledge of the actor, and responsibility is 
attributed at this level when it is attributed for outcries that 
might have been foreseen. This level, however, is not restricted 



82 



tjo Tmknown but foreseeable outcortes; rather, it also corrprehends 
known outcomes that v/ere not part of the actor's intentions. The 
level of foreseeability, therefore, is represented by a variety of 
actor-outccme relationships that vary in tenrs of the actor's know- 
ledge of the outcome. At the level of intentionality, on the other 
hand, responsibility is attributed for only one type of actor-outcorre 
relationship, the intentional production of an outcome. Conpared to 
the level of foreseeability, the level of intentionality appears to 
carpreheiid a smaller variety of relationships. Thus, the equal 
representations of the levels of foreseeability and intentionality 
may partly reflect the greater variety of relationstiips classifiable 
at the former level. If so, intentionality may have been the single 
most frecpently represented relationship, but tlie greater variety 
of relationships conprehended by the level of foreseeability re- 
sulted in its being represented as frequently as the level of inten- 
tionality. The contention that the level of foreseeability includes 
a variety of actor-outcome relationships is supported by the research 
indicating that the amount of AR (Kronstadt, 1965) and punishment 
(Friedrich, 1965) vary with the perceived degree of the actor's know- 
ledge. 

The distribution of the statutes may also reflect tlie nature of 
the judgments guided by them. As used to derive the first hypothesis, 
Heider's theory is concerned with the amount of AR as a function of 
perceived personal causality. In testing the first hypothesis, no 



83 



ineasure of the amount of AR was obtained; rather, the causal struc- 
tures which provide frameworks for all-or-none judgments of guilt 
were assessed. In retrospect, the distribution of causal structures 
guiding absolute judgments should not necessarily foll«v the same 
pattern as judgments of the amount of AR. In such cases, the most 
frequently represented causal structures should be those which gener- 
ate the perceived degree of responsibility that is adequate for a 
judgment of guilt. Without assuming that the criminal law attri- 
butes responsibility at a given state or level of moral development, 
Heider's theory does not predict the causal structiores producing 
this perceived degree of responsibility. The equal representations 
of the levels of foreseeability and intentionality , thus, could 
indicate tliat in the criminal law, either of these causal structures 
fosters the perceived degree of guilt sufficient for an absolute 
judgment of liability. 

The second hypothesis was that the severity of the penalties in- 
creases from the level of commission to the level of intentionality 
and then decreases at the level of justification. To ccrapare the 
penalties prescribed in statutes representing the levels of ccmnission, 
foreseeability, and intentionality, 61 Florida statutes were used. 
It was fouled tl-iat the penalties prescribed at the level of intention- 
ality were significantly greater than the penalties prescribed at 
the level of ccmnission or the level of foreseeability; however, the 
difference between the latter two levels was nonsignificant. The 



84 



honicide statutes were used to ccnpare penalties prescriJDed at the 
levels of foreseeability, intentionality , and justification, and it 
was found that the penalties at the level of intentionality were 
significantly more severe than the penalties at the remaining two 
levels . 

Except for the nonsignificant difference between the levels of 
ccmnission and foreseeability, these findings supported the second 
hypothesis. They are also congruent with previous research (e.g., 
Shaw & Reitan, 1969; Sulzer, 1964) demonstrating that the ainount of 
sanction assigned by individuals is affected by the causal structure 
of the event. In addition to the assignment of pmishments by indi- 
viduals, Friedrich (1955) reported evidence suggesting that the sever- 
ity of a statutory penalty is related to the causal structure of the 
event for which it is prescribed. Ihe results of this study confirm 
Friedrich 's results and provide more direct support for such a rela- 
tionship. As discussed earlier, past research has demonstrated that 
the pattern for AS tends to follow that for AR. Thus, to the extent 
that penalty size reflects the amount of AR, the results of this 
study indirectly support Heider's theory by suggesting that in criminal 
statutes, the amount of AR is also related to the relative causal con- 
tribution of personal factors. 

The failiore to find a difference between the levels of ccmnission 
and forseeability appears to contradict the second hypothesis and 
Heider's theory. Rather than disconfirming Heider's theory, this 



85 



failure could have resulted from eit±Ler the invalidity of the content 
analysis system or the seriousness of the outcones used in the analysis. 

Each statute \vas classified at the level at vM.ch at least two of 
the judges had placed it. ExaiTiining the Florida statutes finally 
classified at the three levels, the percentages of statutes classified 
at the levels of connmission, foreseeability, and intentionality by all 
three judges were 32 percent, 55 percent, and 64 percent, respectively. 
Of the remaining statutes placed at the level of comiission, 58 percent 
were classified there by two of the judges and at the level of fore- 
seeability by the third judge. Based upon this data, it appears as if 
there was relatively less agreenent about the representation of the 
level of commission and, f urthennore , as if the disagreerrent was di- 
rected toward classifying the coirroission statutes at the level of 
foreseeability. This disagreement could indicate that the statutes 
representing the level of corrmission were invalidly classified and 
actually represented the level of foreseeability. If so, the non- 
significaiit difference beb'/een the levels of comiission and foresee- 
ability is accounted for by the failure of the content analysis pro- 
cedure to validly discriminate between the two levels. 

In testing the second hypothesis by the Florida statutes, outcone 
ijitensity was controlled by forming the statutes into groups that, across 
the three levels, were homogeneous with respect to the outcore- 
seriousness ratings. As the outcoire ratings of these statutes ranged 
from 2.5 to 5.0 (on a 7-point scale) , the outcanes used to test the 



86 



second hypotJiesis are best characterized as moderately to noderately- 
high serious. Past research has found that causal structure and 
outcome intensity interact to determine the amount of AS. In analy- 
zing such an interaction, Cuthbert (1966) found that causal structure 
appreciably influenced the assignment of punishments for highly serious 
outcomes only. Inspecting the AS scores reported by Shaw and Reitan 
(1969) , the greatest difference between the levels of foreseeability 
and counission appears to have been obtained for high intensity nega- 
tive outcomes. The failure to find a difference between the levels of 
camiission and foreseeability, thus, may reflect that causal struc- 
ture and outccane seriousness interact in such a fashion that the sanc- 
tions assigned at the levels of cannission and foreseeability are most 
reliably different for very serious outcones. V-Jhether the non- 
significant difference indicates that penalties are undifferentiated 
at the levels of commission and foreseeability, that the levels them- 
selves were not validly differentiated by the content analysis proce- 
dure, or that the effects of causal structure were moderated by outcone 
seriousness must be determined by future research. 

In conclusion, it was found that the frequencies with which the 
levels were represented in the statutes significantly differed such 
that the conditions for criminal liability were most often structured 
according to the levels of foreseeability and intentionality. These 
findings supported the first hypothesis. Except for the nonsignificant 
difference betv/een the levels of ccmmission and foreseeability, the 
second hypothesis was also supported; that is, the severity of the 



87 



penalties increased fron the level of foreseeability to the level of 
intentionality and then decreased at the level of justification. It 
is concluded that the results of this study generally confirmed the 
hypotheses upon vMch it was based. 

These results appear to justify two additional conclusions. 
First, to the extent that the content analysis categories validly 
represented Heider's levels of causality, the results of this study 
support Heider's theory of AR and related research. The causal 
structure of an event does appear to be reflected in the conditions 
for crijrdnal liability as embodied in criminal statutes. As the 
levels of foreseeability and intentionality were the nx)st frequently 
represented causal structures, the findings iirply that criminal lia- 
bility is typically contingent upon a contribution of personal factors 
beyond the mere ccmnission of the criminal act. To the extent that 
penalty size indexes the amount of AR, the results suggest that AR in- 
creases from the level of foreseeability to the level of intention- 
ality and then decreases at the level of justification. These results, 
thus, indirectly support Heider's proposal that AR increases v/ith the 
perceived contribution of personal factors. In general, the results 
also replicate those of past research deraonstrating that the amount 
of AS varies with the causal structure of the event. 

The second additional conclusion is tliat the results extend the 
generalizability of Heider's theory. Predictions from Fielder's theory 
were supported in the context of the criminal law suggesting that the 



88 



theory is generally applicable to the attribution of criminal respon- 
sibility (liability) and the prescription of penalties in the criminal 
law. Although Holder's theory may be applicable to the actual ad- 
ministration of the law, generalization is limited to legal theory 
and criminal statutes until the judgn^nts of responsibility and the 
prescriptions of penalties in criminal cases are studied. The metho- 
dology of this research also extends the generalizability of Heider's 
theory. Although other techniques have been used (Tremble & Shaw, 
1972) , most of the evidence for relationships between causal structure 
and AR and AS has been gathered by Shaw and Sulzer's (1964) laboratory 
technique. By supporting Heider's theory through a content analysis 
of criminal statutes, this study adds to the body of research demon- 
strating that the applicability of Heider's theory is not limited to 
laboratory settings in vThich subjects judge stimulus materials about 
fictitious events. 

Outcare Seriousness 

Past research on AS by individuals (Cuthbert, 1966; Shaw & Reitan, 
1969; Sulzer, 1964) has demonstrated that greater sanctions are assigned 
for high intensity outcomes than for low intensity outcores and, more- 
over, that outccme intensity and causal structure interact so that the 
effects of outcome intensity on AS are moderated by the causal structure 
of the event. Friedrich (1965) similarly found that the severity of 
a statutory penalty was related to the seriousness of the harmful event 



89 



for v^iich it was prescribed. In the present study, the Florida 
statutes were grouped according to the seriousness ratings of the 
outcomes described in them. It was found that the penalties for 
moderately and highly serious outccmes were significantly more severe 
than the penalties prescribed for outcon^s with low serious ratings; 
however, the interaction between causal structure and outcome serious- 
ness was nonsignificant. That more severe penalties tended to be 
prescribed for more serious outccmes is corrpatible with past research. 
Along with the results of Friedrich's study, these findings suggest 
that the severity of the penalty prescribed in a statute, and in- 
directly the degree of responsibility, is related to the objective 
nature of the criminal event as well as to its causal structure. 

At first glance, the failure to find a significant interaction 
betv/een causal structure and outccsne seriousness seons to conflict 
with the past research on AS by individuals; however, the conflict 
may be more apparent than real. CXatccsnes with extremely different 
seriousness ratings were not included in the analysis, and the rela- 
tively limited differences in the seriousness ratings may have sup- 
pressed an interaction. Past research (Cuthbert, 1966; SiiLzer, 1964) 
suggests that if an interaction had been obtained, outccme serious- 
ness would have probably affected the penalties at the levels of 
foreseeability and intentionality to a greater degree than the 
penalties at the level of ccnimission. If, as discussed earlier, the 






90 



Florida statutes classified at the level of ccrrmission had been 
misclassified and actually represented the level of foreseeability, 
the nonsignificant interaction could have resulted frcm the levels 
included in the analysis. Thus, the nonsignificant interaction 
could iirply that outcome seriousness differentially influences the 
prescription of penalties in statutes and the assignment of sanctions 
by individuals; hoA^ever, due to the limited range of the outcome 
ratings and/or the levels of causality included, this research may 
not have been designed so as to detect an interaction. 

Two additional results pertaining to outccme seriousness were 
obtained. First, the outcones at the level of intentional ity were 
rated as more serious than the outcones at the levels of ccjimission 
and foreseeability. Second, by comparing the wi thin-group regression 
coefficients, outcome seriousness appears to have predicted penalty 
severity somewhat better at the level of intentionality than at the 
other two levels. How to account for these findings is puzzling. As 
Heider's theory does not account for the perceived seriousness of events, 
the results do not directly fall within tlie scope of his theory. One 
possible explanation, however, merits attention. 

That the outcomes at the level of intentionality were rated as 
more serious than the other outcones possibly indicates that inten- 
tionally produced social harms are perceived to be more serious than 
unintentionally produced harms. Although an effort was made to obtain 
ratings of outcome seriousness independent of causal structure, this 
finding could indicate that the effort was unsuccessful. Based on 



91 



an examijiation of the outccsne descriptions (see Appendij< D) , inten- 
tionality does not appear to be directly expressed in the descrip- 
tions of tJie outcot^s representing the level of intentional ity any 
more than in the descriptions representing the other two levels. 
Regardless of explicit references to causal structure, however, 
rresasures of outcone seriousness confounded by causal structure could 
have been obtained by an "inferred" causal structure. That is, the 
subjects rating the outcomes may have violated the instructions; 
inferred from their normative expectations whether conviction for an 
outccme typically occurs for the accidental, negligent, or inten- 
tional commJ.ssion of the outcome; and then rated the outcone in terms 
of the inferred condition. The "correct" causal structure of the out- 
cone would have been inferred if the subjects had identified the 
condition (accidental, negligent, or intentional) corresponding with 
the causal structure extracted fron the outcone. As they were aware 
that they were taking part in a study on the "seriousness of crimes," 
the subjects may have indeed been motivated to make such inferences. 
Unfortunately, no evidence bearing on this explanation, v^ich is a vari- 
ant of the theme of demand characteristics (Ome, 1969) , is available. 
Its tenability, however, is sonev^iat doubtful. For this process to 
have produced the seriousness ratings, a substantial proportion of the 
subjects would have had, first, to guess the saire causal condition, 
second, to guess the correct causal condition, and, third, to be simi- 
larly affected by the inferred causal condition. Even if this process 



92 



did produce the differential outcore ratings across the levels of 
causality, it cannot readily account for the relatively stronger 
relationship between outcoi^ seriousness and penalty size within 
the level of intentionality. 

In sumnary, this research has demonstrated that the severity 
of a statutory penalty is related to the seriousness of the outcore 
for v^ich it is prescrited. In congruence with past research, this 
finding suggests that the penalty prescribed in a criminal statute 
is related to the objective characteristics of the event as well as 
to its causal structure. Ihe nonsignificant interaction possibly 
points to differences between the assignment of sanctions by individuals 
and the prescription of penalties in statutes; however^ this research 
may not have been designed so as to detect an interaction. Other re- 
sults on outcone seriousness my represent the influence of a phenom- 
enon similar to damand characteristics; ho/ever, these findings do 
not fall completely within the scope of either this explanation or 
Heider's theory. 

Criminal Law 
From its inception, the purpose of this research has been to study 
Heider's theory; consequently, the focus has remaijied on this theory 
rather than the law itself. As the research was conducted by using 
legal material, its results and the results of other studies in the 
framework of Heider's theory are potentially applicable to the criminal 
law. ihe results seem to ijiply that the law attributes responsiloility 



93 



(liability) and prescribes penalties in accordance with the blame- 
worthiness of the individual; that is, judgn^ts of guilt and pre- 
scriptions of penalties are founded i:^n the principle of retribu- 
tion. Although such a conclusion sems to be warranted, it cannot 
be advanced without reservation. 

Historically and presently, there have been several corpetijig 
rationales or justifications for the use of punishirent in the 
criirdnal law (Bittner & Piatt, 1966; Gibbons, 1968; Packer, 1968). 
Ihese justifications have included deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
retribution. According to the principle of retribution, a person 
should be judged guilty of — held responsible for ~ a crine because 
of his moral blameworthiness; furthermore, the punishnent for the 
crime should fit the moral blaireworthiness of the perpetrator. 

In this study, it has been demonstrated that penalty size in- 
creases frcm the level of foreseeability to the level of intention- 
ality and then decreases at the level of justification; the results 
of past research have shown that the amount of responsibility attri- 
buted for an event follows the sane pattern. This study has also 
shown that the penalties for more serious outcomes tend to be irore 
severe than the penalties for less serious outcorres; in past research, 
a similar pattern has been obtained for AR. If it is assumed that 
AR is a judgment of the moral blaireworthijiess of the accused individual 
and that the sanctioning process is at least partly rrediated by per- 
ceived blameworthiness, the results of this study and those of past 



94 



research suggest that the principle of retribution underlies the 
attribution of responsibility and the prescription of penalties 
in the criminal law. Ihat is, they suggest that the conditions 
for crjjninal liability and the prescription of penalties are based 
upon the perceived moral blameworthiness of the criminal. 

Although this conclusion may be warranted, two notable reser- 
vations iTTUst be discussed. First, according to the retributive 
position, judgments of guilt and the prescriptions of punishment 
are founded upon the moral blameworthiness of the individual. For 
the results to support the conclusion, judgments of responsUoility 
and measurements of the amount of AR must signify the perceived 
moral blameworthiness of the accused person, and the research on 
Heider's theory has not clearly demonstrated that a judgirent of 
responsUDility does signify the j^rceived blameworthiness of the in- 
dividual. In several studies (e.g.. Shaver, 1970a; Iterttole & Shaw, 
1972; Walster, 1966) , the concept of responsibility has not been de- 
fined for the subjects judging the actor; in these studies, v/hether a 
judgment of responsibility referred to the blameworthiness, capacity, 
personal causality, etc., of the actor is unknown. In studies using 
Shaw and Sulzer's (1964) technique, responsibility has frequently 
been defined for the subjects. In Sulzer's (1964) dissertation, for 
exanple, the subjects were instructed as follows: "... Your task is 
to read the story carefully and then decide whether person P is re- 
sponsible for the specified event. If a person is responsible for 



95 



sanething, that n^ans we might praise or blame him for it. 
(p. 107) . " Ihe instructions continued to the effect that if they 
believed the person to be resjxDnsible , the subjects were to JJidicate 
how responsible they believed him to be. Instructions such as 
Sulzer's have the obvious advantage of anchoring judgn^ts of respon- 
sibility and, moreover, anchoring them in terms of praise and blame; 
however, they do not instruct the subject to iiidicate how blarreworthy 
he believes the person per se to be any more than to indicate how 
susceptible the person might be to blaire. Ohat is, such instructions 
anchor judgments of responsiliility in terms of blane without clearly 
specifying that the judgments are to signify the perceived blame- 
worthiness of the person. A conclusion from this research that the 
criminal law is founded upon the principle of retribution, therefore, 
is limited by the failure to specify clearly the meaning of a judg- 
n^nt of responsibility, and this conclusion is justified only to the 
extent that such judgments have signified the moral blaneworthiness of 
the person. Further investigation, thus, is needed before this con- 
clusion can be advanced without qualification. 

Although it is readily evident, a second cjoalification should be 
noted. This research has dealt with criminal statutes, and the adminis- 
tration of the criminal law in terms of actual cases was not investi- 
gated. The conclusion regarding retribution, therefore, is limited to 
the statutory conditions for AR and to the penalties prescribed in 
statutes, ivhether retriJ3ution influences the actual administration of 



96 



the criminal law is open to future research. 

Conclusions 
To suimiarize the principle results, a significant difference 
was found in the frequencies with which the levels of coimiission, 
foreseeability, intenUonality, and justification were represented 
in the saiTples of Florida and tomicide statutes. The levels of com- 
mission and justification were represented in relatively snail pro- 
portions of the statutes, and each of the levels of foreseeability 
and intentionality were represented in approxiinately 40% of the 
statutes. These findings supported the first hypothesis. Although 
the difference between the levels of comnission and foreseeability 
^vas nonsignificant, the statutory penalties increased in severity 
from the level of foreseeability to the level of intentionality 
and then decreased at the level of justification; these results 
generally supported the second hypothesis. Finally, it was found 
that more severe penalties tended to be prescribed for more serious 
outcomes . 

In addition to the conclusion that the tavo hypotheses were gener- 
ally supported, four conclusions are drawn from these results. First, 
to the extent that the content analysis categories validly represented 
Heider's levels, the results support Heider's theory of AR and related 
research. As the statutes could be reliably analyzed in terms of the 
levels of causality, the causal structure of a criminal action does 
appear to be represented in the statutory conditions for criMnal lia- 



97 



bility. The finding that the levels of foreseeability and inten- 
tionality inost frequently described the conditions for liability 
indicates that criminal liability is contingent upon a contribution 
of personal factors greater than the mere canmission of the crime. 
The results bearing on the second hypothesis generally replicate ' 
those of past research indicating a relationship between AS and 
causal structure. To the extent that penalty size indexes the amount 
of AR, these findings also indirectly support Heider's proposal that 
the amount of AR varies with the perceived contribution of personal 
factors. Second, the results extend the generalizability of Heider's 
theory by gathering support for it in the context of the criminal law 
and by virtue of the research methodology. Third, along with the re- 
sults of past research, the results indicate that the sanction 
assigned for an event is related to the objective characteristics of 
the event as well as its causal structure. Fourth, with noted quali- 
fications, the results of the present and past research on Heider's 
theory seem to imply that the principle of retribution underlies the 
conditions for the attribution of responsibility (criminal liability) 
and the prescription of penalties in criminal statutes. 



APPEl-roiCES 



APPENDIX A 

STATUTES SELECTED FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS 

AND ALTERATIONS OF THEIR TEXTS 
Introduction 

This appendix contains the chapters of laws selected for the 
content analysis. In preparing the laws, the texts of several laws 
were altered. Alterations in the content of the laws are also pre- 
sented here. 

The chapters of laws are listed by underlined side headings. 
The side headings consisting of the word chapter , a set of numbers, 
and a title (e.g., Chapter 782 Homicide) refer to the cliapters of 
Florida laws; these laws were taken frcxn Florida Statutes Annotated , 
Title 44. The side headings consisting of the name of a state 
(e.g., Alaska) refer to the states whose homicide laws were selected; 
next to the name of each state, there is a reference to the publica- 
tion from which its homicide laws v;ere taken. 

In the order of their appearance in the chapters, the laws found 
within each chapter are listed under the chapter heading by their 
statute, or section, numbers (e.g., 782.01, 2A:113-1, 22-16-17). If 
a law was not read by the scorers during the content analysis, its 
amission is noted along with the reason for its exclusion. In order 
to present any alteration nade in the la\'7s read by the scorers, the 



99 



100 



the following prx)cedures have been generally adopted: 

(1) If a law was not altered, only the statute nurriber is listed. 

(2) If a carplete sentence or paragraph was deleted from the 
text of the law, the deleted inaterial is quoted or referenced so that 
it can be identified. The follov/ing is presented, for exairple, to 
indicate an alteration of this type in ^^fest Virginia Statute 51-2-1: 
"The second paragraph ;vas omitted because it describes procedural 
matters." In content analyzing the laws, the scorers read 
Statute 61-2-1 in its original form except for the deletion of the 
second paragraph (and except for any other changes listed for this 
statute) . 

(3) If a cxsiplete sentence was added to the text of the law, 
the added sentence is presented along with a reference to its location 
in the law. For exainple, the addition of a sentence to Florida 
Statute 876.12 is indicated in this manner: "The follaving was 
added as the last sentence: 'Any person or persons convicted of vio- 
lating the provisions of this section shall be punished by Penalty 
876.12-1 . ' " Statutes 876.12 was read by the scorers in its original 
form except for -hlie addition of the above sentence as the last sen- 
tence of the statute. 

(4) If part: of a sentence was deleted from the text of a law 
and if nothing vra.s substituted for the deleted inaterial, the text 
surrounding the deleted material is presented along with a set of 
parentheses with no vxDrds within them. Empty parentheses, therefore, 



101 



indicate where irnterial was deleted from a law without substituting 
other naterial for it. For exar^ple, the deletion of the w^rd 
felony from the title of Florida Statute 790.162 is listed in the 
following manner: "The title was altered to read: ^Threat to throw , 
place, or discharge any_ destructive device j^^; penalty.'" The 
title of Statute 790.162, thus, was worded in the n^nner just pre- 
sented except for the parentheses. 

(5) If a sentence within a law was altered by word substitution 
or by adding words without having deleted part of the original text, 
that part of the statute as it was read by the scorers is presented 
here. The iraterial presented here contains part of the statute (as 
it is originally worded) surrounding the altered part and the altered 
part within parentheses. For exanple, the first paragraph of Florida 
Statute 782.04 is origijially vxDrded as follows: "... shall be murder 
in the first degree, and shall te punishable by death.'' In preparing 
this statute, a coded penalty was substituted for the penalty pre- 
scribed in the statute; that is, the word death was replaced by Penalty 
782.04-1. This alteration is listed in the following manner: "The 
first paragraph was altered as follows: • . . . shall be murder in the 
first degree, and shall be punishable by ( Penal ty 782.04-1) . '" it 
should be noted that most of the alterations were of this type and, 
more specifically, consisted of the substitution of a coded penalty 
for the penalties prescribed in the statutes. 

(6) The addition of a footnote defining a crime is indicated in 
this appendix by a statement to the effect that such a footnote was 



102 



added. Footnotes defining the crijT^s of murder, irens laughter, volun- 
tary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter were the only foot- 
notes used. These footnotes were as follows: 

Murder . Murder is a crime whereby a person of sound mind 
and discretion unlawfully kills another person with express 
or ijiplied malice aforetJiought, that is, with a deliterate 
purpose, design, or determination distinctly formed in tlie 
mind of the perpetrator. Murder is sometimes divided into 
degrees, usually murder in the first degree and murder in 
the second degree. Murder in the first degree is generally 
defined to consist of homicides connitted by poison, lying 
in wait; hcmicides conmitted in pursuance of a deliberate 
and premeditated design; and, additionally, homicides accom- 
panying the coirmission of sane of the more atrocious felo- 
nies such as burglary, arson, rape, and robbery. Murder 
m the second degree is generally defined to consist of 
homicides corrmitted with a purpose to kill that is instan- 
taneously formed in the mind of the perpetrator and, ad- 
ditionally, homicides coirmi-tted with a purpose to inflict 
the particular injury without caring '/*iether death is caused. 

Manslaughter . Manslaughter is tlie killijig of another harvan 
being without malice or deliberation. There are tavo types 
of manslaughter. The first is voluntary manslaughter. Vol- 
untary manslaughter occurs i-^.en one person unnecessarily 
kills another person utx)n a sudden heat of passion (for 
exairple, upon a sudden quarrel, tv/o persons fight with one 
person killing the otlier) . Involuntary irrans laughter, the 
second type, occurs uhen one person kills another person 
v/hile committing an unlawful act not usually tending to pro- 
duce great bodily harm or \^ile committing a lawful act ^■/ith- 
out using the proper caution or the requisite skill. 

Voluj itary Manslaughter . Voluntary manslaughter is the unneces- 
sary killing of anotiier human being (1) upon a sudden heat of 
passion and (2) v/ithout either malice or deliberation (as for 
exanple, upon a sudden quarrel, two persons fight, with one 
person killing the other one) . 

Involuntary Manslaugh ter. Involuntary itHnslaughter is the killing 
of another human being (1) without malice or deliberation and 
(2) in the conmission either of an unlawful act not usually tend- 
ing to produce great bodily harm or of a lawful act without using 
the proper caution or the requisite skills. 



APPENDIX A 
STATUTES SELECTED FOR CONTm"T A^IALYSIS 
AND ALTERATIONS OF TflEIR TEXTS 
Listing of Statutes 

Qiapter 782 Homicide 

782.01 

782.02 

The following sentence v;as added as the last paragraph of the 
statute: "Any person connitting justifiable homicide shall be pun- 
ishable by Penalty 782.02-1 . " 

782.03 

The follaving sentence was added at the end of the statute: 
"Any person conxnitting excusable homicide shall be punishable by 
Penalty 782.03-1 ." 

782.04 

The first paragraph was altered to read: "...shall be murder 
in the first degree, and shall be punishable by (Penalty 782.04-1)." 

The second paragraph was altered to read: "...sh^ll be murder 
in the second degree, and shall be punished by (Pe nalty 782.04-2)." 

Bie third paragraph was altered to read: "... shall be murder 
in the third degree, and shall be punished by ( Penalty 782.04-3) ." 



103 



t w- -.j^Jjt^m::m « . U -.^0.1.* 



104 



782.05 

l^is statute was altered as follavs: "... cc^rmonly called a 
duel, with deadly weapons, shall be (punishable by Penalty 782.05-1 )." 
782.06 

This statute was altered as follows: "... the person guilty ' 
of the act descrihed in (a) or (b) shall be (punishable by Penalty 
782.06-1) , " 

782.07 

This statute was altered to read: "... shall be deen^ inan- 
slaughter, and shall be punished by ( Penalty 782.07-1) . " 
782.08 

This statute was altered to read: "... assisting another in 
the corrmission of self-murder shall be (punished by Penalty 782.08-1 ) ." 
782.09 

This statute was altered as follo^^s: "... resulted in the death 
of such mother, shall te (punished by Penalty 782.09-1) ." 
782.10 

This statute was altered as follo^vs: "... death of such child 
or of such mother he thereby produced, be (punished by Penalty 
782.10-1) ." 

782.11 

This statute was altered as folla^s: "... or after such attenpt 
shall have failed, shall be (punishable by Penalty 782.11-1) . " • 



105 



782.12 

This statute was altered as folloivs: "... to avoid such aniiral, 
such owner shall be (punishable by Penalty 782.12-1) . " ' 
782.13 

This statute was altered as follows: "... human being shall be 
drowned or otherwise killed, shall be (punished by Penalty 782.13-1) ." 
782.14 

This statute was altered as follows: "... every such captain, 
engineer, or other person, shall be (punished by Penalty 782.14-1) ." 
782.15 

This statute was altered as follows: "... produce the death of ' 
such other person, he shall be (punishable by Penalty 782.15-1) ." 
782.16 

This statute was altered as follows: "... was murdered, she 
shall be punished by ( Penalty 782.16-1 ) . " 

Chapter 783 Dueling 
783.01 

This statute was altered as follows: "... such challenge, altJiough 
no duel ensues, shall be punished by ( Penalty 783.01-1 )." 
783.02 

This statute was altered as follovs: "... encourages or promotes 
such duel, shall be punished by ( Penalty 783.02-1) ." 



10( 



783.03 

lliis statute was altered as follows: "... accepting a challenge 
to fight a duel, shall be punished by ( Penalty 783.03-1)." 

Chapter 790 ^:feapons and Firearms 

790.001 

790.01 

Subsection (1) was altered as follav;s: "... concealed weapon 
on or about his person shall upon conviction be punished by ( Penalty 
790.01-1) . " 

Subsection (2) was altered as follows: "... concealed firearm 
on or about his person shall be (punished by Penalty 790.01-2)." 
790.02 - 790.04 

QnLtted. ihese statutes describe administrative procedures. 
790.05 

Ihis statute was altered as follo^^s: "... counties of tliis 
state, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by ( Penalty 
790.05-1); provided, this section shall not... ." 

790.051 
790.06 • 

Onitted. This statute describes adirunistrative procedures. 
790.07 

Section (1) was altered as follows: "... attorpts to use any 
weapon or carries a concealed weajxDn (shall be punished by Penalty 
790.07-1)." 



107 



790.07 (Continued) 

Section (2) v;as altered as follou^s: "... atteirpts to use any 
firearm or carries a concealed firearm (shall be punished by Penalty 



790.07-2) ." 

Section (4) v;as altered as follows: "... atterrpting to comnit 
any felony or while under indictment (shall be punished by Penalty 
790.07-3) ." 

790.08 

Onitted. Tnis statute descrites aciiiinistrative procedures. 
790.09 

^is statute ^.'as altered as follows: "... slung shot, or n^tal- 
lic knuckles, shall be punished by ( Penalty 790.09-1)." 
790.10 

This statute was altered as follows: "... so offending, upon con- 
viction shall be punished by ( Penalty 790.10-1) . " 
790.11 



790.12 
790.13 

Omitted. This statute had been repealed. 
790.14 

This statute was altered as follows: "... sections 790.11 and 
790.12 shall upon conviction be punished by (Penalty 790.14-1)." 



108 



790.15 

'mis statute was altered as follows: "... street or occupied 
premises, shall be punished by ( Penalty 790.15-1) . This section 
shall not apply... ." 

790.16 

The first paragraph was altered as follows: "... to do dajTuge 
to the property of any person, shall be (punishable by Penalty 
790.16-1) . " 

The last t^ paragraphs were deleted because they describe ad- 
ministrative procedures. 

790.161 

The word felony was deleted from the title of the statute. 

The first paragraph was altered as follows: "... and any person 
convicted thereof shall he (...) punished in the following nenner. . . ." 

Paragraph (1) was altered as follavs: "... or any person, the 
person so convicted (...) shall be punished by ( Penalty 790.161-1) ." 

Paragraph (2) was altered as follws: "... the property of any 
person, the person convicted (...) shall be punished by ( Penalty 
790.161-2) ." 

790.162 

The title was altered to read: " Tlireat to throw , place , or dis- 
charge any destructive device (...) ; penalty . " 

The body of the statute was altered as follows: "... any person 
convicted thereof shall be (punished by Penalty 790.162-1) . " 



109 



790.163 

The word felony was removed from the title of the statute. 
The body of the statute was altered as follows : "... any 
person convicted tliereof shall be punished by ( Penalty 790.163-1) . " 

790.17 

This statute v/as altered as follows : "... of unsomd mind 
any dangerous weapon, other than an ordinary pocket knife, (shall 
be punished by Penalty 790.17-1) . " 

790.18 

This statute was altered as follows : "... every person violat- 
ing this section shall be (punished by Penalty 790.18-1) . " 

790.19 

This statute was altered as follows: "... the air space of 
this state, shall be punished by ( Penalty 790.19-1)." 

790.20 

Ooitted. This statute had been repealed. 
790.21 

Omitted. This statute describes administrative procedures. 
790.22 

Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... any firearm in vio- 
lation of the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, (shall 
be punished by Penalty 790.22-1) . " 



110 



790.221 

Paragraph (2) was altered to read: "(2) Any person convicted 
of violating this section (shall be punished by Penalty 790.221-1) . " 

790.23 

Paragraph (3) was altered to read: "(3) Any person convicted 
of violating this section (shall be punished by Penalty 790.23-1) . " 

790.24 



This statute was alterejd as follows : "... Any such person wil- 
fully failing to report such treatinent or request therefor shall be 
(punished by Penalty 790.24-1) . " 

790.25 

emitted. This statute consisted of a declaration of policy. 

Chapter 791 Sale of Fireworks 
791.01 



791.02 



791.03 



Omitted. This statute describes administrative procedures. 

791.04 
791.05 

Qnitted. This statute describes administrative procedures. 

791.06 

This statute v/as altered as follows: "... co-partnership, or 
corporation violating the provisions of this chapter shall be 
(punished by Penalty 791.06-1) . " 



Ill 



791.07 

Chapter 795 Enticing Away Unmarried t-Jbinen 
795.01 

This statute was altered as follows : "... clandestine irarriage 
of such person without such consent, shall be punished by ( Penalty 
795.01-1 )." 

795.02 

This statute was altered as follows: ".., assists in such 
abduction for such purpose, shall be punished by ( Penalty 795.02-1) ." 

795.03 

This statute was altered as f oUcta^s : "... house of prostitution 
in this state, shall upon conviction be (punished by Penalty 795.03-1) .' 

Chapter 800 Crin^ Against Mature : Indecent Exposure 
800.01 

This statute was altered as follows : "... either with mankind 
or with beast, shall be punished by ( Penalty 800.01-1)." 

800.02 

Ihis statute was altered as follows : "... lascivious act with 
another person shall be punished by (Penalty 800.02-1) ." 

800.03-1 

This statute was altered as follows : "... Any person convicted 
of a violation hereof shall be punished by (Penalty 800.03-1) . " 



112 



800.04 

This statute was altered as follows: "... rape where such 
child is female, shall be (punished by Penalty 800.04-1) ." 

Chapter 805 Kidnaping and False Iinprisonirient 
805.01 

This statute was altered as follows: "... kidnaped fron this 
state to any other state, place or county, shall be punished by 
( Penalty 805.01-1) . " 

805.02 

This statute was altered as folla^rs: "... shall be guilty of 
kidnaping a person and shall be punished by ( Penalty 805.02-1) . " 

805.03 

The title \^s altered to read: " (Removing) children frcm 
state contrary to court order. " 

Paragraph (4) was altered as follov/s: "Any person convicted of 
a violation of this law shall be (punished by Penalty 805.03-1) ." 

Chapter 806 Arson 
806.01 

This statute was altered as follows: "... guilty of arson, in 
the first degree, and upon conviction thereof, be punished by ( Penalty 
805,06-1)." 



113 



806.02 

This statute was altered as follcws: "... guilty of arson 
in the second degree, and upon conviction thereof, be punished by 
( Penalty 806.02-1) . " 

806.03 

This statute was altered as folla^s: "... guilty of arson in 
the third degree and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by 
( Penalty 806.03-1) . " 

806.04 

This statute was altered as follows : "... fourth degree and 
upon conviction thereof shall, unless otherwise provided, be punished 
by ( Penalty 806.04-1 ) . " 

806.05 

This statute was altered as follows: "... to bum such building 
or property; and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by 
( Penalty 806.05-1) . " 

806.06 

This statute was altered as follows : "... insured by any person 
against loss or damage by fire, shall be (punished by Penalty 
806.06-1) ." 

806.061 

This statute was altered as follows : "... statement in writing 
iji support of a claim for loss or damge by fire, shall be punished 
(by Penalty 806.061-1) . " 



114 



806.07 

This statute v/as altered as follows : "... mentioned in this 
section is burned in the nighttime, shall be punished by ( Penalty- 
SOS. 07-1) ." 

806.08 

This statute was altered as follows: "... product of the soil, 
or the soil itself, of another, shall be punished by ( Penalty 
806.08-1) ." 

806.09 



This statute v;as altered as f ollov/s : "... guilty of the burn- 
ing, as accessory before the fact, and be punished by ( Penalty 
806.09-1) . " 

806.10 

Paragraph (1) was altered as follows: "... guilty of the burn- 
ing, as accessory after the fact, and shall be punished by ( Penalty 
806.10-1) ." 

Paragraph (2) v;as altereci as follov/s: "... fireiran in the per- 
formance of his duty shall be (punished by Penalty 806.10- 2 ) . " 

806.11 

This statute was altered as follov/s : "... make claim or demand 
for the insurance thereon, shall be (punished b y Penalty 806.11-1) ." 



115 



806.111 

Paragraph (1) was altered as follows: "... bum any building 
or property is guilty of a (crin^) . " 

Paragraph (5) was altered to read: " (5) Any person v*io vio- 
lates tills section sh-all, upon conviction thereof, be punished by 
( Penalty 806.111-1) . " 

Chapter 811 Larceny : Receiving Stolen Goods ; Related Crirres - 
811.01 - 811.02 

Omitted, These statutes had been repealed. 

811.021 

Paragraph (2) v/as altered as follows: "... guilty of grand 
larceny and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by (Penalty 
811.021-1) . " 

Paragraph (3) was altered as follov;s: "... guilty of petit 
larceny and upon conviction shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.021-2) . " 

Paragraphs (4) , (5) , and (6) were omittexi because they contain 
procedural information. 

811.022 • ■- 



Paragraph (1) was altered as follavs: "... without paying the |, 

purchase price therefor shall be (punished by Penaltv 811.022-1) [ 

^ . I 

for the first offense. For a second offense, he shall be (punished | 
by Penalty 811.022-2) , and for a third offense he shall be (punished 
by Penalty 811.022-3) . " 



116 



811.022 (Continued) 

Paragraphs (2) , (3) , and (4) were omitted because they contain 
procedural infonration. 

811.03 

This statute was altered as follows: "... alarm caused by fire, 
shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.03-1) . " 

811.04 



This statute was altered as follows : "... testainentary instru- 
ment, shall be pijnished by ( Penalty 811.04-1) ." 

811.05 

This statute was altered as follows: "... thereby to injure or 
defraud any person, shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.05-1) . " 

811.06 

This statute was altered as follows: "... thereby to injure or 
defraud any person, shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.06-1) . " 

811.07 

This statute was altered as follows : "... one hundred dollars 
in value, shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.07-1) ." 

811.08 

This statute was altered as f ollov/s : "... shall be deemed guilty 
of larceny (and shall be punished by Penalty 811.08-1) . " 

811.09 

This statute was altered as follows: "... not the subject of 
larceny at cammon law, shall be (punished by Penalty 811.09-1) . " 



117 



811.10 

This statute was altered as follows : "... comTDn and noto- 
rious thief, and shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.10-1) ." 

811.11 

This statute was altered as follows: "... calf, the property 
of another, shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.11-1) . " 

811.12 



This statute v;as altered as follows : "... subsequent term 
of court, shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.12-1) , " 

811.13 

This statute was altered as follows : "... the property of 
another shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.13-1) . " 

811.14 

This statute vras altered as follows: "... shall, upon convic- 
tion, be punished by ( Penalty 811.14-1) ." 

811.15 



This statute was altered as folla/;s : "... subsequent terra of 
court, shall be punished by (Penalty 811.15-1) . " 

811.16 

This statute was altered as follows : "... to have been stolen 
shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.16-1) . " 

811.163 

Qnitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 



118 



811.165 

Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... for the period 
of time required shall be punishable by ( Penalty 811.165-1) . " 

811.17 

Qnitted. This statute describes aclirinistrative procedures. 

811.18 

This statute was altered as follows : "... coirmon receiver of 
stolen or embezzled goods, and shall be punished by ( Penalty 
811.18-1) . " 

811.19 

The first paragraph was altered as follows : "... guilty of 
larceny and, upon conviction, shall be punished (by Penalty 
811.19-1) . The act of. . . " 

The second paragraph was altered as follows : "... kills any 
dog, the property of another, sb^ll be (punished by Penalty 811.19-2) ." 

811.20 

Omitted. This statute had been repealed. 

811.201 

Q-nitted. This statute describes administrative procedures. 

811.21 

The first paragraph was altered as follows: "... care, or con- 
trol of thie same, shall be punished by (Penalty 811.21-1) ." 



71 1- 1 *ri| ."I r,j=irT« >-* ?^ er.' I iniP^, »^-H 



119 



811.22 

This statute xms altered as follows: "... care or control of 
the same, shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.22-1)." 

811.23 

This statute was altered as follov/s: "... permission of the 
ovmer or agent, shall be pmished by ( Penalty 811.23-1 )." 
811.24 

This statute v;as altered as follov7s: "... with the intention 
of iiTfounding them, shall be (punished by Penalty 811.24-1 ) . " 

811.25 

Ihis statute was altered as follows: "... v/ithout the permis- 
sion of the corner, shall be punished by ( Penalty 811.25-1)." 

811.26 

This statute was altered as follows: "... by penning such 
cattle or other domestic animls, shall be pmished by (Penalty 
811.26-1) ." 

811.27 

Sub-paragraph (a) was altered as follows: "... one hundred 
dollars ($100.00) or more, tlie offender shall be (punished by Penalty 
811.27-1) ." 

Sub-paragraph (b) was altered as follows: "...less than one 
hundred dollars ($100) , the offender shall be (punished by Penalty 
811.27-2)." 



120 



811.271 

Paragraph (5) was altered as follows: "(5) Violation of the 
provisions of tliis section shall (be punished by Penalty 811.271-1) . " 

811.28 

Qnitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 

811.29 

Paragraph (4) was altered as follows: "... a violation under 
subsections (2) or (3) of this section shall be (punished by Penalty 
811.29-1) ." 

811.30 



This statute v/as altered as follows : "... person convicted 
thereof shall be pimished by ( Penalty 811.30-1) . " 



Chapter 812 Embezzlement 



812.01 



This statute was altered as follows : "... fraudulently converts 
it or its proceeds, or any part thereof, to his own use, he shall be 
punished (by Penalty 812.01-1) . " 

812.02 

This statute was altered as follows: "... larceny, or any part 
thereof, shall be pvmished (by Penalty 812.02-1) ." 

812.03 

This statute was altered as follows: "... it is so leased, he 
shall be punished (by Penalty 812.03-1) . " 



121 



812.04 

This statute was altered as follcfws: "... eraploynient or mem- 
bership, he shall be punished (by Penalty 812.04-1) ." 

812.05 

This statute v/as altered as follows : "... to prove a defaulter 
therein, shall be punished (by Penalty 812.05-1) . " 

812.06 

This statute was altered as follov\?s: "... entrusted v/ith the 
custody thereof or not, be punished by ( Penalty 812.06-1) ." 

812.07 
812.08 



Thiis statute was altered as follows: "... abets any officer, 
clerk or agent in any violation of this section, shall be (punished 
by Penalty 812.08-1) . " 

812.09 

This statute was altered as follavs: "... certificate or order, 
to his avn use, he shall be punished by ( Penalty 812.09-1) ." 

812.10 

The third paragraph (labeled 2.) was altered as follows: 
"... effects so converted, secreted or withheld, and shall be 
punished by (Penalty 812.10-1 ) . " 

The fourth paragraph, labeled (2) , v;as emitted since it pertains 
to evidence. 



•*.««* ^>i^raswi 



122 



812.11 

This statute was altered as follows : "... knowing the same 
to have been embezzled, shall be punished by ( Penalty 812.11-1) ." 

812.12 

This statute was altered as f ollov/s : "... credits coming 

into his hands as such receiver, shall be (punished by Penalty 
812.12-1) . The failure of. ... " 

Chapter 813 Robbery 
813.01 

Chatted. This statute had been repealed. 

813.011 

This statute was altered as follows : "... property \*Lich rray 
be the subject of larceny, shall be punished by ( Penalty 813.011-1) ." 

Chapter 823 Nuisances: Doors of Certain Buildings 
823.01 

The first paragraph was altered as follov;s: "... public morals, 
shall be indictable and punishable by (P enalty 823.01-1) . " 

The second paragraph was omitted because it describes administra- 
tive procedures. 

823.02 

TMs statute was altered as follo^vs: "... any house or building, 
shall be punished by (Penalty 823.02-1) . " 



123 



823.03 

This statute was altered as follows : "... circulated a false 
alarm of fire, shall be punished by ( Penalty 823.03-1) ." 

823.04 

This statute was altered as follows : "... any person convicted 
of such offense shall be punished by ( Penalty 823.04-1) . " 

823.041 

Paragraph (3) was altered as follows: "... violating any of 
the provisions of this act shall be (punished by Penalty 823.041-1) . " 

823.05 
823.06 

This statute v/as altered as follows : "... fails to corrply with 
the provisions of this section shall be punished by ( Penalty 823.06-1) . " 

823.07 
823.08 



823.09 



This statute v/as altered as follows: "Any person violating any 
provision of section 823.07, F. S., (shall be punished by Penalty 
823.09-1) ; provided, however, . . . person corrmitting such violation, 

then such person shall be (punished by Penalty 823.09-2) . " j 

i 
823.10 I 

The following was added as the last sentence of the statute: f 



"Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be punished 
by Penalty 823.10-1. " 



124 



Chapter 838 Bribery 
838.01 

This statute was altered as f ollov/s : "... brought before 
him in his official capacity, shall be pijnished by ( Penalty 
838.01-1) . " 

838.011 
838.012 
838.013 

This statute was altered as follows: "... provision of sections 
838.011 - 838.012 shall be punished by (Penalty 838.013-1) ." 

838.02 

This statute was altered as folla^7s: "... trust or appointinent 
under the constitution or laws of this state, and be punished by 
( Penalty 838.02-1) . " 



838.03 



This statute was altered as follows : "... referee has been 
chosen or appointed, shall be pimished by ( Penalty 838.03-1) . " 

838.04 

This statute was altered as follows : "... referee has been 
chosen or appointed, he shall be punished by ( Penalty 838.04-1) . " 

838.05 

This statute was altered as follows : "... any duty pertaining 
to his office, he shall be punished by ( Penalty 838.05-1) ." 






125 



838.06 
838.07 

This statute was altered as f ollov/s : "... provisions of 

i 
section 838.06, shall be punished by ( Penalty 838.07-1) ." [ 

838.071 I 

I, 

f 

The last sentence was altered as follows: "Whoever violates ( 

the provisions of this section shall be punished by ( Penalty 
838.071-1) ." 

838.08 

Quitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 

838.09 

This statute was altered as follows : "... proposed law or 
resolution shall be punished by ( Penalty 838.09-1) . " 

838.10 

This statute was altered as follows : "... such elective public 
office shall be punished by ( Penalty 838.10) . " 

838.11 

emitted. This statute had been repealed. 

838.12 

Paragraph (1) was altered as follows: "... threw any garre, 
contest, match, race or sport, shall be (punished by Penalty 
838.12-1)." 



126 



838.12 (Continued) 

Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... throw any game, 
contest, match, race or sport, shall be (punished by Penalty 
838.12-2 )." 

Chapter 839 Offenses by Auctioneers , Public Officers and Employees 
839.01 

Ttiis statute was altered as follows: "... false statement, 
shall be punished by ( Penalty 839.01-1) . " 

839.02 



This statute was altered as f 0110",^ : "... regulations pre- 
scribed by lav/, he shall be punished by (Penalty 839.02-1 )." 

839.02 1 

Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... provisions of this 
section shall upon conviction be (punished by Penalty 839.021-1) . " 

839.03 

Omitted. This statute had been repealed. 

839.04 

Tnis statute was altered as follows: "... any county, shall be 
pmished by (Penalty 839.04-1) . " 

839.05 

Tills statute v/as altered as follows : "... corporation of vM.ch 
he is an officer, shall be punished by (Penalty 839.05-1) ." 



127 



839.06 

This statute v/as altered as follows: "... so offending shall, 
for each offense, be (punished by Penalty 839.06-1) ." 

839.07 

This statute was altered as follows: "... person upon convic- 
tion thereof shall be punished by ( Penalty 839.07-1) . " 

839.08 . ... 

The last sentence was altered as follows : "... section shall 
upon conviction be punished by ( Penalty 839.08-1) . " 

839.09 

The last sentence was altered as follows : "... this section 
shall be punished, upon conviction, by ( Penalty 839.09-1) ; provided, 
that. 



It 

< • • • 



839.091 



839.10 



The last sentence \vqs altered as follows : "... this section 
shall, upon conviction, be punished by (Penalty 839.10-1) ; provided, 
that... ." ■ 

839.11 

This statute was altered as f ollov7s : "... especially provided 
for, shall be punished by ( Penalty 839.11-1) ." 

839.12 

The first sentence was altered as follows: "... which he charges, 
he shall be pimished by ( Penalty 839.12-1) . " 



128 



839.13 

The first paragraph was altered as follows : "... person so 
offending shall be punished by ( Penalty 839.13-1) . " 

The last paragraph was anitted because it pertains to evidence. 

839.14 

This statute was altered as follows : "... papers or other 
^■nritings, he shall be punished by ( Penalty 839.14-1) ." 



with the proper clerk, 



839.15 

This statute was altered as follows: " 
shall be punished by ( Penalty 839.15-1) . " 

839.16 

This statute was altered as follows: "... the drawing of jurors, 
he shall be punished by ( Penalty 839.16-1) . " 

839.17 



This statute was altered as follows : "... to his ovm default or 
neglect, shall be (punished by Penalty 839.17-1) ." 

839.18 

This statute was altered as follows: "... unless otherwise pro- 
vided, be punished by ( Penalty 839.18-1) ." 

839.19 

This statute was altered as follows : " process delivered to 

him, shall be punished by (Penalty 839.19-1) ." 



^W*-* ; J VT'-^r-iirT-lM Tn~aT ( 






129 



839.20 

This statute v;as altered as f ollcsvs : "... escapes and goes 
at large, he shall be punished by ( Penalty 839.20-1) ." 

839.21 

This statute was altered as follows : "... lawful process 
whatever, shall be punished by ( Penalty 839.21-1) ." 

839.22 

emitted. This statute had been repealed. 

839.221 

Omitted. This statute describes procedural policy. 

839.23 

The first sentence was altered as follows : "... circuit court 
and qualified to act as surety shall be (punished by Penalty 
839.23-1) ." 

839.24 



This statute was altered as follows : "... wilfully fails to 
perform the duty shall be (punished by Penalty 839.24-1) ." 

Chapter 843 Obstructing Justice 
843.01 

This statute was altered as follows : "... legally authorized 
person, shall be punished by (Penalty 843.01-1)." 



130 



843.02 

This statute was altered as follows: "... person of the officer, 
shall be punished by ( Penalty 843.02-1) . " 

843.03 

This statute was altered as follo^vs : "... such intent is effected 
or not, shall be punished by ( Penalty 843.03-1) ." 

843.04 

The second paragraph was altered as follows : "... refusing to 
assist shall be punished by ( Penalty 843.04-1) . " 

843.05 

This statute was altered as follows: "... attenpts so to do, 
shall be punished by ( Penalty 843.05-1 ) . " 

843.06 

This statute was altered as follows : "... arrested upon civil 
process , shall be punished by ( Penalty 843.06-1) . " 

843.07 

The first paragraph was altered as follows : "... neglects to 
obey such justice, shall be punished by ( Penalty 843.07-1) ." 

843.08 

This statute was altered as follows : "... matter pertaining to 
the duty of any such officer, shall be (punished by Penalty 843.08-1) ." 

843.09 

This statute was altered as f ollov/s : "... any criminal charge 
to escape, he shall suffer (Penalty 843.09-1)." 



131 



843.10 

This statute was altered as follows : "... any criminal charge 
to escape , he shall be punished by ( Penalty 843.10-1) . " 

843.11 

This statute was altered as follows : "... any conviction or 
charge of an offense , shall be punished by ( Penalty 843.11-1) . . . 
punishable by iraprisoninent in the state prison, then by ( Penalty 
843.11-2) — tool or instrument to him shall be subject to ( Penalty 
843.11-3) ." 

843.12 

This statute was altered as follows : "... entitled to the lawful 
custody of such person, (shall be punished by Penalty 843.12-1) ." 

843.13 

This statute was altered as follows: "... his escape or to avoid 
detention or recapture , shall be (punished by Penalt y 843.13-1) . " 

843.14 

This statute was altered as follows : "... imprisonment in the 
state prison for life, be punished by ( Penalty 843.14-1) ; and where 
the offense... was punishable in any other manner, he shall be punished 
by ( Penalty 843.14-2) . " 

843.15 

Subparagraph (a) was altered as follows : "... review by certiorari 
after conviction of any offense, be (punished by Penalty 843.15-1) ." 



132 



843.15 (Continued) 

Subparagraph (b) was altered as follows : "... in connection 
vjxth a charge of a misdoneanor, be (punished by Penalty 843.15-2) ." 

843.16 

Paragraph (4) was altered as follows: "... corporation, violat- 
ing coiy of the provisions of this section sliall be (punished by 
Penalty 843.16-1) . " 

Chapter 846 Opium Dens 

846.01 

846.02 

This statute was altered as follows : " about the premises where 

sold, shall be punished by ( Penalty 846.02-1) ." 

846.03 

This statute was altered as follows : "... person in violation of 
section 846.02 shall be punished by ( Penalty 846.03-1) ." 

846.04 

This statute was altered as follows : "... purpose of an opium 
den shall be punished by ( Penalty 846.04-1) . " 

846.05 

This statute was altered as follows : " principal medicinal 

agent, shall be punished by (Penalty 846.05-1) ." 

846.06 - 846.07 



emitted. These statutes pertain to evidence. 



133 



Chapter 847 Obscene Literature : Profanity 
847.01 

emitted. This statute had been repealed. 

847.011 

Subparagraph 1-a was altered as follows: "... assist in doing, 
either knowlingly or innocently, any act or thmg inentioned above, 
(shall be punished by Penalty 847.011-1) . A person who. . . section, 
thereafter violates any of its provisions, (shall be punished by 
Penalty 847.011-2) . " 

Subparagraph 1-b v/as emitted because it pertains to evidence. 

Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... transmit, show, trans - 
mut, or advertise the same, (shall be punished by Penalty 847.011-3) . 
In any prosecution . . . . " 

The last sentence of paragraph (3) was altered to read: "Who- 
ever violates this section (shall be punished by Penalty 847.011-4) . " 

Paragraphs (4) , (5) , (6) , (7) , (8) , (9) , (10) , and (11) were 
emitted because they pertain to administrative procedures or evidence. 

847.012 

Paragraph (3) was altered as follows: "... violating any pro- 
vision of this section (shall be punished by Penalty 847.012-1) . " 

Paragraphs (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) v/ere omitted because they 
describe administrative procedures. 



134 



847.013 

Paragraph 2e was altered as follows : "... provision of this 
section shall (be punished by Penalty 847.013-1) . " 

Paragraphs (3) and (4) were omitted because they describe ad- 
ministrative procedures and legislative intent. 

847.02 - 847.03 

Qnitted. These statutes describe administrative procediores. 

847.04 

This statute was altered as follows : "... as to be heard by 
another, shall be punished by ( Penalty 847.04-1) ; but no prosecu- 
tion. . . ." 

847.05 

This statute was altered as follCTvs : "... obscene language shall 
be punished by ( Penalty 847.05-1) . " 

847.06 

The first paragraph was altered as follows : "... matter of in- 
decent or iimioral character, shall be (punished by Penalty 847.06-1) ." 

The last two paragraphs were anitted because they pertain to 
evidence and administrative procedures. 

847.07 

Quitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 



135 



Chapter 849 Gambling 
849.01 

This statute was altered as follows : "... whether heretofore 
prohibited or not , shall be punished by ( Penalty 849.01-1) . " 

849.02 

This statute was altered as follows : "... violation of section 
849.01 shall be punished (by Penalty 849.02-1) ." ■ ' ' 

849. OS 

This statute was altered as follows : "... for the purpose of 
gaming shall be punished (by Penalty 849.03-1) . " 

849.04 

This statute was altered as follows : "... non-ccrtpos mentis or 
under guardianship shall be punished by (Penalty 849.04-1) . " 

849.05 - 849.51 

emitted. These statutes pertain to evidence. 

849.06 

Paragraph (2) was altered to read: "Violation of this law shall 
be (punishable by Penalty 849.06-1) . " 

849.07 

This statute was altered as follows: "... other thing of value, 
upon such tables , he shall be (punished by Penalty 849.07-1) . " 



■ M** >'*' "* V — ^»-- « . !■ i^«i > ' ' > — c-'»* 



136 



849.08 

This statute was altered as follows : "... for money or other 
thing of value , shall be punished by ( Penalty 849.08-1) . " 

849.09 

Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... subsection (1) of 
this section shall be punished by ( Penalty 849.09-1) . " 

Paragraph (3) v/as altered as follavs: "... subsection (1) of 
this section shall be punished by ( Penalty 849.09-2) . Any person 
vjho... violates any provision thereof shall be punished, upon con- 
viction, by ( Penalty 849.09-3 ) . The provisions of this... ." 

Paragraph (4) was altered as follows: "... subsection (1) of this 
section shall be punished by ( Penalty 849.09-4) ; provided, that ... 
thereafter violates any provision thereof shall be punished, upon con- 
viction, by ( Penalty 849.09-5) ." 

849.091 

This statute was altered as follows : "... membership or affili- 
ation in any such group or organization shall be (punished b y Penalty 
849.091-1)." 



849 


.092 


849 


093 


849 


10 



The last paragraph was altered to read: "Any violation of this 
section shall be (punished by Penalty 849.10-1) . " 



137 



849.11 

This statute was altered as follows: "... for any right, share 
or interest therein, shall be (pimished by Penalty 849.11-1) ." 

849.12 

Quitted. This statute describes administrative procedures. 

849.13 

This statute was altered as follows : "... in connection with 

lotteries, ccannits the like offense, shall (be punished by Penalty 
849.13-1) . " 

849.14 

This statute was altered as follows : "... acts all of which are 
hereby forbidden, shall be (punished by Penalty 849.14-1) ." 

849.15 
849.16 



849.17 - 849.19 

Quitted. These statutes describe administrative procedures, 

849.20 

849.21 - 849.22 



Qnitted. These statutes describe administrative procedures. 

849.23 

This statute was altered as follows : "... provisions of sections 
849.15 - 849.22 shall, upon conviction thereof, be (punished by Penalty 
849.23-1) ; provided, that ... provisions of sections 849.15 - 849.22 
a second time shall, upon conviction thereof, be (punished by Penalty 



138 



849.23 (Contdjiued) 

849.23-2); provided, further .. twice convicted already, stiall, upon 
conviction thereof, be deemed a 'cormon offender' and shall be 
(punished by Penalty 849.23-3) . " 

849.231 
849.232 

Qnitted. This statute pertains to administrative procedures and 
property rights. 

849.233 

This statute was altered as follows: "... violate the provisions 
of section 849.231 shall, upon conviction, be (punished by Penalty 
849.233-1) . ■■ 

849.24 

Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... bookmaker on the 
grounds of a permit holder shall be (punished by Penalty 849.24-1) . 
Ibr a second like offense in this state, he shall be (punished by 
Penalty 849.24-2) . " 

Paragraph (5) v/as altered as follows: "... jai alai fronton 
without haying been reinstated by the ccranission (shall be punished 
by Penalty 849.24-3) . " 

849.25 

Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... engages in bookiTaking 
shall be (punished by Penalty 849.25-1 ) ; provided that . . . thereafter 



139 



849.25 (Continued) 

violates this act, shall be punished, upon conviction, by ( Penalty 
849.25-2) . " 

849.26 - 849.46 

Qnitted. These statutes describe administrative and civil matters 
for the most part. 

Chapter 851 Bucket Shops 

851.01 

851.02 

This statute was altered as follows: "It is (unlawful) for any 
person . . . bucket shop within this state , shall upon conviction thereof 
be punished by ( Penalty 851.02-1) . " 

851.03 

This statute was altered as follcws: "... deemed an accessory, 
and upon conviction thereof, shall be (punished by Penalty 851.03-1) ." 

851.04 

Qnitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 

Chapter 856 Drunkenness ; Vagrancy ; Desertion 
856.01 

This statute was altered as follows : "... liquors or drugs shall 
be punished by (Penalty 856.01-1); but no... ." 



140 



856.02 
856.03 

The last sentence of the second paragraph was altered as follows: 
"... speedy trial, and upon conviction shall be (punished by Penalty 
856.03-1) . " 

856.04 



Paragraph (1) was altered as follows: "... withhold from them 
the means of support, shall be (punished by Penalty 856.04-1) ; pro- 
vided, however. . . . " 

Chapter 860 Offenses Concerning Aircraft , Motor Vehicles , and Railroads 
860.01 

The last sentence of paragraph (1) was altered as follows: "... 
violation of tlrLs section shall be punished (by Penalty 860.01-1) . " 

Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... vehicles mentioned 
herein, he slTall upon conviction be (punished by Penalty 860.01-2) , and 
if the death . . . any person while intoxicated, such person shall be 
(punished by Penalty 860.01-3 ) . " 

Paragraph (3) was emitted because it pertains to legal procedures. 

860.02 - ... 

This statute v;as altered as follows : "... control of such con- 
veyance, shall be punished by ( Penalty 860.02-1) ." 

860.03 

This statute was altered as follows: "... shall be intoxicated, 
he shall be punished by (Penalty 860.03-1) ." 



141 



860.04 

This statute was altered as follows: "... train in this state, 
shall on conviction be punished by ( Penalty 860.04-1) . " 

860.05 

This statute was altered as follows : "... road bed or rolling 
stock shall be punished by ( Penalty 860.05-1) . " 

860.06 

The first sentence of this statute was altered as follows: 
"... any person convicted of a violation of this section shall be 
punished by ( Penalty 860.06-1) . " 

860.07 

The first sentence was altered as follows : "... oh any railroad 
in this state, shall be guilty of a (crinne) ; provided, that — ." 

The second sentence was altered as follows : "... provisions of 
this section shall be punished by ( Penalty 860.07-1) . " 

860.08 



This statute was altered as follows : " — connection v;ith rail- 
road business , shall be punished by ( Penalty 860.08-1) . " 

860.09 , 

This statute was altered as follows : "... any obstruction thereon 
shall be punished by ( Penalty 860.09-1) . " 

860.10 

The last sentence was altered as follows : "... violating the pro- 
visions of this section shall be (punished by Penalty 860.10-1) . " 



142 



860.11 

This statute was altered as follows: "... drive cattle thereon, 
shall be pianished by ( Penalty 860.11-1) . " 

860.12 

Omitted. This statute had been repealed. 
860.13 

Paragraph (3) was altered as follows: "... provisions of this 
section shall be punished by ( Penalty 860.13-1) . " 

Paragraph (4) was emitted because it pertains to administrative 
procedures . 

860.14 



The last sentence was altered as follows: "... violating the 
provisions of this section shall be (punished by Penalty 860.14-1) ." 

860.15 

Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... wilfully violating 
the provisions of this section shall be (punished by Penalty 860.15-1) ." 

Chapter 862 Offenses Concerning Seamen 
862.01 

Ttie last sentence was altered as follows : "... provisions of 
this section shall be punished by ( Penalty 862.01-1) ." ■ ' 

862.02 

The last sentence was altered as follows : "... seamen or sailors 
shall be punished by ( Penalty 862.02-1) . " 



143 



862.03 

This statute was altered as follows: "... any port of the state, 
he shall be (punished by Penalty 862.03-1) . " 

Chapter 865 Violation of Certain Commercial Restrictions 
865.01 

Qnitted. This statute had been repealed. 

865.02 

This statute was altered as follows : "... product of the state , 
shall be punished by ( Penalty 865.02-1 ) . " 

865.03 

Quitted. This statute had been repealed. 

865.04 

This statute was altered as follows: "... rubbish or other thing, 
shall be punished by ( Penalty 865.04-1) . " 

865.05 

This statute was altered as follows : "... deceive or defraud the 
purchaser, shall be (punished by Penalty 865.05-1) ." 

865.06 

Paragraph (3) was altered as follows: "... any act inade unlawful 
under this section (shall be punished by Penalty 865.06-1) . " 

Paragraphs (3 a) and (4) were emitted because they pertain to 
administrative procedures. 

865.061 



Quitted. This statute had been repealed. 



144 



865.062 
865.07 

The first paragraph was altered as follows : "... containing 
such syrup or mixture , shall be punished by ( Penalty 865.07-1) . " 

865.08 



This statute v/as altered as follows : "... parted with his in- 
terest therein , shall be punished by ( Penalty 865.08-1) . " 

865.09 

Paragraph (4) was emitted because it pertains to administrative 
procedures. 

Paragraph (5) was altered as follows: "... failure to cooply with 
law shall be ( Penalty 865.09-1) . " 

865.10 

Paragraph (3) was altered as follows: "... violation of this 
section shall be punishable (by Penalty 865.10-1) . " 

Chapter 870 Affrays ; Riots ; Routs ; Unla\^^ful Assemblies 
870.01 

Paragraph (1) was altered as follows: "... affray shall be punished 
by ( Penalty 870.01-1) . " 

Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... inciting or encouraging 
a riot, shall be punished by ( Penalty 870.01-2) ," 

870.02 



This statute was altered as follows : "... other unlawful act , 
each of them shall be punished by Penalty 870.02-1) . " 



145 



870.03 

Ihis statute was altered as follows : "... ship or vessel , each 
of them shall be punished by ( Penalty 870.03-1) . " 

870.04 

This statute was altered as follows: "... deemed one (1) of 
the rioters or persons unlawfully assembled, and may be prosecuted 
and punished (by Penalty 870.04-1) . " 

870.041 - 870.047 
870.048 

This statute v/as altered as follows : "... emergency measure 
established pursuant thereto shall be (punishable by Penalty 870.048-1) . " 

870.05 

This statute was altered as follows : "... officers and all per- 
sons acting by their order or under their direction , shall be ( ... ) 
fully justified in law (and punishable by Penalty 870.05-1 ) ; and if any 
of said officers . . . refused to aid and assist said officer shall be 
(punished by Penalty 870.05-2) . " 

870.06 

The last sentence was altered as follows : "... participating in 
such drill or parade , shall be (punished by Penalty 870.06-1) . " 

Chapter 876 Criminal Anarchy ,, Coirmunism , Wearing Masks , Hoods , Etc. 
876.01 



146 



876.02 

The last paragraph was altered as follows : "... shall be (pun- 
ished by Penalty 876.02-1) . " 

876.03 

This statute v;as altered as follows : " — presence , aid or 
instigation shall be (punished by Penalty 876.03-1) . " 

876.04 

This statute v/as altered as follows : "... permits such use to 
be continued, he shall be (punished by Penalty 876.04-1) ." 

876.05 - 876.07 
876.08 

This statute v/as altered as follows : "... failing to corply 
with the provisions of sections 876.05 - 876,10, shall be (punished 
by Penalty 876.08-1) . " 

876.09 ■ ■ 



876.10 



This statute was altered as follows: "... perjury, and shall be 
prosecuted and punished (by Penalty 876.10-1) . " 

876.11 
876.12 

The follov/ing v/as added as the last sentence: "Any person or per- 
sons convicted of violating the provisions of this section shall be 
punished by Penalty 876.12-1. " 



L-- 



147 



876.13 

The following was added as the last sentence: "Any person or 
persons convicted of violating the provisions of this section shall 
be punished by Penalty 876.13-1 . " 

876.14 



The following was added as the last sentence: "Any person or 
persons convicted of violating the provisions of this section shall 
be punished by Penalty 876.14-1 . " • : 

876.15 



The folla-;ing was added as the last sentence: "Any person or 
persons convicted of violating the provisions of this section shall 
be punished by Penalty 876.15-1 . " 

876.16 
876.17 

The folla.<7ing was added as the last sentence. "Any person or per- 
sons convicted of violating the provisions of this section shall be 
punished by Penalty 876.17-1 . " 

876.18 

The following was added as the last sentence. "Any person or 
persons convicted of violating the provisions of this section shall be 
punished by Penalty 876.18-1 . " 

876.19 ■ ' 

The following v/as added as the last sentence: "Any person or 
persons convicted of violating the provisions of this section shall be 



148 



876.19 (Continued) 

punished by Penalty 876.19-1 . " 

876.20 

The following was added as the last sentence. "Any person or 
persons convicted of violating the provisions of this section shall 
be punished by Penalty 876.20-1 . " 

876.21 

Qnitted. This statute contained the penalty that had been in- 
corporated into statutes 876.12 - 876.15 and 876.17 - 876.20. 

876.22 
876.23 

Paragraph (1) was altered as follows: "(1) It shall be (unlawful) 
for any person. . . . " 

Paragraph (2) was altered as follows: "... violates any of the 
provisions of this section shall be (punished by Penalty 876.23-1) . " 

876.24 

This statute was altered as follows: "It shall be (unlawful) 
for any person after. . . Any person convicted of violating this section 
shall be (punished by Penalty 876.24-1 ) . " 

876.25 

Qrdtted. This statute perta.ins to the rights of an individual 
convicted of violating certain statutes. 



149 



876.26 

876.27 - 876.31 

Omitted. These statutes pertain to administrative procedures 
and the rights of persons convicted of certain crimes. 

Alaska ( Alaska Statutes Annotated , Title 11, Section 11.15.010 - 

Section 11.15.110) 
11.15.010 



This statute was altered as follows : "... guilty of murder in 
the first degree , and shall be (punished by Penalty 11.15.010-1) . " l 

11.15.020 [ 

This statute v;as altered as follows : "... an aircraft and thereby 
occasions or iiTplQn:Tents the death of another (shall be punished by 
Penalty 11.15.020-1) ." 

11.15.030 

This statute was altered as follows : "... guilty of murder in the 
second degree , and shall be (punished by Penalty 11.15.030-1) . " 

11.15.040 

This statute was altered as follows : "... guilty of manslaughter' 
and is punishable by ( Penalty 11.15.040-1) . " 

The footnote defining manslaughter was added. 

11.15.050 

Omitted. This statute pertained to suicide. 



150 



11.15.060 

emitted. This statute pertained to abortions. 

11.15.070 

This statute was altered as follows : "... which produces the 
death of the person, is (punishable by Penalty 11.15.070-1) ." 

11.15.080 

This statute v;as altered as follows : "... second degree , or is 
not jiistifiable or excusable, is (punishable by Penalty 11.15.080-1) ." 

11.15.090 

The following was added as the last sentence: "Every person con- 
mitting justifiable hcmicide is punishable by Penalty 11.15.090-1 . " 

11.15.100 

The following was added as the last sentence: "Every person com- 
mitting justifiable homicide is punishable by Penalty 11.15.100-1 . " 

11.15.110 



The following V7as added as the last sentence. "Every person 
cormiitting excusable homicide is punishable by Penalty 11.15.110-1 . " 

Delaware ( Delaware Code Annotated , Title 11, Section 575 - Section 578) 
571 

This statute was altered as follows : "... guilty of murder in 
the first degree and (shall be punishable by Penalty 571-1) . " 



151 



572 

This statute was altered as follcws : "... in the second degree 
and of a felony, and shall be (punished by Penalty 572-1) ." 
A footnote defining murder was added. 

573-574 



Omitted. These statutes describe administrative procedures. 

575 

Paragraph (a) was altered as follows : "... except as provided 
in subsection (b) of this section, is (punishable by Penalty 575-1) . " 

A footnote defining manslaughter was also added to paragraph (a) . 

Paragraph (b) was altered as follows : "... it is so found by the 
verdict , shall be (punished by Penalty 572-2) . " 

A paragraph defining manslaughter was also added to paragraph (b) . 

576 

Qnitted. This statute pertains to administrative matters. 

577 

Omitted. This statute pertains to assault. 

578 

Omitted. This statute pertains to attempted murder. 

Hawaii (Hav/aii Revised Statutes , Title 38, Section 748-1 Through 

Section 748-12) . 
748-1 
748-2 



152 



748-3 

emitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 

748-4 



This statute was altered as follows : "... murder in the first 
degree shall be punished by ( Penalty 748-4-1) . Whoever is ... murder 
in the second degree shall be punished by ( Penalty 748-4-2) . " 

748-5 

Omitted. This statute pertains to administrative procedures 
and evidence. 

748-6 

A footnote defining manslaughter was added. 

748-7 

This statute was altered as follows : " the offense of man- 
slaughter shall be (punished by Penalty 748-7-1) . " 

748-8 

emitted. This statute describes administrative procedures. 

748-9 

Paragraph (a) was altered as follows : "... negligent homicide 
in the first degree and shall be (punished by Penalty 748-9-1) . " 

Paragraph (b) v/as altered as follows : "... negligent hordcide 
in the second degree and shall be (punished by Penalty 748-9-2) . " 



748-10 



emitted. This statute pertains to administrative procedures. 



153 



748-11 

emitted. This statute pertains to assault and battery. 

748-12 

emitted. This is a statute of limitation. 

Indiana (Bums Annotated Indiana Statutes, Title 10, Section 10-3401 

Through Section 10-3405) . 
10-3401 

This statute was altered as f ollov/s : "... murder in the first 
degree and on conviction shall suffer ( Penalty 10-3401-1) . " 

10-3402 

This statute was altered as f ollavs : "... whereof the person 
thus injured shall die, is (punishable by Penalty 10-3402-1) ." 

10-3403 

This statute was altered as follows : "... the person thus in- 
jured shall die within this state, is (punishable by Penalty 10-3403-1) ." 

10-3404 



Thi-S statute was altered as follows : "... murder in tlie second 
degree, and, on conviction, shall be (punished by Penalty 10-3404-1) ." 

10-3405 

The first paragraph was altered as follows : "... voluntary man- 
slaughter, and, on conviction, shall be (punished by Penalty 10-3405-1) ." 



154 



10-3405 (Continued) 

The second paragraph was altered as follows : " — involuntary 
manslaughter, and, on conviction, shall be (punished by Penalty 

10-3405-2) : Provided, That motor vehicle, the punishinent for the 

offense shall be ( Penalty 10-3405-3) . " 

Iowa ( lov/a Code Annotated , Title 35, Section 690.1 - Section 690.11) 

690.1 

690.2 

This statute was altered as follows : "... murder in the first 
degree, and shall be punished by ( Penalty 690.2-1) ." 

690.3 

This statute was altered as follows : "... murder in the second 
degree, and shall be punished by ( Penalty 690.3-1) ." 

690.4 

Omitted. This statute describes administrative procedures. 

690.5 

Craitted. This statute had been repealed. 

690.6 - 690.7 

Omitted. Ttiese statutes pertain to assault. 

690.8 

Qiiitted. This statute pertains to inciting homicide. 
690.9 

Omitted. This statute pertains to attempted homicide or injury. 



155 



690.10 

This statute was altered as f oIIctvs : " crime of man- 
slaughter shall be (punished by Penalty 690.10-1) ." ..'_. _"'; 

A footnote defining inanslaughter was added. 

690.11 

This statute was altered as follows : " causes the death 

of a human being is (punishable by Penalty 690.11-1) . " 

Louisiana ( Louisiana Statutes Annotated Revised Statutes , Title 14 , 

Section 29 - Section 32). 

29 

30 

The last sentence was altered as follows : "... crime of murder 
shall be punished by (Penalty 30-1) . " 

31 

The last sentence was altered to read: "TVhoever carmits man- 
slaughter shall be (punished by Penalty 31-1) . " 

32 

The second paragraph (sentence) was emitted because it pertains 
to evidence. ... 

Tne third paragraph (or sentence) was altered to read: "I'Jhoever 
cortmits the crime of negligent homicide shall be (punished by Penalty 
32-1) . " 



i^.-'T*tO''M.i-*»'r--irtf-'J-'.-V r ^ ffr « k.T5 i-^t-; V r > -«" ^rVir-^-enrr.l--^tt r — s^If* m 



156 



^^i^e (MaJJie Revised Statutes Annotated , Title 17, Sections 2551 - 2552 

and Sections 2651 - 2657) . 
2551 

This statute was altered as follows : "... as defined by camion 
law, shall be punished by ( Penalty 2551-1 ) , except that... ." 
A footnote defining manslaughter v/as added. 

2552 

The first sentence was altered as follows: "... concerned therein, 
and thereby human life is destroyed, is (punishable by Penalty 2552-1 ) ." 

The last sentence was omitted because it pertains to a criire other 
than hcmicide. 

2651 

This statute was altered as follows : "... is guilty of murder and 
shall be punished by ( Penalty 2651-1) . " 

2652 

The first sentence was altered as follows: "... thereby injured, 
and human life is thereby destroyed, is (punishable by Penalty 2652-1) ," 

The last sentence was emitted because it pertains to a criire other 
than homicide. 

2653 

This statute was alteresd as follows : "... any person , of which he 
dies in the State , is (punishable by Penalty 2653-1) . " 



157 



2654 

Ihis statute was altered as follows : "... murder and may be 
indicted, tried, and punished (by Penalty 2654-1) . " 

2655 

emitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 

2656 

emitted. This statute pertains to assault. 

2657 

emitted. This statute pertains to attenpted murder. 

Maryland ( The Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of Maryland , 

Article 27, Sections 387 -388 and Sections 407 - 414). 
387 

This statute was altered as follows : "... the crime of man- 
slaughter shall be (punished by Penalty 387-1) . " 

A footnote defining manslaughter was also added. 

388 

The first paragraph was altered as follows : "... grossly negligent 
imnner, shall be guilty of (the crime) to be known . . . , and the person 
so convicted shall be (punished by Penalty 388-1) . The police ... . " 

The last paragraph was emitted because it pertains to procedural 
matters . 






158 



407 

This statute was altered as follows : "... wilful , deliberate 
and premeditated killing shall be (punished by Penalty 407-1) . " 

408 

This statute was altered as follows : "... attempt to perpetrate 
any arson, shall be (punished by Penalty 408-1)." 

409 

This statute was altered as follows : "... cattle , goods , wares 
or merchandise , shall be (punished by Penalty 409-1) . " 

410 

This statute was altered as follows : "... penal institution in 
any of the counties of the State , shall be (punished by Penalty 410-1) . " 

411 

This statute v/as altered by adding these words : "... and punish- 
able by Penalty 411-1) . " 

A footnote defining murder was also added. 

412 

emitted. Tliis statute describes administrative procedures. 

413-414 

Omitted. These statutes were incorporated into earlier statutes 
in adding the coded penalties. 



159 



I'linnesota ( Minnesota Statutes Annotated , Part 5, Section 609.18 - 

Section 609.215). 
609.18 
609.185 

This statute vzas altered as follows : "... raorder in the first 
degree and shall be (punished by Penalty 609.185-1) : (1) Causes the 
death... ." 

609.19 

This statute was altered as follows : " guilty of murder in 

the second degree and may be (punished by Penalty 609.19-1) . " 

609.195 

This statute was altered as follows : "... guilty of murder in 
the third degree and may be (punished by Penalty 609.195-1) : (1) Per- 
petrates an act... ." 

609.20 

This statute was altered as follows : "... manslaughter in the 
first degree and may be (punished by Penalty 609.20-1) : (1) Intention- 
ally causes . . . . " 

609.205 

This statute was altered as follows : "... manslaughter in the 
second degree and may be (punished by Penalty 609.205-1) : (1) By his 
culpable... ." 



160 



609.21 

Ihis statute was altered as follows : "... operation of a vehicle 
resulting in death and may be (punished by Penalty 609.21-1) . " 

609.215 

Quitted. This statute pertains to suicide. 

Mississippi ( Mssissippi Code 1942 Annotated , Title 11, Section 2215 - 

Section 2233) . 
2215 

The follov7ing was added as the last sentence: "Every person vdio 
shall be convicted of murder shall be punished by Penalty 2215-1 . " 

2216 

This statute was altered as f olla«;s : "... second engaged in such 
duel , shall be (pxonished by Penalty 2216-1) . " 

2217 

Quitted. This statute contains the penalty incorporated into 
sections 2215 and 2216. 

2218 

This statute was altered as follows : "... emission of another 
shall be justifiable (and punished by Penalty 2218-1) in the following 

2219 

This statute was altered as follows: " procurement, or amission 

of another shall be excusable (and punished by Penalty 2219-1) ... . " 



161 



2220 

Ihis statute was altered as follows : "... besides such as are 
above enumerated and excepted, shall be (punished by Penalty 2220-1) ." 

2221 

This statute was altered as follows: "... killing would be 
murder at conmon law, shall be (punished by Penalty 2221-1) . " 

2222 

This statute was altered as follows: "... resulted in the death 
of the nother, shall be (punished by Penalty 2222-1) . " 

2223 

Qnitted. This statute pertains to abortions. 

2224 

This statute was altered as follows : "... not in necessary self- 
defense, shall be (punished by Penalty 2224-1) ," 

2225 

This statute was altered as follows: "... atterrpt shall have 
failed, shall be (punished by Penalty 2225-1 ) ." 

2226 

This statute was altered as follov/s: "... law, and not in neces- 
sary self-defense, shall be (punished by Pe nalty 2226-1) ." 

2227 

This statute was altered as follows : "... engaged in an attenpt 
to caimit such injury, shall be (punished by Pe nalty 2227-1) ." 



162 



2228 

This statute was altered as follows : "... to avoid the animal 
such owner shall be (punished by Penalty 2228-1) . " 

2229 

This statute was altered as follows : "... human being shall 
be drowned or otheri'/ise killed, shall be (punished by Penalty 2229-1) ." 

2230 

This statute was altered as follows : "... person shall be 
killed, every such captain, engineer, or other person, shall be 
(punished by Penalty 2230-1) . " 

2231 

This statute was altered as follows : "... which shall cause the 
death of such other person, he shall be (punished by Penalty 2231-1) ." 

2232 

This statute was altered as follows: "... authority of law, not 
provided for in this chapter, shall be (punished by Penalty 2232-1) ." 

2233 

Qnitted. This statute had been incorporated in previous laws 
in referring to the penalties for the various types of manslaughter. 

Nebraska ( Reissue of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska of 1943 , 

Chapter 28, Section 28 - 401 through Section 28 - 405). 
28-401 

The first sentence was altered as follows : "... murder in the 



163 



28-401 (Continued) 

first degree, and upon conviction thereof shall suffer ( Penalty 

28-401-1) ." 

28-402 

This statute was altered as follows : "... murder in the second 
degree; and upon conviction thereof shall be (punished by Penalty 
28-402-1) . " 

28-403 

Ihis statute was altered as follows : "... guilty of man- 
slaughter; and upon conviction thereof shall be (punished by Penalty 
28-403-1) ." 

28-403.01 

This statute was altered as follows : "... irotor vehicle homi- 
cide and, upon conviction thereof, shall be (punished by Penalty 
28-403.01-1) . " 

28-404 and 28-405 

Quitted. These statutes pertain to crimes other than homicide. 

Mew Jersey (New Jersey Statutes Annotated , Title 2A, Section 2A: 113-1 

Through Section 2A: 113-9) . 
■2A: 113-1 



2Ar 113-2 



2A: 113-3 



emitted. This statute pertains to administrative matters. 



164 



2A: 113-4 

The first sentence was altered as follows : " aiders , abetters , 

counselors and procurers , shall suffer ( Penalty 2A: 113-4-1) . " 

l!he second sentence was altered as follows : "... murder in the 
second degree shall suffer ( Penalty 2A:113-4-2) . " 

2A: 113-5 

This statute vjas altered as follows : "... crime of manslaughter 
shall be punished by ( Penalty 2A:113-5-l) • " 

A footnote defining manslaughter was also added. 

2A: 113-6 

This statute was altered as follotvs: "... kidnapping, murder, 
rape, robbery or sodomy, (shall suffer Penalty 2A; 113-6-1) ." 

2A: 113-7 

emitted. This statute pertains to attempted honicides. 

2A: 113-8 

Quitted. This statute pertains to a criire other than homicides. 

2A: 113-9 

This statute was altered as follows : "... rights or safety of 
others , is (punishable by Penalty 2A: 113-9-1) . " 

New York ( McKinney ' s Consolidated Laws of New York, Book 39, Title A, 

Section 125.00 - Section 125.60). 
125.00 
125.05 



165 



125.10 

The last sentoice was altered to read: "Criminally negligent 
hcmicide is (punishable by Penalty 125.10-1) . " 

125.15 

The last sentence was altered to read: "Manslaughter in the 
second degree is (punishable by Penalty 125.15-1) . " 

125.20 

The last sentence was altered to read: "Manslaughter in the 
first degree is (punishable by Penalty 125.20-1) . " 

125.25 

The last sentence was altered to read: "Murder is punishable 
by Penalty 125.25-1) . " • ' 

125.30 - 125.35 

Quitted. These statutes pertain to administrative matters. 

125.40 - 125.60 

emitted. These statutes pertain to abortions. 

Ohio ( Ohio Revised Code Annotated , Title 29, Section 2901.01 - 

Section 2901.10) . 
2901.01 

The second sentence was altered as follows : "... murder in the 
first degree and shall be punished by (Penalty 2901.01-1) . " 

The third sentence was omitted because it further described the 
penalty. 



166 



2901.02 

The last sentence was altered to read: "Whoever violates this 
section is (punishable by Penalty 2901.02-1) . " 

2901.03 

The second paragraph was altered as follows: "I'Jhoever violates 
this section is (punishable by Penalty 2901.03-1 ) . I^Jhoever being . . . 
together to violate this section, shall be (punished by Penalty 
2901.03-2) . " 

2901.04 

The second sentence was altered to read: "Whoever violates this 
section is (punishable by Penalty 2901.04-1) . " 

2901.05 

This statute was altered as follavs : "... guilty of murder in 
the second degree and shall be (punished by Penalty 2901.05-1) . " 

2901.06 

This statute was altered as follows : " guilty of manslaughter 

in the first degree, and shall be (punished by Penalty 2901.06-1) ." 

A footnote defining .manslaughter was also added. 

2901.07 

The last sentence was altered as follows : "... contributes di- 
rectly to the death of any person, shall be (punished by Penalty 
2901.07-1)." 



167 



2901.08 

Quitted. Ihis statute pertains to offenses other than hcmicide. 

2901.09 

The last paragraph was altered to read: "Whoever violates this 
section shall be pmished by ( Penalty 2901.09-1) if such attenpt 
results in the death of the person upon whan it is made." 

2901.10 

Ihe last sentence was altered as follows : "... upon whom it is 
made, shall be punished by ( Penalty 2901.10-1) ." 

Oklahona ( Oklahoma Statutes Annotated , Title 21, Section 691 - 

Section 733) . 
691 
692 
693 
694 



695 

emitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 
701 

The following was added as the last sentence. "Every person con- 
victed of murder shall be punished by Penalty 701-1 . " 
702 

emitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 
703 



158 



704 
705 
706 

This statute was altered as follows : "... and every second 
engaged in such duel, is punishable by Penalty 706-1 ) . 

707 

Quitted. This statute had been incorporated into earlier 
ones in adding references to the penalty for murder. 

711 

The following was added as the last sentence. "Every person • 
guilty of manslaughter in the first degree is punishable by Penalty 
711-1." 

712 

This statute was altered as follows : "... which produces the 
death of such other person, is (punishable by Penalty 712-1) ." 

713 

This statute was altered as follows : "... not prohibited in 
the next following section, is (pionishable by Penalty 713-1) ." 

714 

Qnitted. This statute pertains to abortions. 
715 

Ouitted. This statute had been incorporated into earlier ones 
in adding references to the penalty for manslaughter in the first degree. 



169 



716 

The following were added as the last words: "... and pijnishable 
by Penalty 716-1 . " 

A footnote defining manslaughter was also added. 

717 

This statute was altered as follows: "... to avoid such aniinal, 
the owner is (punishable by Penalty 717-1) . " 

718 

This statute was altered as follows : "... human being is drowned 
or otherwise killed, is (punishable by Penalty 718-1 ) ." 

719 

This statute was altered as follows : "... bursting or breaking 
any person is killed, is (punishable by Penalty 719-1) ." 

720 

This statute was altered as follavs : "... death of a human being 
is produced, is (punishable by Penalty 720-1) ." 

721 

This statute was altered as follows : "... occurs whereby any 
human being is killed is (punishable by Penalty 721-1) . " 

722 

emitted. This statute had been incorporated into earlier ones 
in adding references to the penalty for manslaughter in the second 
degree . 



170 



731 

This statute was altered as follows: "Honicide is excusable (and 
punishable by Penalty 731-1) in the following cases ... . " 

732 

This statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is justifiable 
(and punishable by Penalty 732-1 ) when canmitted by . . . . " 

733 

This statute was altered as follows: "Hcmicide is also justifi- 
able (and punishable by Penalty 733-1) when ccmnitted by . . . . " 

Oregon ( Oregon Revised Statutes , Title 16, Section 163.010 - 

Section 163,140) . 
163.010 

Paragraph (3) was altered as follows: "... murder in the first 
degree sliall be punished by ( Penalty 163.010-1) . " 

163.020 

Paragraph (4) was altered as follows" "... murder in the second 
degree sliall be punished by ( Penalty 163.020-1) . " 

163.040 

The folla/7ing was added as the last sentence: "(4) Every person 
convicted of manslaughter shall be punished by Penalty 163.040-1 . " 

163.050 

Qnitted. This statute pertains to sioicide. 

163.070 

This statute was altered as follows : "... which produces the 
death of such person, is (punishable by Penalty 163.070-1) ." 



171 



163.080 

Quitted. This statute had been incorporated into earlier ones 
in adding references to the penalty for manslaughter. 

163.091 

This statute was altered as follows : "... guilty of negligent 
homicide, and, upon conviction, shall be punished by Penalty 163.091-1) ." 

163.100 

This statute was altered as follows: "The killing of a human being 
is justifiable (and punisliable by Penalty 163.100-1) v^en ccsrmitted . . . ." 

163.110 

This statute was altered as follows: "The killing of a human being 
is excusable (and punishable by Penalty 163.110-1) when carmitted. . . ." 

163.120 

Qnitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 

163.130 

Qnitted. Tliis statute pertains to evidence and administrative pro- 
cedures . 

163.140 

Qnitted. This statute describes adndnistrative procedures. 

Rhode Island ( General Laws of Rhode Island , Title 11, Section 11-23-1 

Through Section 11-23-4) . 
11-23-1 



172 



11-23-2 

This statute was altered as follows : " unless he shall then 

be ■under sentence of imprisonment for life, shall be (punished by 
Penalty 11-23-2-1) . Every person . . . second degree shall be (punished 
by Penalty 11-23-2-2) . Every person . . . under sentence of irrprison- 
ment for life shall be (punished by Penalty 11-23-2-3 ) . " 

11-23-3 

This statute was altered as follows : "... canmit manslaughter 
shall be (punished by Penalty 11-23-3-1) . " 

A footnote defining manslaughter was also added. 

11-23-4 



emitted. This statute describes administrative matters. 

South Dakota ( South DaJcota Ccnpiled Laws 1967 , Title 22 , Section 22-16-1 

Through Section 22-16-39) . 
22-16-1 
22-16-2 



22-16-3 



emitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 

22-16-4 

This statute was altered as follows: "Hcxnicide is murder (and 
punishable by Penalty 22-16-4-1) when perpetrated without ... . " 

22-16-5 
22-16-6 



173 



22-16-7 

Thj_s statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is inurder (and 
punishable by Penalty 22-16-7-1) when perpetrated by any' act . " 

22-16-8 
22-16-9 

This statute was altered as follows: "Honiicide is murder (and 
punishable by Penalty 22-16-9-1) when perpetrated without. . . ." 

22-16-10 

This statute was altered as follows : "... in such duel , is guilty 
of murder ( ... ) , may be prosecuted in any county in the state ( , and 
shall be punished by Penalty 22-16-10-1) . " 

22-16-11 

The following was added as the last sentence: "Every person con- 
victed of violating any provision of this section shall be punished by 
Penalty 22-16-11-1) . " 

22-16-12 

Quitted. This statute had been incorporated into earlier on® in 
adding references to the penalty for murder. 

22-16-13 and 22-16-14 

Omitted. These statutes describe administrative procedures. 

22-16-15 

The following was added as the last sentence. "Any person con- 
victed of violating any provision of this section shall be punished by 
Penalty 22-16-15-1) . " 



174 



22-16-16 

This statute was altered as follows: "HOTiicide is (punishable 
by Penalty 22-16-16-1) \*ien perpetrated without. ..." 

22-16-17 

This statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is (punishable by 
Penalty 22-16-17-1) when perpetrated unnecessarily... ." 

22-16-18 

emitted. This statute pertains to abortions. 

22- 16-19 

Quitted. This statute had been incorporated into earlier ones in 
adding references to the penalty for manslaughter in the first degree. 

22-16-20 

The follov/ing vjere added as the last words of the statute : "... 
and punishable by Penalty 22-16-20-1 . " 

A footnote defining manslaughter was also added. 

22-16-21 

This statute v;as altered as follows : "... manner and thereby 
causes a human being to be killed, is (punishable by Penalty 22-16-21-1) ." 

22-16-22 ■ 

This statute was altered as follows : "... bursting or breaking 
any person is killed, is (punishable by Penalty 22-16-22-1) ." 



175 



22-16-23 

This statute was altered as follows : "... human being is 
drowned or otherwise killed, is (punishable by Penalty 22-16-23-1) . " 

22-16-24 

This statute was altered as follows : " — whereby the death 
of a human being is produced, is (punishable by Penalty 22-16-24-1) ." 

22-16-25 

This statute was altered as follows: "... manslaughter in the 
first degree under existing laws , (punishable by Penalty 22-16-25-1) . " 

22-16-26 

This statute was altered as follows : "... which produces the 
death of such other persons , is (punishable by Penalty 22-16-26-1) . " 

22-16-27 

This statute was altered as follows : "... occurs whereby any 
human being is killed, is (punishable by Penalty 22-16-27-1) ." 

22-16-28 

This statute was altered as follows : "... circijmstances permitted 
to avoid such animal , the owner is (punishable by Penalty 22-16-28-1) . " 

22-16-29 

emitted. This statute had been incorporated into earlier ones by 
adding references to the penalty for manslaughter in the second degree. 



176 



22-16-30 

This statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is excusable (and 
punishable by Penalty 22-16-30-1) when corrmitted by. . . ." 

22-16-31 

This statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is excusable (and 
pixiishable by Penalty 22-16-31-1) when committed by . . . . " 

22-16-32 

This statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is justifiable 
(and punishable by Penalty 22-16-32-1) when committed by . " 

22-16-33 

This statute was altered as follows: "Hcaidcide is justifiable 
(and punishable by Penalty 22-16-33-1) when necessarily. . . ." 

22-16-34 



This statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is justifiable 
(and punishable by Penalty 22-16-34-1) when committed by — ." 

22-16-35 

This statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is justifiable 
(and punishable by Penalty 22-16-35-1) when corrmitted by... ." 

22-16-36 through 22-16-39 

emitted. These statutes pertain to suicide. 

Texas ( Vernon's Annotated Penal Code of Texas , Title 15 , Article 1201 

Article 1258) . 
1201 



177 



Texas (Continued) 



1202 



1203 
1204 

1205 
1206 
1207 

The following was added as the last sentence: "Any person com- 
mitting justifiable homicide shall be punished by Penalty 1207-1 ." 

1208 
1209 
1210 
1211 
1212 
1213-1214 

emitted. These statutes pertain to procedural matters. 
1215 
1216 
1217 
1218 
1219 
1220 
1221 
1222 



178 



1223 

emitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 
1224 
1225 



1226 
1227 
1228 

The following was added as the last sentence: "Any person coa- 
rnittijig excusable homicide shall be punished by Penalty 1228-1 . " 
1229 
1230 
1231 
1232 



1233 
1234 
1235 
1236 
1237 ■ 

This statute was altered to read: "Negligent honicide of the 
first degree shall be punished by (Penalty 1237-1) . " 
1238 
1239 
1240 
1241 



179 



1242 

This statute was altered as follows : "... hcynicide ccmnitted in 
the execution of such unlawful act shall be ( Penalty 1242-1) . " 
1243 

This statute was altered as follows: "... penal law, the hcmicide 
resulting therefrom is (punishable by Penalty 1243-1) . " 

1244-1255 

emitted. These statutes had been repealed. 

1256 
1257 

This statute was altered to read: "The punishment for murder 
shall be ( Penalty 1257-1) . " 

1257a 

Omitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 

1257b 

This statute was altered as follows : "... charge to the facts 
in the case and shall instruct the jury that (if) from all the facts 
and circumstances in evidence the jury believes the defendant was 
prompted and acted (without) his malice aforethought, they (can) assess 
tlie punishment at ( Penalty 1257b-l) ; provided, however, that... ." 

1257c 
1258 

emitted. This statute pertains to evidence. 



180 



Utah ( Utah Code Annotated 1953 , Title 76, Section 76-30-1 Through 

Section 76-30-14) . 
76-30-1 
76-30-2 



76-30-3 



A footnote defining murder was added. 

76-30-4 

This statute was altered as follows : "... murder in the first 
degree shall suffer ( Penalty 76-30-4-1) . Every . . . murder in the 
second degree shall be (punished by Penalty 76-30-4-2) . " 

76-30-5 
76-30-6 

This statute was altered to read: "Voluntary manslaughter is 
punishable by (Penalty 76-30-6-1) . (Involuntary manslaughter is 
punishable by Penalty 76-30-6-2) . " 

76-30-7 



Qnitted. This is a statute of limitation. 

76-30-7.4 

This .statute was altered as follows : "... disregard of human life 
or safety, shall be (punished by Penalty 76-30-7.4-1) . A death under. . . 

76-30-8 

This statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is excusable (and 
punishable by Penalty 76-30-8-1) in either of the following cases — . " 



181 



76-30-9 

This statute was altered as follows: "Honicide is justifiable 
(and punishable by Penalty 76-30-9-1 ) v/hen ccmnitted by public ... . " 

76-30-10 

This statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is also justi- 
fiable (and punishable by Penalty 76-30-10-1) v/hen ccjrmitted by any — 

76-30-11 
76-30-12 

emitted. This statute had been incorporated into earlier ones 
in adding references to the penalties for justifiable and excusable 
honicides . 

76-30-13 

emitted. This statute pertains to attempted killing. 

76-30-14 

emitted. This statute pertains to assault. 

Virginia ( Code of Virginia 1950 , Title 18.1, Section 18.1-21 Through 

Section 18.1-26) . 
18.1-21 

A footnote defining murder was added. 

18.1-22 

This statute was altered to read: "Murder of the first degree 
shall be punished (by Penalty 13.1-22-1) . " 



182 



18.1-23 

This statute was altered to read: "Mxirder of the second degree 
shall be punished by ( Penalty 18.1-23-1) . " 

18.1-24 

This statute was altered to read: "Voluntary manslaughter shall 
be punislied by ( Penalty 18.1-24-1) . " 

A footnote defining voluntary manslaughter was also added. 

18.1-25 

This statute was altered to read: "Involuntary manslaughter 
shall be punished by ( Penalty 18.1-25-1) . " 

A footnote defining involuntary manslaughter was also added. 

18.1-26 



Omitted. This statute pe.rtains to administrative matters. 

V7ashington ( Revised Code of Washington Annotated ^ Title 9 , 

Section 9.48.010 - Section 9.48.170). 
9.48.010 
9.48.020 
9.48.030 



The last sentence was altered to read: "r-turder in the first degree 
shall be punishable by ( Penalty 9.48.030-1) . " 

9.48.040 

The last sentence v/as altered to read: "Murder in the second degree 
shall be punished by ( Penalty 9.48.040-1) . " 



183 



9.48.050 

This statute was altered as follows : "... duel out of the state , 
in wiiich any person is killed, shall be (pi:inished by Penalty 
9.48.050-1) ." 

9.48.060 

The last sentence was altered to read: "Manslaughter is punish- 
able by ( Penalty 9.48.060-1) . " 

A footnote defining manslaughter was also added. 

9.48.070 



Tliis statute was altered as follows: "... injury ccrrmitted 
upon the mother of such child, is (punishable by Penalty 9.48.070-1) ." 

9.48.080 

Qnitted. This statute pertains to abortions. 

948.090 

emitted. This statute pertains to abortions, 

9.48.100 

This statute was altered as follows: "... not himself in fault, 
such owner or custodian shall be (punishable by Penalty 9.48.100-1) . " 

9.48.110 

This statute was altered as follows : "... human being shall be 
drowned or otherwise killed, shall be (punished by Penalty 9.48.110-1) ." 



184 



9.48.120 

This statute was altered as follov/s : "... v^ereby the death 
of a hunen being is occasioned, shall be (punished by Penalty 
9.48.120-1) ." 

9.48.130 

This statute was altered as follows: "... design, shall cause 
the death of the latter, shall be (punished by Penalty 9.48.130-1) ." 

9.48.140 

This statute was altered as follows : "... whereby the death 
of a human being is occasioned, shall be (punished by Penalty 
9.48.140-1) . " 

9.48.150 

This statute v/as altered as follows: "Hcmicide is excusable 
(and punishable by Penalty 9.48.150- 1) when camiitted by. . . . " 

9.48.160 

This statute was altered as follovv's: "Hanicide is justifiable 
(and punishable by Penalty 9.48.160-1) viien committed either... ." 

9.48.170 

This statute was altered as follows: "Homicide is also justi- 
fiable (and punishable by Penalty 9.43.170-1) when ccranitted either... ." 



185 



West Virginia ( West Virginia Code ^ Chapter 61, Section 61-2-1 

Through Section 61-2-8) . 
61-2-1 

A footnote defining murder was added to the first paragraph. 

The second paragraph was omitted because it describes procedural 
iratters . 

61-2-2 



This statute was altered as follows : "... first degree shall be 
punished by ( Penalty 61-2-2-1) . " 

61-2-3 

This statute was altered as follows : "... second degree shall 
be punished by ( Penalty 61-2-3-1) . " - • 

61-2-4 

This statute was altered to read: "Voluntary inans laughter shall 
be punished by ( Penalty 61-2-4-1) . " 

A footnote defining voluntary rrenslaughter was also added. 

61-2-5 

This statute v/as altered to read: "Involuntary manslaughter is 
(unlawful) , and any person convicted thereof shall be (punished by 
Penalty 61-2-5-1) . " 

A footnote defining involuntary manslaughter was also added. 



61-2-6 



emitted. This statute pertains to administrative matters. 



186 



61-2-7 

Qnaitted. This statute pertains to attenpted killing or injury. 

61-2-8 



emitted. This statute pertains to abortions. 

VJisconsin ( VJisconsin Statutes Annotated , Title 45, Section 940.01 

Section 940.12) . 
940.01 

The first sentence was altered as follows : "... human being 
with intent to kill that person or another shall be (punished by 
Penalty 940.01-1) . " 

940.02 

This statute v.'as altered as follows: "... depraved mind, re- 
gardless of human life , may be (punished by Penalty 940.02-1) . " 

940.03 

Tliis statute v;as altered as follows : "... consequence of the 
commission of or attenpt to commit the felony, may be (punished by 
Penalty 940.03-1) . " 

940.04 



emitted. This statute pertains to abortions. 
940.05 

This statute was altered as follows : "... death of another human 
being under any of the following circumstances may be (punished by 
Penalty 940.05-1) ... . " 



187 



940.06 

Sentence (1) was altered as follo^-/s: "... death of another 
human being by reckless conduct may be (punished by Penalty 
940.06-1) ." 

940.07 



This statute xvas altered as f oIIovn's : "... which the circum- 
stances may permit to avoid such animal, imy be (punished by Penalty 
940.07-1) . " 

940.08 

Sentence (1) was altered as follows: "... firearm, airgun, 
knife or bow and arrow may be (punished by Penalty 940.08-1) . " 

940.09 



Tills statute was altered as follows : "... the death of another 
may be (punished by Penalty 940.09-1) . No person shall. . . ." 

940.12 

Omitted. This statute pertains to suicide. 

V?yoming ( VJyoming Statutes , Title 6, Section 6-54 Through Section 6-58) 
6-54 

This statute was altered as follows: "... human being, is guilty 
of murder in the first degree and shall (be punished by Penalty 
6-54-1)." 



188 



6-55 

This statute ^vas altered as folla^/s: "... human being, is guilty 
of murder in the second degree, and shall be (punished by Penalty 
6-55-1) . " 

6-56 

This statute was altered as follows: "... other person, whereof 
the person thus injured sliall die, is (punishable by Penalty 6-56-1) . " 

6-57 

This statute was altered as follows : "... whereof the person 
thus injured shall die within this state, is (punishable by Penalty 
6-57-1) ." 

6-58 

This statute was altered as follows : "... neglect or criminal 
carelessness, is guilty of nians laughter, and shall be (punished by 
Penalty 6-58-1) . " 



APPENDIX B 
A SYSTEM FOR CONTENT ANALYZING CRIMINAL LAWS 
FOR THE ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY 

General Instinctions 

1. Use the content analysis system described later to content 
analyze the laws. 

2. Each law generally consists of a number designating it, a 
title, and a text in v>fcLch criminal conduct is described and ■ ■ 
penalties are prescribed. In preparing statutes for content 
analysis, the original penalties v^re removed and replaced by the 
word Penalty and a series of numbers and letters (e.g.. Penalty 
750.05-1) . Following the procedixres, definitions, and criteria 
outlined in the content analysis system, you are to content 
analyze the naterial ccrtprising the laws each tijie you encounter a 
penalty (i.e., the wiord Penalty and a series of numbers and letters. 

3. Content analyze the penalties according to the order of their 
appearance in a booklet of laws. You can return to a penalty if 
you need to; however, atterrpt to analyze the penalties in the order 
of their appearance. 

4. In making decisions about each penalty, use the material provided 
in the booklet of laws in which the penalty is located. This 
material will usually consist of the texts of the statutes. In same 



189 



190 



laws, however, you will find references tx5 footnotes that are located 
on the last pages of each booklet. When you are content analyzing a 
poJTtion of the iraterial and vihen a footnote is referenced in this 
material, consider the content of the footnote to be a paxt of the 
naterial . 

Content Analysis Systen 
1. Read the law imtil you encounter a penalty. For the penalty, 
consider all the inaterial that describes the conduct susceptible 
to the penalty; this material nay involve more than one statute. 
Identify the conduct that is susceptible to the penalty and the 
social harm that is produced by the conduct. 

A. Identify the conduct susceptible to the penalty. 

1) In general, conduct consists of the actions (e.g., 
killing soreone) or failures to act (e.g., not stopping at 
a stop sign) that are described by the law and that are 
susceptible to the penalty. Consider the conduct as it 
is totally described by the law; that is, in identifying 
the conduct, include all the imterial describing it. 



Example 



One statute is stated as follows: "Whoever causes bodily harm 
to another by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that 
person or another may be punislied by Penalty 940.20-1 (Wisconsin 



191 



Statutes Aimotated , Title 45, Section 940,20) ." Ihe conduct 
described by this statute is causing bodily liarm to another person 
by an act perfonned with an intent to cause such Iiann. 

According to one statute: "Any person who, by the operation of 
any vehicle upon any Mghway or upon other property, public or 
private, at an irrraoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless, 
or negligent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly, shall cause the 
death of another, shall be punishable by Penalty 750.324-1 ( Micliigan 
Ccanpiled Laws Annotated , Chapter 750, Section 750.324)." 
The conduct susceptible to this penalty is driving a vehicle either 
at an irrmoderate rate of speed and causing the death of another or 
in a careless, reckless, or negligent fasliion and causing the death 
of another person. 

In the last two examples, acts ^vere proscribed by the laws. In 
this example, a failure to act is described and susceptible to 
penalization: failing to cover an open v^all so as not to be 
dangerous to hurran beings, animals, or fowls. According to this 
statute: "Every person owning or occupying any land on which there 
is a well having a diaineter greater than six inches and which is 
rrore than ten feet deep shall at all tiires keep tlie same covered in 
such a rranner as not to be dangerous to huiran beings, animals or 
fowls. 

"Any person violating tlie provisions of this section slTall be 
punished by Penalty 18.1-74-1 ( Code of Virginia 1950 /Annotat ed, 
Title 18.1, Section 18.1-74)." ~ " 



2) It may appear to you that several different sets of 
actions (or failures to act) can be susceptible to the saim 
penalty. Each of these different sets of actions (or 
failures to act) will be called a form of conduct. Identify 
and distinguish between the forms of conduct that appear 
different to you and that are susceptible to the penalty. 



1 
The example statutes were altered as they would have been for ' 



the content analysis. 



192 



Consider each form of conduct as it is totally described 
by the law. 



Example 

According to one statute: "Every person v*io knowingly sends or 
causes to be sent, or brings or causes to be brought, into this 
state for sale or distribution, or in this state possesses, prepares, 
publishes, or prints, with intent to distribute or to exhibit to 
others, or who offers to distribute, distributes, or exhibits to ' 
others, any obscene natter is punisliable by Penalty 331.2-1 
( West's Annotated California Pesnal Code , Title 9, Section 311.2) ." 
The followxng different forms of conduct are susceptible to the 
same penalty: (1) knowingly sending or causing obscene natter to 
be sent (or knavingly bringing or causing obscene matter to be 
braught) into tlie state for sale or distribution, (2) know±ngly having 
or making (possessing, preparing, publishing, or printing) obscene 
matter in the state with an intent to distribute or exhibit it to ' 
others, (3) offering to distribute, distributing, or exhibiting 
obscene rratter to others. 

Or^ statute provides: "Ary person who, by the operation of any 
vehicle upon any highway or upon other property, public or private, 
at an iirmoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless, or 
negligent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly, shall cause the death 
of another, sliall be punishable by Penalty 750.324-1 ( I^ichigan 
Ccrapiled Laws Annotated , Chapter 750, Section 750.324)." Tlie follow- 
ing two different forms of conduct are susceptible to the same 
penalty: (1) driving a vehicle at an inmoderate rate of speed and 
causing the death of another person and (2) driving a vehicle in a 
manner that could be described as careless, reckless, or negligent 
and causing tlie death of another person. 



B. Identify the social harm. The social harm can be identified 
by inferring the harmful effect or consequence that the 
conduct, susceptible to the penalty, woiold prxxiuce. For 
each penalty, identify the one social harm that any form 
of the conduct susceptible to the penalty would produce. 



193 



Examples 

According to one statute: "Any person, who unlawfully taJ^es any 
won^n against her will, and by menace, force, or dioress, coirpels her 
to marry him or any other person, or to be defiled, or v7ho unlawfully 
talces any vjcmm against her will with the intent to corrpel her by 
menace, force, or duress to marry him or any other person, or to be 
defiled, shall, on conviction, be punished by Penalty 1-1 (Code of 
Mabama, Title 14 , Section 1) . " The social harm produced by~the 
conduct susceptible to Penalty 1-1 is the violation of the rights and 
privileges of womanhood by an actual or atten^ted forced marriage 
or defilerrent. 

One statute provides: "Every person who assaults another with 
intent to conmit murder, is punishable by Penalty 217-1 (West's 
Arjiotate d California Penal Code, Title 8, Section 217)." "The^nduct 
susceptible~to tliis penalty produces the social harm of creating a 
serious apprehension of bodily injury in another person. 



C. Exclude from further analysis any conduct that is not 

susceptible to the penalty. Conduct that is not similar to 
tliat described by the law vrould, of course, be excluded. 
The text of the law may explicitly exesnpt certain conduct 
from susceptibility to the penalty; exclude such conduct 
frcm further analysis. 



Examples 



One statute states: "No person, firm, or corporation shall cut or 
remove or destroy any native growing fruit bearing shrub or tree on 
any native growing timbered lands in the state of North Dalcota, except 
where such land is being cleared for agricultural purposes. Any person, 
firm, or corporation violating any of the provisions of this section 
shall be punished by Penalty 12-41-13-1 ( North Dakota Century Code , 
Title 12, Section 12-41-13)." In further analyzing the conduct des- 
cribed by this statute, do not include conduct consisting of clearing 
land for agricultural purposes. 



194 



Anotier statute provides : "A person who provides , supplies or 
administers to a pregnant \^o:nan, or procures such vranan to take any 
rredicine, drugs, or substance, or uses or employs any instrument or 
other means vte.tever, with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage 
of such voran, unless it is necessary to save her life, shall be 
punished by Penalty 13-211-1 ( Arizona Revised Statutes , Title 13, 
Section 13-211) ." Do not submit to further analysis conduct that 
consists of attanpts to procure a miscarriage to protect the life 
of the pregnant xvcitian. 



2. For each form of conduct, estimate tlie level of the attribution 
of responsUaility that is required for a person to be susceptible 
to the penalty. 

A. Tb nake this estimate, initially assume tliat the descrip- 
tion of each foim of conduct represents both of tvro things. 
First, assume that it represents the description of a person 
vfho is performing "the conduct; tliat is, assume that the 
description of the form of conduct describes the behavior 

of a person. Second, assume that the description comprises 
tlie information that is sxrfficient for the law to attribute 
responsibility to him and to punish him; that is, the 
description represents the info23:H.tion that the law 
requires to be known before it will attribute responsibility 
to him and punish him. 

B. The level of the attribution of responsibility required for 
a person to be susceptible to the penalty consists of the 
level at wiiich the lav/ is attributing responsibility vAien 
the description of tlie conduct comprises the information that 
suffices for the law to attribute responsibility to the person. 



195 



The law may require a lower level of the attribution of 
responsibility. It iray appear logical to you that if more 
information were available to the law, the law would take 
this information into account and, tliereby, attribute respon- 
sibility at a higher level. For example, the law may merely 
describe a form of conduct that does not imply foreseeability, 
intentionality, or justification. If this were the case, 
the law WDuld require the level of coiimission. Even though 
it may appear logical to you tlvat tlit law would consider 
information relevant to foreseeability, intentionality, 
or justification if this information were available and, 
thereby, would attribute responsibility at a higher level, 
the law does not require this information so that the level 
of ccmnission is the required level. 



Example 

Only one form of conduct is described by the following statute. 
This conduct is negligently ijijuring another person. The use of the 
word negligently suggests that the level of foreseeability is required 
for a person to be susceptible to Penalty 1239--1, Even though it may 
seem logiceil tliat a person who intentionally injures another person 
would also be susceptible to a penalty, the level of foreseeability 
is required for tliis conduct. Here is the statute: 

"Negligent injuring is the inflicting of any injury upon tlie 
person of another by criminal negligence. 

"VJhoever conmits the crinne of negligent injuring shall be 
punished by Penalty 1239-1 ( Louisiana Statutes Annotated - Revised 
Statutes, Title 14, Section 39).'' 



196 



3. Classify the conduct according to the one level of the attribution 
of responsibility that is generally required for a person to be 
susceptible to the penalty. 

A. Estimate the level of the attribution of responsibility 
required for each form of the conduct to be susceptible to 
the penalty. 

B. For all fomns of conduct susceptible to the peiialty, then 
classify the conduct according to the one level of the 
attribution of responsibility that is generally required for 
susceptibility. To do this, consider the various forms of 
conduct and the corresponding levels of the attribution of 
responsibility required for susceptibility to the penalty. 
Then classify the conduct according to the one level that is 
iTOst characteristically, coimDnly, frequently, or predomin- 
ately required for a person to be susceptible to. tJne penalty, 
regardless of the particular form of conduct. This most 
characteristically, cormionly, frequently, or predominately 
required level is the level that is generally required 

for susceptibility to the f^nalty. For each penalty, 
record the generally required level. 



Exairples 

Since witli intent to describes all forms of false pretenses 
susceptible to Penalty 713.1-1 in tliis statute, tlie level of 
intentionality is the level that is generally required for a person 



197 



to be susceptible bo it: "If any person designedly and by false 
pretense, or by any privy or false token, and with intent to defraud, 
obtain from another any money, goods, or other property, or so 
obtain the signature of any person to any written instrument, the 
false making of which would be punished as forgery, he shall be 
punished by Penalty 713 . 1-1 {Iowa Code Annotated, Title 35 , Section 
713.1) ." 

One statute provides: "Any person who negligently and carelessly 
sets fire to any Vvooded country or forest belonging to this state 
or the United States within this state, or to any place from wiiich 
fire is conmunicated to any such wooded country or forest, or wiio 
accidently sets fire to any such wDoded country or forest, or to 
any place to wMch fire is ccsmmunicated to any such i^vooded country 
or forest, and does not extinguish the same or use every reasonable 
effort to that end, or v/ho builds ciny fire for lawful purposes or 
otherwise in or near any such vvOoded country or forest, and through 
carelessness or neglect permits said fire to extend to and bum 
through such wooded country or forest, shall be punished by Penalty 
39-514-1; provided that notliing herein contained shall apply to 
any person who in good faith shall set a back fire to prevent the 
spread of a fire already burning ( Tennessee Cede Annotated , Title 
39, Section 39--514) ." 

At least three different forms of conduct can be extracted 
from the conduct susceptible to Penalty 39-514-1: (1) negligently 
and carelessly settijig fire to v.ooded coun-try, (2) accidently 
setting fire to vrooded country, and (3) building a fire and then 
through carelessness or neglect allowing the fire to bum wooded 
country. Because carelessness and negligence describe tvvo of the 
three forms of the conduct (forms numbered 1 and 3) , the level of 
foreseeability is required for these tv?D forms of conduct. Since 
this ].evel is raost frequeiitly required, tlie level of foreseeability 
is tlie level of the attribution of responsibility generally required 
for susceptibility to the penalty. 



C, TwD or more different levels of tlie attributi.on of responsi- 
bility may appear to be equally general. If such a case 
arises, select tlie lowest of these levels as the generally 
required level. 

4. Iti estiirate the level of tlie attitbution of responsibility . 

required for each form of conduct and to classify the conduct 



198 



according to tlie level of the attribution of responsibility generally 
required for suscepti±)ility to the penalty, use the text of the laws, 
"vvords and plirases", and the general nature of the conduct. 

A. Consider tlie entire text of the laws and any referenced 
footnotes diat describe tli.e conduct susceptible to the penalty. 

B. Certain "v.ords Jind phrases" have been identified, and are 
listed later, to represent tliree levels of the attribution 
or responsibility. 

1) If one of these words and plirases describes the conduct 
(or similar I'lOrds and phrases that are not listed but that 

convey the meaning of die particular level) , classify the 
conduct as requiring the level represented by the v»rd or 
phrase as long as the v^ord or phrase does convey the 
ineaning of tlie level and as long as its meaning is not 
altered by other v^rds and phrases in the text of the law. 

2) If tiie text of tlie law does alter the meianing of one of 
tliese vvords and phrases, niake your decisions in terms of 
tlie total text describing the conduct. Attention must be 
directed to one such alteration. Several words and phrases 
may describe the conduct (or a forra of it) , and these vx^rds 
and phrases may represent different levels. The words 
knowingly and intentional ly , for example, rray describe a 
form of conduct. As a general rule, if such words are 
connected by and, classify the conduct according to the 
higher level. If the conduct, for exanple, were "knowingly 
and intentionally receiving stolen property", classify it 



199 



as requiring t±ie level of intentionality. As another 
general rule, if such vsords and phrases are connected by 
the word or, classify it as requiring the lower level. 
If tJie conduct were, for example, "knowingly or intention- 
ally receiving stolen property", classify it as requiring 
tlie level of f oreseeability . 
C. No word or phrase, similar to those listed to represent a 
level of the attribution of responsibility, may describe 
the conduct. If no such x^rord or phrase describes the 
conciuct, classify the conduct at the level of cormaission 
unless you believe tliat the general nature of the conduct 
described is such that sane level other than ccantdssion 
is required and unless the conditions outlined later are 
satisfied . 
5. Use tlie following definitions and criteria to estimate the level 
of the attribution of responsibility required for each form of 
conduct and to classify the conduct according to the level of the 
attribution of responsibility generally required for susceptibility 
to the penalty. 

^' Le'^'^l of Coninission 

1) General definition. Responsibility is attributed at the 
level of conmission if the law describes conduct that is 
perfoinned by a person. The law does not describe conduct 
performed under the conditions of f oreseeability, intention- 
ality, or justification. 



200 



2) Classify the conduct at the level of commission if the 
following conditions are iret (both a and b) : 

a. the law describes conduct; and 

b. the conduct is not described in such a fashion that 
the conditions of f oreseeability , intentionality, or 
justification, as defined later, are satisfied. 



Examples 

Since conduct is described, since no word or phrase representing 
another level of the attribution of responsibility describes the 
conduct, and since I do not believe tliat the descriptions of the 
conduct would allov/ people to infer reliably anotlier level of the 
attribution of responsibility, the level of coiimission is generally 
required for the conduct to be susceptible to tlaeir corresponding 
penalties in each of the following statutes : 

(1) "Mioever uses any automobile, truck or other irotor vehicle ovmed 
by this State for any purpose except in tlie transaction of business 
for the State shall be punished by Penalty 1342-1 ( Vernon ' s Annotated 
Penal Code of Texas, Title 17, Article 1342) ." 

(2) "Any person v,ho shall witliout the consent of the owner or person 
in charge of a rrotor vehicle climb upon or in such vehicle, whether 
the same be in motion or at rest, or sliall ^.viiile said vehicle is at 
rest and unattended attempt to manipulate any of the levers, starting 
crank or other device or to set said vehicle in motion shall be 
punished by Penalty 1343-1 ( Ve.mon ' s Annoteted Penal Code of Texas , 
Title 17, Article 1343) ." 

(3) "All logging and railroad locomotives, dinkey engines and other 
engines and boilers operated or used within two hundred feet of any 
forest, cut-over, brush or grass land, v/nich do not use oil as fuel, 
shall be equipped with efficient appliances or devices to prevent 
the escape of fire and sparks from the STiioke stacks, ash pans and 
fire boxes thereof. Such applicances and devices shall at all tirres 
be kept in proper adjustment and in good repair, and the State 
Forester or his designated agents iray examjjie any loconotive or 
other engine to detennine the condition of said appliances and 
devices. Any person operating any logging or railroad locomotive, 
dinkey engine or other engine or boiler in violation of any provision 



201 



of this article shall be sentenced to Penalty 1329-1 (Vernon's 
Annotated Penal Code of Texas, Title 17, A2rticle 1329)7^* 



B. Level of Foreseeabili ty . 

1) General Definition. Responsibility is attributed at the 
level of foreseeability if the law describes conduct that is 
performed by a person v^o either (1) cxDuld have foreseen or 
did foresee the social harm produced by his conduct or 

(2) could have known or did know factors that partly define 
his conduct. The law does not describe the conduct as 
being performed under the conditions of intentionality or 
justification. 

2) Classify the conduct at the level of foreseeability if 
the following conditions are met (a, b, and c) . 

a. the law describes conduct; and 

b. the law describes the conduct in terms of one of the 
f ollov/ing : 

(1) description of conduct in terras of v,ords and 
phrases representing the level of foreseeability. 
a) words and phrases, like tliose listed below 
(and o'tlier WTords and phrases that are not 
listed but that convey the rreaning of the level 
of foreseeability) , describe the conduct and 
imply that the person (1) could have foreseen 



202 



or did foresee the harmful consequences of his 
conduct or (2) could have known or did !know 
factors that portly define the conduct, 
b) if the text of the law does not alter the 
meanings of these WDrds and phrases so that the 
level of foreseeahility is no longer signified 
by them, classify the conduct at the level of 
foreseeability if these VvOrds and phrases 
describe or define the conduct: 

aid, aiding 

careless, carelessly, carelessness 

oounsel 

had good reason to believe, has good reason 
to believe, has reasonable grounds to believe 

knows, kno\"ffi, knowing, knowingly, with 
knowledge of 

negligence, negligent, negligently, through 
negligence (may be noiified by such words 
as culpable, criminal, or gross) 

reckless, recklessly, through recklessness 

(perfonned) under circumstances likely to 
produce the particular harm 

unreasonable 

wanton, wantonly, wantonness 

(harm is produced) while ccranitting or 
atterrpting to coinnit soire other act that 
is likely to produce the harm of interest or 
v^ch naturally leads to the harm of 
interest 



203 

(harm is produced) ^lile camnittijig sane 
other unlawful act or in the consequence of 
comnitting an unlawful act 

(perfonr^ed) with or without due caution or 
circumspection; without using proper caution 

(2) -nature of conduct inherently includes foreseea- 

bility of consequences. 

a) if "the law does not describe the conduct in 
terms of v»rds and phxases representing the level 
of foreseeability, the general nature of the 
conduct may suggest that most persons perform- 
ing the conduct could foresee that their 
conduct would produce the social harm (the 
conduct's Inarmful effects or consequences) . 

b) if the general nature of the conduct does 

suggest that most persons performing the 

conduct could foresee that their conduct would 

produce the social harm, classify the conduct 

at the level of foreseeability if all of the 
follov/ing conditions are irsit: 

1- you clearly identify a social harm that 
the conduct would bring about; 

2- you believe that most other people 
reading the lav/ vrould independently identify 
the conduct to produce the same social harm 
as you do; 

3- you believe that rrost persons perfojmiing 

the conduct cou].d ordinarily foresee that 



204 



their cxDnduct would produce this social 
harm (i.e., you believe that conduct of this 
general nature — not a specific instance of 
it — would generally be performed under the 
conditions of foreseeability) ; 
4- you believe that most other people 
reading the law \vould also believe that 
most people performing the conduct could ' ■ 
ordinarily foresee that their conduct would 
produce this social harm. 
(3) the conduct is described by vrards and phrases 
representing the level of intentional ity as defined 
later. Tlie person is susceptible to the penalty, 
however, for a particular harmful effect of the 
conduct which is not itself described by the words 
and phrases representing the level of intentionality 
and which is more of a foreseeable but unintended 
consequence than an intended consequence, 
c. and ; the conduct is not described in such a fashion 
that the conditions of intentionality or justifica- 
tion, as defined later, are satisfied. 



Exarrples 

Because all forms of "the conduct in the statute that follows are 
modified by the v»rd knowing , the level of foreseeability is generally 



205 



required for susceptibility to the following penalty: "Any person 
beiag irarried who shall narry another person, the lawful husband 
or wife being alive, and taiowing that such lawful husband or wife 
is living, shall be punished by Penalty 26-5602-1 ( Georgia Code 
Annotated, TitJ.e 26, Section 26-5602)." 

The conduct in the following statute is not described in terms 
of words and plu-ases dnat represent the level of foreseeability. The 
general nature of tlie conduct, ho^vever, seems to require this level: 
"Any person who sh^ll place or throw glass or other dangerous 
pointed or edged substances in or on any beach or waters adjacent 
thereto, highway, or v.'alk or on public property witliin 50 feet of a 
public highway, shall be punishable by Penalty 750.493a-l ( Michigan 
Compiled Laws Annotated, Chapter 750, Section 750.493a)." 

In the follo\';ng statute, the conduct susceptible to Penalty 
1335-1 generally requires id'ie level of intentioiiality since it is 
descrH^ed in terms of wilfully . To be susceptible to Penalty 1335-2, 
this conduct must lead to the death of another person. If a 
death v;ere produced by the wilfull injury of the railroad tracks, 
the death would appear to be an unintended but foreseeable 
consequence rroreso than an intended consequence. Susceptibility to 
Penalty 1335-2, thus, seenis to generally require the level of 
foreseeability. Here is the statute: "If any person shall mlfully 
place any obstXLiction upon tlie track of any railroad, or remove 
any rail therefrom, or displace or interfere with any switch 
thereof, or in any way injure such read, or do any dairage to any 
railroad, locomotive, tender or car v/nereby the life of any person 
might be endangered, b.e sliall be punished by Penalty 1335-1. If 
the life of any person is lost by such act the offender is guilty 
of murder and punishahle by Penalty 1335-2 ( Vernon ' s Annotated 
Penal Code of Texas, Title 17, Article 1335) ." 



Level of Intentionality . 

1) General definition. Responsibility is attributed at 
the level of intentionality if the law describes conduct 
that is perforrred by a person who either (1) intended to 
produce the specific barm of his conduct, or (2) intended 
to produce a social harm similar to the one that he 
produced, or (3) performed the conduct along with an 



206 



intent to accoiplish sane other harm that is explicitly- 
stated by the law. 

2) Classify the conduct at the level of intentionality 
if the following conditions are inet (a, b, and c) : 

a. the law describes conduct; and 

b. the law eitlier (1) describes the conduct in terms 

of vrords and phrases representing the level of intention- 
ality or (2) describes conduct of a nature that you 
perceive to inherently include intentionality of 
consequences . 

(1) description of conduct in terms of words and 
phrases representing the level of intentionality. 
a) ;vDrds and phrases, similar to those listed 
later (and other words and phrases that are 
not listed but that convey the meaning of the 
level of intentionality) , describe the conduct 
and imply that the person (1) intended to pro- 
duce the particular harmful consequences of his 
conduct, (2) intended to produce harmful conse- 
quences similar to those that his conduct 
produced, or (3) perfonr^xi the conduct along 
wi-lJi an intent to accoiplish seme other harm 
that is explicitly stated by the law. 



207 



b) if the text of the law does not alter the 
meanings of these v.ords and phrases so that 

they no longer signify the level of intention- 

ality as defined here, classify the conduct 

at the level of intentionality if these words 

and phrases describe or define the conduct: 

calculated to (produce) 

conspiracy, conspire 

defraud 

deliberate, deliberately, with 
deliberation 

designed, designedly, by design, with 
design of 

false pretenses 

forcibly 

forcibly and against another person's 
will 

fraud, fraudulent, fraudulently 

intentionally, v/ith intent to (of) , 
with the ijitention of, with a specific 
intent 

lying in wait 

premeditated, -through premeditation 

purposely, with purpose of, for purpose 
of 

v/ilful (willful) , wilfully (willfully) 



208 



with a depraved mind r-egardless of the 
social welfare of others 

(2) nature of aDnduc± inherently includes inten- 
tional consequences. 

a) if the law does not describe the conduct in 
terms of v/ords and phrases that irepresent the 
level of intentionality, the general nature of 
the conduct may suggest that most persons per- 
forming the conduct would intend the social harm 
(the haimful consequences) produced by it . 

b) if the description of "the conduct does suggest 
that most persons performing the conduct v^ould 
intend the social harm, classify the conduct at 
the level of intentionality if all of the 
folla.'/ing conditions are satisfied: 

1- you clearly identify a social harm that 
the conduct would bring about; 

2- you believe that icost otlier people read- 
ing the lav/ would independently identify 
the conduct to produce the same social harm 
as you do; 

3- you believe that rrost persons performing 
the conduct woiild ordinarily foresee this 
social harm and would ordinarily intend to 
produce it (i.e., you believe that conduct 



209 



of this general nature — ^not a specific 
instance of it — would generally be performed 
under the conditions of intentionality) ; 
4~ you believe that most other people reading 
the law V/Ould also infer tliat voost persons ■ 
^^erfomiing -the conduct \\oi.ild ordinarily 
foresee this social iTarm and would ordinarily 
intend to produce it. 
c. and ; the conduct is not described in such a fashion 
that the conditions of the level of justification, as 
defined later, are satisfied. 

Examples 

Tiie following statute describes conduct that generally requires 
the level of in.tentionality because all forms of the conduct are 
described by the v.ord w ilfully : "Mioever wilfully bums any bridge 
vhich by law or usage is a public highvsy shall be sentenced to 
Penalty 1320-1 ( Vernon ' s Annotated Penal Code of Texas , Title 17, 
Article 1320) ." 

Tlie follov/ing statute describes conduct that generally requires 
the level of intentionality Joecause all forms of tlie conduct are per- 
forrred along v/itii an intent to accomplish soma other harm (in this 
case defrauding a nev/sboy) that is stated by the law: "Any person who 
obtains newspapers from persons under eighteen (18) years of age 
engaged in selling newspapers at retail, without paying therefor, 
with intent to defraud such a person selling newspa^^rs sh^ll be 
punished by Penalty 10-2122-1 ( Bum's Indiana Statutes Annotated , 
Title 10, Section 10-2122)." 

Although no word or phrase representing the level of intentionality 
describes the conduct susceptible to Penalty 10-2115-1, tlriis conduct 
seems inherently to require the level of intentionality. This 
conduct is described in the following statute: "Whoever represents 
or advertises himself by poster, circular letter or in any other 



210 



nmmer, as the agent of any fictitious or spurious insuraiice corpany 
which xs not possessed of the capital and assets required by the laws 
o± this state shall, on conviction, be punished by Penalty 10-2115-1 
( B-om's Indiana Statutes Annotated , Title 10, Section 10-2115) ." 



^* ^^^1 of Justification 

1) General definition. Responsibility is attrJJDUted at the 
level of justification if the law descrUoes conduct that is 
performed by a person under any of the conditions of 
comdssion, foreseeability, or intentionality, as descrited 
earlier. The law additionally describes tlie psrfomance of 
the conduct in terms of factors, like the follov/ing ones, 
that v7ould attenuate the amoiont of responsibility attri- 
buted to the person: (1) the person perfoiToing the conduct 
is influenced by circumstances that would affect other 
ordinarily reasonable persons so that tliey too would be more 
likely to perform the conduct, or (2) the person is 
described as having personal characteristics -that vTould 
reduce his capacity to formulate and/or control the intentions 
of an ordinarily reasonable person. 

2) Classify the conduct at the level of justification if the 
following conditions are satisfied (a and b) : 

a. the law describes conduct. The conduct can be 
performed at any of the levels of corrmission, foreseeabil- 
ity, or intentionality, as defined earlier; and 

b. the law additionally describes the conduct in terms' 



211 



of factors that you perceive Vvould attenuate the airount 
of responsibility attributed to the performer of the 
conduct . 

(1) describing tlie conduct in terms of factors, 
lilce tlie following ones, would attenuate the amount 
of responsibility attributed: (a) the person 
perforired the conduct under circumstances that you 
perceive would increase the likelihjood that irost 
ordinarily reasonable persons would also perform 
the conduct; or (b) the person who performed the 
conduct is described as having personal characteris- 
tics that would reduce his capacity to formulate 
and/or control the intentions of an ordinarily 
reasonable person. 

(2) if these words and phrases (and otlier words and 
phrases that are not listed but that convey the 
meaning of tlie level of justification—see later) 
describe the conduct and if the n^anings of these 
words and phrases are not altered by the text of 
the ].av; so that a different level of the attri- 
bution of responsibility is signified, classify 
the conduct at the level of justification: 

coerced by soneone (or his threats) , 
under duress, iopelled by someone 
(or his threats) 



212 



excuse, excused 

insanity, niental illness 

in the (exercise of tlie privilege of) 
preventing a felony, to prevent a felony 

in the (exercise of the privilege of) 
defense of others, in the defense of 
another 

in tlie heat, in tlie heat of passion, in 
the sudden heat of passion ■ - 

iavoluntary drunkenness, involuntary 
intoxication 

under provocation, under sudden 
provocation 

under the pressure of natural physical 
forces, due to necessity 

(3) other ^vords and plirases, tliat describe the 

conduct, could suggest justifying conditions to 

you. Use these additional vords and plirases to 

classify the conduct at the level of justification 

if all of the follo\^7ing are satisfied: 

a) you would attribute less responsibility to 
the person who perforrred the conduct under the 
influence of the conditions, represented by 
the vrords and phrases, than to the person vAx3 
performed the conduct and was not influenced by 
these conditions; 

b) you believe that most other people reading 
the law wDiiLd also attribute a smaller aniount 



213 



of responsibility to the person who performed 
the conduct under the influence of the conditions 
than to the person who performed the conduct 
and was not influenced by than. 



Exanple 

Tlie conduct susceptible to Penalty 940.05-1 in the following 
statute generally requires the level of justification: 

"Whoever causes the death of another human being under any of 
the following circumstances may be punished by Penalty 940.05-1: 

(1) Without intent to kill 6md while in the heat of passion; or 

(2) Unnecessarily, in the exercise of his privilege of self- 
defense of others or the privilege to prevent or terminate tlie 
canmission of felony; or 

(3) Because such person is coerced by threats wade by someone 
other than his co-conspirator and which cause him reasonably to 
believe tliat his act is the only means of preventing iimiinent death 
to liimself or another; or 

(4) Because the pressure of natural physical forces causes such 
person reasonably to believe tliat his act is the only means of pre- 
venting iirruinent public disaster or ijiininent death to himself or 
anotlier ( Wiscons in Statutes Annotated, Title 45, 940.05)." ■ 



APPENDIX C 

INSTRUCTIONS USED IN SELECTING CRITERIA 

WORDS StCi PHRASES FOR COInTIENT ANALYSIS SYSTE-I 

Consider each of the follovv^ing sets of words and phrases as they 
are defined. Suppose a set of words and phrases were used exclusively 
to describe conduct associated with a person; furthermore, suppose 
that the conduct is a crime. If responsibility were attributed to 
the person for this conduct, at what level would you generally perceive 
that the responsibility is being attributed? That is, if responsibility 
were attributed to a person for conduct described by the set of words 
and phrases, what level of the attribution of responsibility does the 
set of words and phrases suggest to you in general? 

Choose only one of tliese levels: camussion, foreseeability, 
intentionality , or justification. iMake your selection in accordance 
with these definitions of the levels. 

Level of Ccmni ssion. The set of words and phrases generally describes 
conduct that could be performed . The conduct described by the set of 
\'vords and phrases does not generally inply foreseeability, intention- 
ality, or justification, as defined later. 

Level of Foreseeability . The set of v/ords and phrases generally iirplies 
that (a) the person does or could foresee the consequences of his conduct 
or tliat (b) the person does or could know facts that partly describe 
the conduct. The conduct descriJ^ed by these v/ords and phrases would not 
generally imply intentionality or justification, as defined later. 

Level of Intenti onality. The set of words and phrases generally implies 
tliat the person performing tlie conduct intended the consequences of the 
conduct. The conduct described by the set of words and phrases would 
not generally imply the level of justification, as defined later. 

Level of Justification . The set of words and phrases describes factors 
that would attenuate the aiiraunt of responsibility attributed to the 
person. These factors can be (a) circumstances that would influence 
the person performing the conduct and tliat would affect other ordinarily 
reasonable people so that they would be more likely to perform the conduct 
too, (b) personal characteristics that would reduce the person's capacity 
to formulate and/or control the intentions of an ordinarily reasonable 
person, or (c) any other factor that would reduce the amount of responsi- 
bility that you would attribute to the person. 



214 ! 



. «!J».*rtWI 



APPEbDIX D 
MATERIALS USED TO TEST TtlE 
SECOND HYPOTHESIS BY THE FLORIDA STATUTES 

Instructions for Outcome-Seriousn ess Ratings 



As part of a study on the seriousness of crimes, we are interested 
in the perceived seriousness of harmful events. In this questionnaire, 
therefore, several events have been descriloed which some people are 
likely to consider to be harmful to some degree. For each event, we 
want your opinion, and v/e want you to indicate how ser ious you belie ve 
the event to be_ by v/riting a ni:tmber from to 6 in tlie" blank printed 
next to it". 

Here are some examples of the events that you will encounter in 
this questionnaire: (1) "A person is killed;" (2) "Indecent and ob- 
scene language is used in a public place;" (3) "VJhile released on bail, 
a person charged with a misdeameanor fails to appear in court as re- 
quired." A blank space is printed next to each event. For each event, 
you are to wTite in its space a number from to 6 v.hich best represents 
where you would place the event along the following scale: 



1 2 3 4 ~~~~ 5—— g 

(not at all (moderately (extremely 

serious) serious) serious) 

You may believe tliat the event is "not at all serious," that is, that the 
event has no harmful effects and that it is alright for it to occur, if 
you believe this, v.'rite in the space beside the event. On the other 
hand, you may believe that the event is "extremely serious," tliat is, 
that the effects of tlie event are among the most harmful possible; if you 
believe this, va'ite 6 in the space beside the event. If you believe that 
the event lies bete/een these extremes and is "moderately serious," write 
3 in the space beside the event. If you believe that the event is more 
than "not at all serious," but less than "moderately serious," choose the 
number between and 3 that best represents your belief. If you believe 
that the event is more than "mcxlerately serious" but less than "exiiremely 
serious," choose the number between 3 amd 6 tliat best represents your be- 
lief. 



215 



216 



In rating each event, assume that it is camiitted by a person 
who does not have any particular right, permission, or authority to 
comiit it. For exairple, one event is described as follows: "Taking 
cultivated fruit or vegetables valued at $100 or more." Assume that 
this property was taken by a person v^o did not have the right to do 
so. If the event describes a failure to do sonething, make the 
similar assunption that the event should have been cormitted. For 
exaiiple, one event is described as follows: "Failure to assist a 
peace officer in preserving the peace." Iii rating this event, assume 
that the officer should have been assisted. Finally, assume that the 
event is ccmnitted by any ordinarily reasonable person unless a speci- 
fic type of person is nentioned (as in one of the examples presented 
earlier, a specific type of person — scnieone charged with a mis- 
demeanor — is described as comnitting the event) . Other than these 
assurrptions , rate the events as they are described, and do not take 
into account any extenuating or aggravating circumstances that would 
affect your beliefs about their seriousness. 



If you have no questions, please begin. 



217 



APPENDIX D (Continued) 

Descriptions of Outccmes for Seriousness Ratings* 

Ccinmission 

Carrying a concealed weapon (Note: A weapon means any dirk, nietallic 
knuckles, slingshot, billie, tear gas gun, cheraical device, or other 
deadly instrument; hc^vever, firearms, such as pistols, or ccfimon 
pocket knives are not weapons) (790.01-1). 

3.1 .5 
Manually carrying a pistol or repeating rifle (790.05-1) . 

3.3 ,0S 

A weapon is used in ccnmitting a felony (Note: A weapon means any 
dirk, metallic knuckles, slingshot, billie, tear gas gun, chemical 
device, or otlier deadly instrument; however, firearms, such as pistols, 
or corraon pocket knives are not weapons) (790.07--1) . 

5.0 5.0 

Carrying a gun or other firearm in a national forest (790.14-1) . 

2.6 .5 

Possessing a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or a machine 
gun (790.221-1). 

4.6 5.0 

A firearm or concealed weapon is in the possession of a person con- 
victed of a felony (790.23-1) . 

3.2 20.0 



* The descriptions of the outccmes are organized according to the levels 

of causality that they represented. The number placed at the end of 
each description is the coded penalty number; it can be used to identify 
the statute from which the outcome description was taken. Beneath each 
description are two sets of numlDers. The one at the left is the median 
seriousness rating of the outccme. The one at the right is the maximum 
penalty (in years) prescribed for the outccme. 



218 



Failure to keep records of the sales and purchases of secondhand 
goods by a dealer (811.155-1). 

2.0 1.0 

Someone's vehicle or draught animal (e.g., horse or ox) is tempor- 
arily taken or used (811.21-1) . 

3.1 .5 

Cattle are driven a distance of 10 miles or itore frcm their proper 
location (811.23-1). 

2.6 3.0 

Failure to keep sales records and work orders for tropical and semi- 
tropical friait by a dealer (811.271-1) . 

2.4 ,5 

A bonfire is made within 165 feet of a house (823.02-1) . 

2.9 .08 

The carcass of a dorestic animal is improperly disposed of (823.041-1) 

2.0 .5 

The duties of a public office are performed by someone before he has 
met the legal qualifications of the office (839.18-1). 

2.8 .25 

Profane, vulgar, and indecent language is used in a public place 
(847.04-1). 

1.2 .16 

Indecent and obscene language is used in a public place (847.05-1) . 

.9 .08 

Being drunk frcm alcohol or drugs (856.01-1) . 
1.4 .25 



219 



Being a vagrant (856.03-1). 

.6 .5 

An automobile is driven by an intoxicated person (860.01-1) . 

3.9 1.0 

A person perforrris his duties on a train or other public carrier while 
intoxicated (860.03-1) . 

3.6 . .25 

A train is boarded while it is in motion (860.06-1) . 

1.6 .08 

Failure by a dealer to keep records of the purchases of automobile 
parts \-dien these purchases ai-e made from people who are not regular 
dealers in automobile parts (860.14-1). 

3.0 .5 

A syrup is sold that is a mixture of different ingredients without 
having labeled its container with both the percentages of the dif- 
ferent ingredients and the address of its manufacturer (865.07-1) . 

3.6 .5 

Cotton or leaf tobacco is brought without having evidence that the 
producer has parted with his interest d_n it (865.08-1) . 

2.1 .5 

There is a fight between two people in a public place (870.01-1) . 

2.1 1.0 

The idea is advocated that the constitutional govemiient should be 
overthro^-m by force or violence (876.021) . 

3.4 10.0 

A mask is worn that covers a person ' s face and conceals his identity 
(876.12-1). 

.4 .25 



220 



A mask is worn that covers a person's face and conceals his identity 
(876.14-1). 

.4 .25 

A iTBeting is held on someone else ' s property by a person who wears a 
mask that covers his face and conceals his identity (876.15-1). 

2.2 .25 

A burning or flanu-ng cross is placed in a public place (876.17-1) . 

2.7 .25 

A burning or flaming cross is placed on saneone else's property 
(876.18-1). 

3.9 .25 

Forseeability 

A person is killed (782.11-1) . 

5.9 20.0 

A person is procla.iired to be a coward (783.03-1) . 

.2 .5 

A weapon or fireana is displayed in a inade, angry, or threatening 
manner (790.10-1). 

4.4 1.0 

A firearm or dangerous weapon (other than an ordinary pocket knife) is 
furnished to a minor or to a person of unsound mind (790.17-1) . 

5.0 .25 

A firearm or dangerous weapon (otiier than an ordinary pocket knife) is 
sold to a minor by a dealer (790.18-1) . 

3.9 .5 

A lewd or indecent act (not rape) is coninitted toward a child under 
14 years old (800.04-1). 

4.9 10.0 



221 



A shopping cart is removed from the premises of a grocery store 
(811.29-1). 

1.5 .05 

Failure of an auctioneer to make a complete statement of his sales 
(839.01-1) . 

2.6 .5 

Failure to pay public money into the state treasury by a receiver 
of such money (839.02-1) . 

4.3 1.0 

Certificates according to v^ich money is to be paid out of p\±)lic funds 
are bought by a county officer (839.04-1) . 

2.8 .5 

Failure by a judge to file the records belonging to his office upon 
resigning from office (839.15-1) . 

3.2 1.0 

A bail which is insufficient is accepted (839.23-1) . 

1.5 .08 

Failure to assist a peace officer in preserving the peace (843.06-1) . 

2.2 .08 

An inmate is aided in escaping from a correctional institution for boys 
or girls (843.13-1) . 

3.8 .25 

Visiting aii opia^i den as a customer (346.05-1) . 

2.6 .5 

Obscene literature is trajisported into the state so that it can be 
sold or distributed (847.06-1). 

1.2 1.0 



222 



A house is rented to a person who uses it for gambling (849.03-1) . 

1.9 3.0 

Possessing a lottery ticket or an advertisement of a lottery (849.09-4). 

.2 1.0 

Lottery tickets or advertisements of a lottery are printed (849.10-1) . 

.3 5.0 

The outcome of a contest of skill, speed, power, or enduramce is 
gambled on (849.14-1). 

.5 .5 

Possessing paraphernalia (not including ordinary dice or playing cards) 
ccmmonly used in gambline (849.233-1). 

.4 1.0 

Failure to leave a race track after having been ordered to do so because 
of illegal bookmaking activities (849.24-3). 

2.8 .25 

A person is killed (860.01-3). 

5.9 20.0 

A duplicate key for a switch lock of a railroad is given away without 
having the autliority to do so (860.10-1) . 

3.9 .25 

Railroad tracks are obstructed by injuring a bridge of the railroad ■ 
company or by driving cattle onto the tracks (860.11-1) . 

4.0 10.0 

An aircraft is operated in a manner tliat endangers the life or property 
of another person (860.13-1). 

5.3 .5 



223 



The cxxnmander of a ship discharges a disabled sailor or a pauper with- 
out having provided for his maintenance (862.03-1). 

3.3 .16 

A business is operated under a trade name that is neither the proper 
nane nor the kno^vn called narme of the businessman (865.09-1) . 

2.9 .16 

A riot is caused or participated in (870.01-2) . 

2.9 2.0 

Failure to assist a peace officer in suppressing a riot (870.04-1) . 

1.9 2.0 

Intentionality 

The death of a child is concealed v;hich prevents knowledge of whether 
the child was bom alive or dead (782.16-1) . 

4.2 1.0 

There is a threat that an explosive bcmb, grenade, poison gas bcmb, or 
other destructive device will be discharged (790.162-1). 

4.7 20.0 

A false report is made about the planting of a baib (790.163-1) . 

3.6 10.0 

An explosive barb or other deadly missile is thrown into a building, 
vehicle, boat, or aircraft (790.19-1). 

5.9 10.0 

Failure to report the treatrrent of a gunshot wound to the proper authori- 
ties by the treating physician or nurse (790.24-1) . 

2.8 .5 

A dwelling house or a part of it is burned (806.01-1) . 

4.4 20.0 



224 



Flarnmable or explosive materials are placed in a building in such a 
fashion that the building could be burned (806.05-1) . 

4.9 10.0 

Property insured against damage by fire is burned in such a fashion 
that the insurance may be collected (805.06-1) . 

4.0 5.0 

A building erected for public use; a factory; or a bam, shop, or 
office in the yard of a dwelling house is burned during the night- 
tiirs (806.07-1). 

4.9 20.0 

Iferchandise is taken fraii a store without paying for it (811.022-3). 

3.3 5.0 

Hogs are taken from their proper owner (811.14-1) . 

3.3 5.0 

A dog valued at $100 or more is taken from its a.vner (811.19-1) . 

3.2 5.0 

Cultivated fruit or vegetables valued at $100 or more are taken 
(811.27-1). 

3.1 5.0 

Cultivated fruit or vegetables valued at less than $100 are taken 
(811,27-2). 

2.5 1.0 

After it had been entrusted to him, a person conceals property valued 
at $100 or more in such a fashion that it could be misused (812.02-1) 

3.2 5.0 

A depositor is deprived of property valued at $100 or nore that had 
been entrusted to and misused by a banker (812.05-1) . 

3.8 5.0 



225 



A security for a loan, is lost because it was misused by the person to 
whom it had been entrusted (812.09-1) . 

3.4 5.0 

Misuse of the f-unds of a bank by the receiver of such funds (812.12-1) 

3.7 10.0 

A gift is given to a public officer whose official actions could be 
influenced by it (838.01-1) . 

3.8 5.0 

A gift is given to a court officer \N^ose official actions could be in- 
fluenced by it ( 838.0 3-1) . 

3.9 5.0 

A gift is accepted by a sheriff whose official actions could be af- 
fected by it (838.05-1). 

3.8 .25 

A gift is given to a public officer whose official actions could be 
influenced by it (838.09-1). 

3.8 5.0 

A candidate for an elective public office is given a gift which could 
influence his actions on a matter that will cone before him in his 
official capacity (838.10-1). 

4.0 5.0 

I^ilure by a public officer to give his successor conplete possession 
of the records belonging to his office (839.14-1) . 

3.8 .5 

Failure by a jailor to receive into his jail a prisoner who has been 
committed to it on a criminal conviction (839.21-1) . 

3.8 ■ 1.0 

I"Jhile released on bail, a person charged with a misdemeanor fails to 
appear in court as required (843.15-2) , 

2.8 1.0 



226 



A distrUDutor of publications does not do business with a dealer unless 
he will also buy obscene literature (847.011-4). 

2.8 5.0 

Railroad tracks are injured {e.g., by having the rails removed from 
them) (860.09-1). 

5.2 20.0 

Vlhen servicing a vehicle, a repairman charges for repairs that were not 
made or for parts that were not provided or were not needed (860.15-1) . 

4.0 .25 

Native grov/ing plants that are rapidly beccming extinct within the 
state are collected (865.06-1). 

3.0 .08 



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Briscoe, M. E. Attribution of responsibility and assignnKnt of 
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Garcia-Esteve, J. , & Shaw, M. E. Rural and urban patterns of re- 
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Gibbons, D. C. Society , crirr^ and criminal careers: An introduction 
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230 



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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 

Trueraan R. Trer.Tble, Jr., was bom January 5, 1946, in Richmond, 
Virginia. In June, 1964, he graduated from Crewe High School. He 
received t±ie degree of Bachelor of Arts in psychology from the 
College of William and Mary in June, 1968. Since September, 1968, 
he has been continuing his education in psychology at the Graduate 
School of the University of Florida. He was awarded the degree of 
Master of Arts in March, 1970. Upon completing his doctoral work, 
he plans to pursue a career in social psychology. 



232 



I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it 
conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully 
adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy. 



// / /y(^~^'^-^^-rj 





Marvin E. Shaw, Chairman 
Professor of Psychology 

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it 
conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully 
adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy. 




^.^ 




Elmer V\f. Bock 

Associate Professor of Sociology 



I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it 
conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully 
adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy. 




C. Mchael Levy, Jr. 
Associate Professor of Psyg 



lology 



I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it 
conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully 
adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy. 




Richard K. McGee 

Associate Professor of Psychology 



I certify that I have read this study and that in rc^ opinion it 
conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully 
adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy. 



Guillermo F. flascaro 

Assistant Professor of Psychology 



This dissertation was submitted to the Department of Psychology in the 
College of Arts & Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was ac- 
cepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy. 

August, 1972 



Dean, Graduate School 



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